abatement hearing in Texas

2025Id. at 877 (noting that the insureds contend there is “no claim to ‘abate’”); see Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1985) (“[S]ustaining a plea in abatement requires that the claim be abated until removal of some impediment.” (emphasis added)); Tex. Highway Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967) (“[A] plea in abatement, if sustained, would require an abatement of the claim or cause of action until some obstacle to its further prosecution was removed.” (emphasis added)).

2021The separation, by the court, of multiple parties’ claims either to permit separate actions on each claim or to allow certain interlocutory orders to become final.”). 16 Bifurcate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. 17 Abatement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY; see Tex. Highway Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967) (“[A] plea in abatement, if sustained, would require an abatement of the claim or cause of action until some obstacle to its further prosecution was removed.”). 18 See ante at 12.

2007In Smith v. State, 858 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, pet. ref'd), we held that a defendant may waive the right to appeal and that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without the consent of the trial court.

2002In Smith v. State, 858 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, pet. ref'd), we held that a defendant may waive the right to appeal and that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without the consent of the trial court.

2008Because Fernandez established the basic elements for an abatement, the Trustees were obligated to refute Fernandez’s abatement evidence or establish an exception to the abatement rule. 6 See Flowers, 406 S.W.2d at 199 (Tex.1966); cf. Hartley *83 v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (providing that if the second court determines that one of the exceptions applies, it may assume dominant jurisdiction and proceed to judgment).

2008Because Fernandez established the basic elements for an abatement, the Trustees were obligated to refute Fernandez’s abatement evidence or establish an exception to the abatement rule.6 See Flowers, 406 S.W.2d at 199 (Tex. 1966); cf. Hartley v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (providing that if the second court determines that one of the exceptions applies, it may assume dominant jurisdiction and proceed to judgment).

2008Because Fernandez established the basic elements for an abatement, the Trustees were obligated to refute Fernandez’s abatement evidence or establish an exception to the abatement rule. 6 See Flowers, 406 S.W.2d at 199 (Tex.1966); cf. Hartley *83 v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (providing that if the second court determines that one of the exceptions applies, it may assume dominant jurisdiction and proceed to judgment).

2008Because Fernandez established the basic elements for an abatement, the Trustees were obligated to refute Fernandez’s abatement evidence or establish an exception to the abatement rule.6 See Flowers, 406 S.W.2d at 199 (Tex. 1966); cf. Hartley v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (providing that if the second court determines that one of the exceptions applies, it may assume dominant jurisdiction and proceed to judgment).

2008See Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 248 .

2008See Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 248 .

2004See Peterson , 117 S.W.3d at 818 ; see also Wead v. State , 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim.

2004See Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 818 ; see also Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). 3 .

2004See Peterson , 117 S.W.3d at 818 ; see also Wead v. State , 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim.

2004See Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 818 ; see also Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). 3 .

1978The result of sustaining a plea in abatement was pointed out in Texas Highway Department v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.Sup.1967), by Chief Justice Calvert, who, speaking for the Court, said: "... [a] plea in abatement, if sustained, would require an abatement of the claim or cause of action until some obstacle to its further prosecution was removed ..." It was observed by Justice Garwood in Kelly v. Bluff Creek Oil Company, 158 Tex. 180 , 309 S.W.2d 208, 214-215 (1958): "... [T]he practice of misnaming a plea in bar in order to procure a preliminary trial as if the plea were one in abat

1978The result of sustaining a plea in abatement was pointed out in Texas Highway Department v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.Sup.1967), by Chief Justice Calvert, who, speaking for the Court, said: "... [a] plea in abatement, if sustained, would require an abatement of the claim or cause of action until some obstacle to its further prosecution was removed ..." It was observed by Justice Garwood in Kelly v. Bluff Creek Oil Company, 158 Tex. 180 , 309 S.W.2d 208, 214-215 (1958): "... [T]he practice of misnaming a plea in bar in order to procure a preliminary trial as if the plea were one in abat

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2022In the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record at most shows that trial counsel had his client’s sign blank pass slips, which trial where a non-English speaking defendant “had an interpreter while he consulted with his attorney about waiving his right to a jury trial and his attorney requested the bench trial in [the defendant’s] presence,” the trial court did not plainly err in failing to conduct a colloquy). 32 Rios, 626 S.W.3d at 414; see Arizona v. Koker, 513 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) (where the appellant was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he did not object to his

2020Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006).

2020Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006).

2009See 2009 Tex. LEXIS 304, at *2-3 .

2009See 2009 Tex. LEXIS 304, at *2-3 . 2 Accordingly, we will also apply rule 7.2 in this case.

2009See Baylor Medical , 280 S.W.3d at 228 ; In re Prudential Ins.

2009See Baylor Medical, 280 S.W.3d at 228 ; In re Prudential Ins.

2007This is a plausible statement that the failure to timely file the notice of appeal was the result of mistake "'even though counsel . . . may appear to have been lacking in that degree of diligence which careful practitioners normally exercise.'" See Dimotsis v. State Farm Lloyds , 966 S.W.2d 657, 657-58 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (quoting Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc. , 774 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. 1989)) (holding that appellant's counsel's explanation of erroneous calculation of date for filing notice of appeal by adding 30 days to date trial court overruled motion for new trial was

2007This is a plausible statement that the failure to timely file the notice of appeal was the result of mistake “ ‘even though counsel ... may appear to have been lacking in that degree of diligence which careful practitioners normally exercise.’ ” See Dimotsis v. State Farm Lloyds, 966 S.W.2d 657, 657-58 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (quoting Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex.1989)) (holding that appellant’s counsel’s explanation of erroneous calculation of date for filing notice of appeal by adding 30 days to date trial court overruled motion for new trial was reaso

2007This is a plausible statement that the failure to timely file the notice of appeal was the result of mistake "'even though counsel . . . may appear to have been lacking in that degree of diligence which careful practitioners normally exercise.'" See Dimotsis v. State Farm Lloyds , 966 S.W.2d 657, 657-58 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (quoting Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc. , 774 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. 1989)) (holding that appellant's counsel's explanation of erroneous calculation of date for filing notice of appeal by adding 30 days to date trial court overruled motion for new trial was

2007This is a plausible statement that the failure to timely file the notice of appeal was the result of mistake “ ‘even though counsel ... may appear to have been lacking in that degree of diligence which careful practitioners normally exercise.’ ” See Dimotsis v. State Farm Lloyds, 966 S.W.2d 657, 657-58 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (quoting Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex.1989)) (holding that appellant’s counsel’s explanation of erroneous calculation of date for filing notice of appeal by adding 30 days to date trial court overruled motion for new trial was reaso

2026See Umoja v. State, 965 S.W.2d 3 , 12 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (per curiam) (op. on reh’g) (dismissing attempted appeal of trial court’s findings in an abatement hearing for want of jurisdiction).

2025See id.

2025Id. at 877 (noting that the insureds contend there is “no claim to ‘abate’”); see Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1985) (“[S]ustaining a plea in abatement requires that the claim be abated until removal of some impediment.” (emphasis added)); Tex. Highway Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967) (“[A] plea in abatement, if sustained, would require an abatement of the claim or cause of action until some obstacle to its further prosecution was removed.” (emphasis added)).

2024We must defer to the trial court’s fact-finding that the reporter’s record provided to this court accurately represents the trial proceedings and that no material part of it has 32 been lost or destroyed.15 See Harris, 2014 WL 1389756 , at *2; Jaynes v. State, 216 S.W.3d 839, 844 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, no pet.).

2021See Nava, 480 S.W.3d at 763 (holding that “[w]hen an appeal is abated, the trial court regains limited jurisdiction” and may not consider matters not included within abatement order).

2021See Rhoades, 934 S.W.2d at 119 ; Rezac, 782 S.W.2d at 870 .

2020See In re S.V., No. 05-16-00519-CV, 2017 WL 3725981 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2017, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard); see also Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835 , 838–39 (Tex. 2004).

2018See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 315 , 318–20 (Tex. Crim.