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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.green2 sentences2023Code, § 2778 [“the following rules are to be applied, unless a contrary intention appears” (italics added)]; Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 555 [“unless the parties’ agreement expressly provides otherwise, a contractual indemnitor has the obligation, upon proper tender by the indemnitee, to accept and assume the indemnitee’s active defense against claims encompassed by the indemnity provision” (italics added)].) Here, the parties chose to include an expiration term to respondent’s obligation to indemnify or defend. 2020Corp. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 40, 49 ; see Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 425, 436 .)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 552 .) 10 Crawford is not directly on point here, as it is not an equitable subrogration case and did not involve multiple subcontractors potentially liable for some of a number of different injuries, but it clearly supports respondents’ position in this case: The Crawford footnote commented upon the problem of “sorting out multiple, and potentially conflicting, duties to assume the active defense of litigation then in progress” and indicated that a non- | 2 | 2 |
Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Courtred2 sentences2020Corp. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 40, 49 ; see Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 425, 436 .)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 552 .) 10 Crawford is not directly on point here, as it is not an equitable subrogration case and did not involve multiple subcontractors potentially liable for some of a number of different injuries, but it clearly supports respondents’ position in this case: The Crawford footnote commented upon the problem of “sorting out multiple, and potentially conflicting, duties to assume the active defense of litigation then in progress” and indicated that a non- 2008(See Regan Roofing, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 425, 437 .) Weather Shield and its amici curiae raise similar concerns. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Freemangreen2 sentences2019(See, e.g., People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 498 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 , 882 P.2d 249 ["Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt."].) This result is unchanged by appellant's claim that the decision was unreasonable because of the "obvious 'implied malice' implications" of the concession. 2019(See, e.g., People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 498 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 , 882 P.2d 249 ["Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt."].) This result is unchanged by appellant's claim that the decision was unreasonable because of the "obvious 'implied malice' implications" of the concession. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mayfieldgreen2 sentences1995As we previously have recognized, “[t]o the extent defendant is arguing that it is necessarily incompetence for an attorney to concede his or her client’s guilt of murder [or burglary and murder as in this case], the law is otherwise.” (People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 177 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 852 P.2d 331 ].) Furthermore, as pointed out above, the record does not demonstrate counsel ignored “any express wish on defendant’s part to present an active defense” with regard to either the felony-murder or burglary counts. 1995As we previously have recognized, “[t]o the extent defendant is arguing that it is necessarily incompetence for an attorney to concede his or her client’s guilt of murder [or burglary and murder as in this case], the law is otherwise.” (People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 177 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 852 P.2d 331 ].) Furthermore, as pointed out above, the record does not demonstrate counsel ignored “any express wish on defendant’s part to present an active defense” with regard to either the felony-murder or burglary counts. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksonred2 sentences1993(People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) The record does not show that counsel ignored any express wish on defendant’s part to present an active defense with regard to that count. 1993(People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) The record does not show that counsel ignored any express wish on defendant’s part to present an active defense with regard to that count. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burtongreen2 sentences1993(Cf. People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 856-857 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 771 P.2d 1270 ].) To the extent defendant is arguing it was an incompetent tactical choice, we disagree. 1993(Cf. People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 856-857 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 771 P.2d 1270 ].) To the extent defendant is arguing it was an incompetent tactical choice, we disagree. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gibsongreen2 sentences1985(People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 291, 298-299 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 360 ]; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 119, 133-134 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 302 ]; People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62, 66 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) Here, appellant simply claimed that “two witnesses on the fourth floor” should have been called to testify. 1985(People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 291, 298-299 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 360 ]; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 119, 133-134 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 302 ]; People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62, 66 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) Here, appellant simply claimed that “two witnesses on the fourth floor” should have been called to testify. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hallgreen2 sentences1985(See, e.g., In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 427-428 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 637 P.2d 690 ]; People v. Rodriguez (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1031-1032 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 118 ].) In addition, People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 , has been interpreted as requiring a court not only to listen to a defendant’s volunteered reasons for believing he has been denied effective representation, but also to make an active inquiry into those reasons. 1985(See, e.g., In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 427-428 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 637 P.2d 690 ]; People v. Rodriguez (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1031-1032 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 118 ].) In addition, People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 , has been interpreted as requiring a court not only to listen to a defendant’s volunteered reasons for believing he has been denied effective representation, but also to make an active inquiry into those reasons. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Terrillgreen2 sentences1985(People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 291, 298-299 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 360 ]; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 119, 133-134 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 302 ]; People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62, 66 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) Here, appellant simply claimed that “two witnesses on the fourth floor” should have been called to testify. 1985(People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 291, 298-299 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 360 ]; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 119, 133-134 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 302 ]; People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62, 66 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) Here, appellant simply claimed that “two witnesses on the fourth floor” should have been called to testify. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences1985(See, e.g., In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 427-428 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 637 P.2d 690 ]; People v. Rodriguez (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1031-1032 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 118 ].) In addition, People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 , has been interpreted as requiring a court not only to listen to a defendant’s volunteered reasons for believing he has been denied effective representation, but also to make an active inquiry into those reasons. 1985(See, e.g., In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 427-428 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 637 P.2d 690 ]; People v. Rodriguez (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1031-1032 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 118 ].) In addition, People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 , has been interpreted as requiring a court not only to listen to a defendant’s volunteered reasons for believing he has been denied effective representation, but also to make an active inquiry into those reasons. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Munozgreen2 sentences1985(People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 291, 298-299 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 360 ]; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 119, 133-134 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 302 ]; People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62, 66 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) Here, appellant simply claimed that “two witnesses on the fourth floor” should have been called to testify. 1985(People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 291, 298-299 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 360 ]; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 119, 133-134 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 302 ]; People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62, 66 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) Here, appellant simply claimed that “two witnesses on the fourth floor” should have been called to testify. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1961While defendant’s counsel on appeal may perhaps feel that he would have tried the case in a different manner, the asserted shortcomings (and they appear only by assertion) of Mr. Nunnelley’s conduct of the defense, whether taken singly or together, fall far short of constituting “such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ ” (People v. Wein (1958), supra, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [44], and eases there cited; see also People v. Williams (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 285, 292-293 [11] [ 330 P.2d 942 ] ; People v. Simeone (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 593, 597 [3] [ 282 P.2d 1961While defendant’s counsel on appeal may perhaps feel that he would have tried the case in a different manner, the asserted shortcomings (and they appear only by assertion) of Mr. Nunnelley’s conduct of the defense, whether taken singly or together, fall far short of constituting “such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ ” (People v. Wein (1958), supra, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [44], and eases there cited; see also People v. Williams (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 285, 292-293 [11] [ 330 P.2d 942 ] ; People v. Simeone (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 593, 597 [3] [ 282 P.2d | 1 | 1 |
People v. Simeonegreen2 sentences1961While defendant’s counsel on appeal may perhaps feel that he would have tried the case in a different manner, the asserted shortcomings (and they appear only by assertion) of Mr. Nunnelley’s conduct of the defense, whether taken singly or together, fall far short of constituting “such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ ” (People v. Wein (1958), supra, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [44], and eases there cited; see also People v. Williams (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 285, 292-293 [11] [ 330 P.2d 942 ] ; People v. Simeone (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 593, 597 [3] [ 282 P.2d 1961While defendant’s counsel on appeal may perhaps feel that he would have tried the case in a different manner, the asserted shortcomings (and they appear only by assertion) of Mr. Nunnelley’s conduct of the defense, whether taken singly or together, fall far short of constituting “such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ ” (People v. Wein (1958), supra, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [44], and eases there cited; see also People v. Williams (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 285, 292-293 [11] [ 330 P.2d 942 ] ; People v. Simeone (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 593, 597 [3] [ 282 P.2d | 1 | 1 |
People v. Weinred1 sentence1961While defendant’s counsel on appeal may perhaps feel that he would have tried the case in a different manner, the asserted shortcomings (and they appear only by assertion) of Mr. Nunnelley’s conduct of the defense, whether taken singly or together, fall far short of constituting “such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ‘farce or a sham.’ ” (People v. Wein (1958), supra, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410 [44], and eases there cited; see also People v. Williams (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 285, 292-293 [11] [ 330 P.2d 942 ] ; People v. Simeone (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 593, 597 [3] [ 282 P.2d | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Stewart
red
1 sentence2024(See People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 388, 398 .) 4 As the sentencing hearing commenced, defense counsel allowed Rodriguez to speak directly to the judge to request a continuance of the sentencing hearing for himself. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp.
green
1 sentence2020Corp. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 40, 49 ; see Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 425, 436 .)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 552 .) 10 Crawford is not directly on point here, as it is not an equitable subrogration case and did not involve multiple subcontractors potentially liable for some of a number of different injuries, but it clearly supports respondents’ position in this case: The Crawford footnote commented upon the problem of “sorting out multiple, and potentially conflicting, duties to assume the active defense of litigation then in progress” and indicated that a non- | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Cain
red
2 sentences2019The court in Cain squarely rejected this argument, noting, " '[t]o the extent defendant is arguing that it is necessarily incompetence for an attorney to concede his or her client's guilt of murder [or burglary and murder as in this case], the law is otherwise.' [Citation.] Furthermore, as pointed out above, the record does not demonstrate counsel ignored 'any express wish on defendant's part to present an active defense' with regard to either the felony-murder or burglary *67 counts." ( Cain, supra , 10 Cal.4th at pp. 30-31, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 .) In addition, appellant cannot 2019The court in Cain squarely rejected this argument, noting, " '[t]o the extent defendant is arguing that it is necessarily incompetence for an attorney to concede his or her client's guilt of murder [or burglary and murder as in this case], the law is otherwise.' [Citation.] Furthermore, as pointed out above, the record does not demonstrate counsel ignored 'any express wish on defendant's part to present an active defense' with regard to either the felony-murder or burglary *67 counts." ( Cain, supra , 10 Cal.4th at pp. 30-31, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 .) In addition, appellant cannot | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Lucas
green
1 sentence2016It was not unreasonable to seek to avoid the death penalty by 25 seeking a conviction on one count of second degree murder and one count of involuntary manslaughter on a plausible theory, when the prosecution’s evidence put defendant at grave risk of two first degree murder convictions. . . . [C]andor may be the most effective tool available to counsel.” (Id. at p. 177.) Also instructive is People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Marsden
green
1 sentence1985(See, e.g., In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 427-428 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 637 P.2d 690 ]; People v. Rodriguez (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1031-1032 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 118 ].) In addition, People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 , has been interpreted as requiring a court not only to listen to a defendant’s volunteered reasons for believing he has been denied effective representation, but also to make an active inquiry into those reasons. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.