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7 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1922–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodred2 sentences2005Passive Warning Devices means those types of traffic control devices, including signs, markings and other devices, located at or in advance of grade crossings to indicate the presence of a crossing but which do not change aspect upon the approach or presence of a train. 23 C.F.R. § 646.204 ; see Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 672 -73 & n. 11, 113 S.Ct. at 1741 -42 & n. 11 (stating that installed item must meet the definition of warning device by being either an active warning device or a passive warning device as defined in 23 C.F.R. § 646.204 and holding that motion-detection circuitry intended to b 2005Passive Warning Devices means those types of traffic control devices, including signs, markings and other devices, located at or in advance of grade crossings to indicate the presence of a crossing but which do not change aspect upon the approach or presence of a train. 23 C.F.R. § 646.204 ; see Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 672 -73 & n. 11, 113 S.Ct. at 1741 -42 & n. 11 (stating that installed item must meet the definition of warning device by being either an active warning device or a passive warning device as defined in 23 C.F.R. § 646.204 and holding that motion-detection circuitry intended to b | 2 | 2 |
Rohrmoos Venture, Eric Langford, Dan Basso, and Tobin Grove v. Utsw DVA Healthcare, Llpgreen1 sentence2024Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 498 (Tex. 2019). | 1 | 1 |
Shaun T. Mian Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.green1 sentence2008Mian Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 237 S.W.3d 851, 863-64 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence can give rise to both the inference of a product defect and the inference that the defect 8 BIC did object to the discovery request on the basis that the requested docum ents were irrelevant to the design defect claim , which was the only active claim asserted by Carter at the tim e; BIC claim s that it was therefore justified in destroying the m anufacturing quality reports. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grandinetti v. Grandinetti
green
1 sentence2015Such actions constitute and rise to the level of an abuse of discretion that would warrant the reversal of the underlying judgment by this court. 12 Prayer Wherefore, premises considered, Appellant prays that this Court review the foregoing authority and arguments of Counsel and upon such review reverse the judgment of the trial court in accordance with the assertions herein and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the law. 9 Hughes v. Hughes No-12-07-00313-CV (Tex. App. Tyler {12th Dist.} 2009) 10 Texas Family Code 151.001 11 Villasenor v. Villasenor 91 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Southwestern Settlement & Development Co. v. Village Mills Co.
green
1 sentence1936These facts explain appellants’ prior possession and negative the issue that the prior possessors had title. 41 Tex.Jur. 536, 547; Southwestern Settlement & Development Co. v. Village Mills Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 245 S.W. 975 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Archibald v. Jacobs
green
2 sentences1922As said by the Supreme Court in the case of Archibald v. Jacobs, 69 Tex. 248 , 6 S. W. 177 : The “abandonment of a homestead occupied as such, cannot be accomplished by mere intention; there must be a discontinuance of the use, coupled with an intention not again to use as a home, to constitute abandonment, and without the abandonment of an existing homestead no right can exist to fix that character to another property, unless it be by way of addition to the existing homestead.” In the case of Bayless v. Guthrie (Tex. Com. 1922As said by the Supreme Court in the case of Archibald v. Jacobs, 69 Tex. 248 , 6 S. W. 177 : The “abandonment of a homestead occupied as such, cannot be accomplished by mere intention; there must be a discontinuance of the use, coupled with an intention not again to use as a home, to constitute abandonment, and without the abandonment of an existing homestead no right can exist to fix that character to another property, unless it be by way of addition to the existing homestead.” In the case of Bayless v. Guthrie (Tex. Com. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Dobkins v. Kuykendall
neutral
2 sentences1922The active principle of law which requires the final abandonment of “the intention ultimately to reside upon” a tract of unimproved land acquired for homestead purposes before the law will cease to protect same as a homestead during the time not actually occupied as such (Dobkins v. Kuykendall, 81 Tex. 180, 183 , 16 S. W. 743 , and authorities cited) applies with equal force where a homestead has been designated by actual use and occupancy, and, before the protecting care of the law will be withdrawn there must be a complete final abandonment of the use of such property for homestead purposes. 1922The active principle of law which requires the final abandonment of “the intention ultimately to reside upon” a tract of unimproved land acquired for homestead purposes before the law will cease to protect same as a homestead during the time not actually occupied as such (Dobkins v. Kuykendall, 81 Tex. 180, 183 , 16 S. W. 743 , and authorities cited) applies with equal force where a homestead has been designated by actual use and occupancy, and, before the protecting care of the law will be withdrawn there must be a complete final abandonment of the use of such property for homestead purposes. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.