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11 California opinions name it 1 courts 1961–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Board of Supervisors of Merced County v. California Highway Commissiongreen2 sentences1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction 1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction | 2 | 2 |
Bass v. Braungreen2 sentences1961(Stuart v. Hollywood Turf Club, 146 Cal.App.2d 261, 264 [ 303 P.2d 897 ] ; Bass v. Braun, 178 Cal.App.2d 744, 749 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 212 ].) The-action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a. motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed by section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating factors in the exercise of that-discretion would be pertinent to both motions; and its decision “will be disturbed only in cases of manifest abuse.” (Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal 1961(Stuart v. Hollywood Turf Club, 146 Cal.App.2d 261, 264 [ 303 P.2d 897 ] ; Bass v. Braun, 178 Cal.App.2d 744, 749 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 212 ].) The-action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a. motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed by section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating factors in the exercise of that-discretion would be pertinent to both motions; and its decision “will be disturbed only in cases of manifest abuse.” (Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal | 2 | 2 |
Beswick v. Palo Verde Hospital Assn.green2 sentences2002Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) “ ‘In passing upon the motion for an early and preferential setting, the court was not limited to a consideration of the single fact that the [mandatory dismissal] period was about to expire but was required to view the total picture, including the dilatory action of the plaintiff, the condition of the court’s calendar, the rights of other litigants, and the prejudice to the *1364 defendant resulting from the delay. [Citations.] The action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecut 2002Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) “ ‘In passing upon the motion for an early and preferential setting, the court was not limited to a consideration of the single fact that the [mandatory dismissal] period was about to expire but was required to view the total picture, including the dilatory action of the plaintiff, the condition of the court’s calendar, the rights of other litigants, and the prejudice to the *1364 defendant resulting from the delay. [Citations.] The action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecut | 1 | 3 |
Landau v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015Bill 2375, Sept. 4, 1990, p. 1, italics added [by Landau, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 202].) “ ‘Among the several concerns at which the legislation was aimed was the excessive amount of time consumed by the disciplinary process. . . .’ “As the Center for Public Interest Law Report indicated, appellate review played a major part in the overall duration of the disciplinary process. ‘Court of Appeal review normally takes several years to complete.’ (Center for Public Interest Law, Physician Discipline in California: A Code Blue Emergency (Apr. 5, 1989) p. 22.)” ( Landau, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at 2015Bill 2375, Sept. 4, 1990, p. 1, italics added [by Landau, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 202].) “ ‘Among the several concerns at which the legislation was aimed was the excessive amount of time consumed by the disciplinary process. . . .’ “As the Center for Public Interest Law Report indicated, appellate review played a major part in the overall duration of the disciplinary process. ‘Court of Appeal review normally takes several years to complete.’ (Center for Public Interest Law, Physician Discipline in California: A Code Blue Emergency (Apr. 5, 1989) p. 22.)” ( Landau, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at | 1 | 1 |
Salinas v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.green2 sentences2002Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) “ ‘In passing upon the motion for an early and preferential setting, the court was not limited to a consideration of the single fact that the [mandatory dismissal] period was about to expire but was required to view the total picture, including the dilatory action of the plaintiff, the condition of the court’s calendar, the rights of other litigants, and the prejudice to the *1364 defendant resulting from the delay. [Citations.] The action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecut 2002Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) “ ‘In passing upon the motion for an early and preferential setting, the court was not limited to a consideration of the single fact that the [mandatory dismissal] period was about to expire but was required to view the total picture, including the dilatory action of the plaintiff, the condition of the court’s calendar, the rights of other litigants, and the prejudice to the *1364 defendant resulting from the delay. [Citations.] The action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecut | 1 | 1 |
Dick v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1987Discussion I The trial court may in its discretion grant a motion for preference upon showing of cause which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served. (§ 36, subd. (d).) “ ‘ “The action of the court on such a motion [for trial preference] is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed in section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure [now substantially reenacted as sections 5 83.410 2 and 584.420, subd. (a)(2)(A)-(B)]; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating facto 1987Discussion I The trial court may in its discretion grant a motion for preference upon showing of cause which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served. (§ 36, subd. (d).) “ ‘ “The action of the court on such a motion [for trial preference] is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed in section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure [now substantially reenacted as sections 5 83.410 2 and 584.420, subd. (a)(2)(A)-(B)]; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating facto | 1 | 1 |
Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences1987(Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) Although Salas was decided upon the review of an action under the five-year statute (§ 583.310), the same principles apply to this case. 1987(Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) Although Salas was decided upon the review of an action under the five-year statute (§ 583.310), the same principles apply to this case. | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Carlesongreen2 sentences1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L 1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L | 1 | 1 |
Killian v. City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L 1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L | 1 | 1 |
Cannon v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L 1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L | 1 | 1 |
Crumpler v. Board of Administrationgreen2 sentences1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L 1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. City of Fresnogreen2 sentences1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L 1985(Cannon v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 17, 22 [ 346 P.2d 1 ]; see Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ]; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 430 ]; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 341 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 497 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) Apparently, the July 1972 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws “was one of the motivating factors in the Legislature’s enactment of the present L | 1 | 1 |
Industrial Welfare Commission v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction 1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction | 1 | 1 |
California Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Industrial Welfare Commissiongreen2 sentences1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction 1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction | 1 | 1 |
Hayashi v. Lorenzgreen2 sentences1961(Stuart v. Hollywood Turf Club, 146 Cal.App.2d 261, 264 [ 303 P.2d 897 ] ; Bass v. Braun, 178 Cal.App.2d 744, 749 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 212 ].) The-action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a. motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed by section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating factors in the exercise of that-discretion would be pertinent to both motions; and its decision “will be disturbed only in cases of manifest abuse.” (Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal 1961(Stuart v. Hollywood Turf Club, 146 Cal.App.2d 261, 264 [ 303 P.2d 897 ] ; Bass v. Braun, 178 Cal.App.2d 744, 749 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 212 ].) The-action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a. motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed by section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating factors in the exercise of that-discretion would be pertinent to both motions; and its decision “will be disturbed only in cases of manifest abuse.” (Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Raggio v. Southern Pacific Co.green2 sentences1961Co., supra, 178 Cal.App.2d 923, 929 .) It is settled that “the duty rests upon a plaintiff at each stage of the proceedings to use due diligence to expedite his case to a-final determination.” Raggio v. Southern Pacific Co., 181 Cal. 472, 475 [ 185 P. 171 ].) Delay attributable to the *261 pressure of business, sickness, or death of counsel or of the parties is not necessarily excusable. 1961Co., supra, 178 Cal.App.2d 923, 929 .) It is settled that “the duty rests upon a plaintiff at each stage of the proceedings to use due diligence to expedite his case to a-final determination.” Raggio v. Southern Pacific Co., 181 Cal. 472, 475 [ 185 P. 171 ].) Delay attributable to the *261 pressure of business, sickness, or death of counsel or of the parties is not necessarily excusable. | 1 | 1 |
Stuart v. Hollywood Turf Clubgreen2 sentences1961(Stuart v. Hollywood Turf Club, 146 Cal.App.2d 261, 264 [ 303 P.2d 897 ] ; Bass v. Braun, 178 Cal.App.2d 744, 749 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 212 ].) The-action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a. motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed by section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating factors in the exercise of that-discretion would be pertinent to both motions; and its decision “will be disturbed only in cases of manifest abuse.” (Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal 1961(Stuart v. Hollywood Turf Club, 146 Cal.App.2d 261, 264 [ 303 P.2d 897 ] ; Bass v. Braun, 178 Cal.App.2d 744, 749 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 212 ].) The-action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a. motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed by section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating factors in the exercise of that-discretion would be pertinent to both motions; and its decision “will be disturbed only in cases of manifest abuse.” (Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co.
green
2 sentences2002Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) “ ‘In passing upon the motion for an early and preferential setting, the court was not limited to a consideration of the single fact that the [mandatory dismissal] period was about to expire but was required to view the total picture, including the dilatory action of the plaintiff, the condition of the court’s calendar, the rights of other litigants, and the prejudice to the *1364 defendant resulting from the delay. [Citations.] The action of the court on such a motion is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecut 1987Discussion I The trial court may in its discretion grant a motion for preference upon showing of cause which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served. (§ 36, subd. (d).) “ ‘ “The action of the court on such a motion [for trial preference] is tantamount to action upon a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute within the two-year period prescribed in section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure [now substantially reenacted as sections 5 83.410 2 and 584.420, subd. (a)(2)(A)-(B)]; in each instance the motion is addressed to its sound legal discretion; the motivating facto | 3 | 1985–2002 |
Davies v. Contractors' State License Board
green
2 sentences1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction 1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial (Davies v. Contractors’ State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco v. All Persons
green
2 sentences1973However, the motivating principle in both trial and appellate courts is expressed by the Supreme Court in Mercantile Trust Co. v. All Persons, 183 Cal. 369 , at page 381 [ 191 P. 691 ], as follows: ‘Upon this whole subject we would say that in dealing with old instruments and muniments of title, the parties and witnesses to which are dead, and as to whose execution or the circumstances under which they were executed, or as to whose exact contents in case they or the original record of them is lost, certain and positive evidence is not possible, the same exactitude and certainty of proof cannot 1973However, the motivating principle in both trial and appellate courts is expressed by the Supreme Court in Mercantile Trust Co. v. All Persons, 183 Cal. 369 , at page 381 [ 191 P. 691 ], as follows: ‘Upon this whole subject we would say that in dealing with old instruments and muniments of title, the parties and witnesses to which are dead, and as to whose execution or the circumstances under which they were executed, or as to whose exact contents in case they or the original record of them is lost, certain and positive evidence is not possible, the same exactitude and certainty of proof cannot | 2 | 1967–1973 |
Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co.
green
2 sentences1985A different standard of review was recently enunciated by the Fourth Appellate District in Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 712 ], review denied August 29, 1985. 1985A different standard of review was recently enunciated by the Fourth Appellate District in Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 712 ], review denied August 29, 1985. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Sullivan v. Kaiser Engineers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Butcher v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
green
1 sentence1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Reed v. Del Chemical Corp.
green
1 sentence1982So long as a reasonable basis for such action exists, the motivating factors considered in reaching the decision are immaterial ( Davies v. *795 Contractors' State License Bd., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 940, 947 ) and supportive findings are not required. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at pp. 390-391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 952, 958-961 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 504 ].) The limited scope of review of quasi-legislative administrative action is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanction | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Knight v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
green
1 sentence1961Co., supra, 178 Cal.App.2d 923, 929 .) It is settled that “the duty rests upon a plaintiff at each stage of the proceedings to use due diligence to expedite his case to a-final determination.” Raggio v. Southern Pacific Co., 181 Cal. 472, 475 [ 185 P. 171 ].) Delay attributable to the *261 pressure of business, sickness, or death of counsel or of the parties is not necessarily excusable. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.