third and final requirement in California

1989The hallmark of the Kelly/Frye rule, and the point emphasized by the Attorney General here, is that the proponent must establish, “usually by expert testimony,” that the technique is “ ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 , quoting Frye, supra, 293 Fed. at p. 1014 , italics omitted.) The proponent also must establish that “the witness furnishing such testimony” is “properly qualified as an expert to give [such] an opinion.” ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 , italics omitted.) The third and final requir

1989The hallmark of the Kelly/Frye rule, and the point emphasized by the Attorney General here, is that the proponent must establish, “usually by expert testimony,” that the technique is “ ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 , quoting Frye, supra, 293 Fed. at p. 1014 , italics omitted.) The proponent also must establish that “the witness furnishing such testimony” is “properly qualified as an expert to give [such] an opinion.” ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 , italics omitted.) The third and final requir

2022We agree with the People that a Kelly/Frye hearing is not appropriate for challenging the expert medical testimony in this case.6 Applicable Law “The hallmark of the Kelly/Frye rule … is that the proponent must establish, ‘usually by expert testimony,’ that the technique is ‘ “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” ’ [Citation.] The proponent also must establish that ‘the witness furnishing such testimony’ is ‘properly qualified as an expert to give [such] an opinion.’ [Citation.] The third and final requirement … is for the pro

1989The hallmark of the Kelly/Frye rule, and the point emphasized by the Attorney General here, is that the proponent must establish, “usually by expert testimony,” that the technique is “ ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 , quoting Frye, supra, 293 Fed. at p. 1014 , italics omitted.) The proponent also must establish that “the witness furnishing such testimony” is “properly qualified as an expert to give [such] an opinion.” ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 , italics omitted.) The third and final requir

2025Code, § 815.6.) “[T]here are three elements to a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6.” (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 983, 991 .) “First and foremost, application of [Government Code] section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 , italics omitted.) “Second, but equally important, [Governm

2025Code, § 815.6.) “[T]here are three elements to a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6.” (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 983, 991 .) “First and foremost, application of [Government Code] section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 , italics omitted.) “Second, but equally important, [Governm

2025Code, § 815.6.) “[T]here are three elements to a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6.” (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 983, 991 .) “First and foremost, application of [Government Code] section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 , italics omitted.) “Second, but equally important, [Governm

2025Code, § 815.6.) “[T]here are three elements to a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6.” (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 983, 991 .) “First and foremost, application of [Government Code] section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 , italics omitted.) “Second, but equally important, [Governm

2022Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013 , superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 ) conditions the “admissibility of expert testimony based upon the application of a new scientific technique” on a “preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community.” (Kelly, at p. 30.) 6 For efficiency purposes, we do not specifically reach the People’s forfeiture claim.

2022(World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 292 (World-Wide Volkswagen); Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 .) The question is whether a “defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” (World-Wide Volkswagen, at p. 297; Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 464 (Vons).) 21.

2018It Will Serve the Public Interest to Allow the Lawsuit to Proceed Absent countervailing circumstances not present in this case, we ordinarily view the need for judicial resolution of a substantial question of law or fact as an adequate “public 45 See One Star, Inc. v. Staar Surgical Co. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1094-1095 . 46 Cf. Wat.

2009(Ibid.) “ ‘Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts.’ ” (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 898 .) As in any negligence action, causation is usually a question of fact for the jury.

1988Restitution in this case also fosters two additional goals of probation: to rehabilitate the criminal by “making [him] understand that he has harmed not merely society in the abstract but also individual human beings, and *957 that he has a responsibility to make them whole” (People v. Richards, supra, 17 Cal.3d 614, 620 ); and to make amends “for any injury done to any person resulting from” the probationer’s breach of the law.

1988C The third and final requirement for the validity of a condition of probation set forth in People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 , also is met inasmuch as payment of restitution by defendant will serve to deter future criminal conduct on his part by requiring him to compensate the victim of his crime.

1960(See also Bryan v. Smalley (1959), 166 Cal.App.2d 763 [ 333 P.2d 387 ].) As the Supreme Court stated in Alarid v. Vanier, supra (1958), 50 Cal.2d 617 , however, "No precise formula can be drawn for deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice.

1960(See also Bryan v. Smalley (1959), 166 Cal.App.2d 763 [ 333 P.2d 387 ].) As the Supreme Court stated in Alarid v. Vanier, supra (1958), 50 Cal.2d 617 , however, "No precise formula can be drawn for deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice.

1960(See also Bryan v. Smalley (1959), 166 Cal.App.2d 763 [ 333 P.2d 387 ].) As the Supreme Court stated in Alarid v. Vanier, supra (1958), 50 Cal.2d 617 , however, "No precise formula can be drawn for deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice.

1960VI, § 4½; Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc. (1959), 53 Cal.2d 266, 273 [ 1 Cal. Rptr. 330 , 347 P.2d 674 ].) The third and final instruction to which appellant objects charged that in deciding whether a violation of statute were excusable or justifiable, the jury "may assume that a person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey the law and will do so unless causes not of his own intended making induce him, without moral fault, to do otherwise. ’ ’ In Alarid v. Vanier, supra (1958), 50 Cal.2d 617, 623-624 , the Supreme Court expressly disapproved this instruction.