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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Quiles v. Parentgreen2 sentences2022(See Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 (Quiles); see 13 In Goldstein I, the plaintiff offered a concrete theory of damages. 2022(See Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 (Quiles); see 13 In Goldstein I, the plaintiff offered a concrete theory of damages. | 2 | 2 |
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017At most it puts an economic burden on them increasing the cost of doing business.” (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 293, 305 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 814 ], italics added (Mobil Oil); see Building Industry, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 132.) As we explain more fully in the next section, the right to pollute is a valuable privilege for which a cost may properly be imposed. 4. 2017At most it puts an economic burden on them increasing the cost of doing business.” (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 293, 305 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 814 ], italics added (Mobil Oil); see Building Industry, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 132.) As we explain more fully in the next section, the right to pollute is a valuable privilege for which a cost may properly be imposed. 4. | 1 | 1 |
California Building Industry Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Districtgreen2 sentences2017At most it puts an economic burden on them increasing the cost of doing business.” (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 293, 305 (Mobil Oil), italics added; see Building Industry, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 28 Under the Act, the Board was to consider “direct emission reduction measures.” (§ 38561, subd. (b).) This is another term for command-and-control measures. 43 132.) As we explain more fully in the next section, the right to pollute is a valuable privilege for which a cost may properly be imposed. 4. 2017At most it puts an economic burden on them increasing the cost of doing business.” (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 293, 305 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 814 ], italics added (Mobil Oil); see Building Industry, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 132.) As we explain more fully in the next section, the right to pollute is a valuable privilege for which a cost may properly be imposed. 4. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Colemangreen2 sentences2016The discovery of a valuable claim is in every instance a condition for thereafter obtaining some possessory or fee simple interest in federal land (id., § 22; United States v. Coleman (1968) 390 U.S. 599, 600-603 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 170 , 88 S.Ct. 1327 ]), but the act as a whole is devoted entirely to the allocation of real property interests among those who would exploit the mineral wealth of the nation’s lands, not regulation of the process of exploitation—the mining—itself. 2016The discovery of a valuable claim is in every instance a condition for thereafter obtaining some possessory or fee simple interest in federal land (id., § 22; United States v. Coleman (1968) 390 U.S. 599, 600-603 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 170 , 88 S.Ct. 1327 ]), but the act as a whole is devoted entirely to the allocation of real property interests among those who would exploit the mineral wealth of the nation’s lands, not regulation of the process of exploitation—the mining—itself. | 1 | 1 |
Vargas v. City of Salinasgreen2 sentences2011As our Supreme Court has explained, “[a] full reading of the Stanson decision reveals . . . that our opinion’s statement that the government ‘may not “take sides” in election contests’ . . . properly must be understood as singling out a public entity’s ‘use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign’ . . . .” (Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 36 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 205 P.3d 207 ], citations omitted (Vargas).) It further explained that “the threat to the fairness of the electoral process to which Stanson referred arises when a public entity or public official is able 2011As our Supreme Court has explained, “[a] full reading of the Stanson decision reveals . . . that our opinion’s statement that the government ‘may not “take sides” in election contests’ . . . properly must be understood as singling out a public entity’s ‘use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign’ . . . .” (Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 36 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 205 P.3d 207 ], citations omitted (Vargas).) It further explained that “the threat to the fairness of the electoral process to which Stanson referred arises when a public entity or public official is able | 1 | 1 |
John Siebel Associates v. Keelegreen2 sentences1994To simply and completely abrogate the decree robs plaintiffs of the valuable claim as if it had never existed." (3) The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. ( Verner v. Verner (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 718, 724 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 826 ].) "The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court." ( John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal. App.3d 560, 565 [ 233 Cal. Rptr. 231 ].) (2b) The instant stipulated judgment is clear and unambiguous in providing t 1994To simply and completely abrogate the decree robs plaintiffs of the valuable claim as if it had never existed." (3) The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. ( Verner v. Verner (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 718, 724 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 826 ].) "The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court." ( John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal. App.3d 560, 565 [ 233 Cal. Rptr. 231 ].) (2b) The instant stipulated judgment is clear and unambiguous in providing t | 1 | 1 |
Verner v. Vernergreen2 sentences1994To simply and completely abrogate the decree robs plaintiffs of the valuable claim as if it had never existed." (3) The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. ( Verner v. Verner (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 718, 724 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 826 ].) "The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court." ( John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal. App.3d 560, 565 [ 233 Cal. Rptr. 231 ].) (2b) The instant stipulated judgment is clear and unambiguous in providing t 1994To simply and completely abrogate the decree robs plaintiffs of the valuable claim as if it had never existed." (3) The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. ( Verner v. Verner (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 718, 724 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 826 ].) "The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court." ( John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal. App.3d 560, 565 [ 233 Cal. Rptr. 231 ].) (2b) The instant stipulated judgment is clear and unambiguous in providing t | 1 | 1 |
Goldberg v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIF.green2 sentences1969(Cf. Goldberg v. Regents of the University of Cal. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 885 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) The proceedings under Vehicle Code section 13353 are civil, not criminal, in nature, although they may result in the denial of a valuable privilege. 1969(Cf. Goldberg v. Regents of the University of Cal. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 885 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) The proceedings under Vehicle Code section 13353 are civil, not criminal, in nature, although they may result in the denial of a valuable privilege. | 1 | 1 |
County of Los Angeles v. Frisbiegreen2 sentences1944(Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 284 [ 248 P. 917 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [ 122 P.2d 526 ].) "Therefore," as was said in People v. Merrill, 24 Cal.App. 206, 210 [ 140 P. 1075 ], "when a suggested construction of a statute in any given case necessarily involves a decided departure from what may be fairly said to be the plain purpose of the enactment, such construction will not be adopted to the exclusion of a possible, plausible interpretation which will promote and put in operation the legislative intent." As above stated, the fund advancement by the Commodity C 1944(Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 284 [ 248 P. 917 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [ 122 P.2d 526 ].) "Therefore," as was said in People v. Merrill, 24 Cal.App. 206, 210 [ 140 P. 1075 ], "when a suggested construction of a statute in any given case necessarily involves a decided departure from what may be fairly said to be the plain purpose of the enactment, such construction will not be adopted to the exclusion of a possible, plausible interpretation which will promote and put in operation the legislative intent." As above stated, the fund advancement by the Commodity C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Merrillgreen2 sentences1944(Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 284 [ 248 P. 917 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [ 122 P.2d 526 ].) "Therefore," as was said in People v. Merrill, 24 Cal.App. 206, 210 [ 140 P. 1075 ], "when a suggested construction of a statute in any given case necessarily involves a decided departure from what may be fairly said to be the plain purpose of the enactment, such construction will not be adopted to the exclusion of a possible, plausible interpretation which will promote and put in operation the legislative intent." As above stated, the fund advancement by the Commodity C 1944(Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 284 [ 248 P. 917 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [ 122 P.2d 526 ].) "Therefore," as was said in People v. Merrill, 24 Cal.App. 206, 210 [ 140 P. 1075 ], "when a suggested construction of a statute in any given case necessarily involves a decided departure from what may be fairly said to be the plain purpose of the enactment, such construction will not be adopted to the exclusion of a possible, plausible interpretation which will promote and put in operation the legislative intent." As above stated, the fund advancement by the Commodity C | 1 | 1 |
Uhl v. Badaraccogreen2 sentences1944(Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 284 [ 248 P. 917 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [ 122 P.2d 526 ].) "Therefore," as was said in People v. Merrill, 24 Cal.App. 206, 210 [ 140 P. 1075 ], "when a suggested construction of a statute in any given case necessarily involves a decided departure from what may be fairly said to be the plain purpose of the enactment, such construction will not be adopted to the exclusion of a possible, plausible interpretation which will promote and put in operation the legislative intent." As above stated, the fund advancement by the Commodity C 1944(Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 284 [ 248 P. 917 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [ 122 P.2d 526 ].) "Therefore," as was said in People v. Merrill, 24 Cal.App. 206, 210 [ 140 P. 1075 ], "when a suggested construction of a statute in any given case necessarily involves a decided departure from what may be fairly said to be the plain purpose of the enactment, such construction will not be adopted to the exclusion of a possible, plausible interpretation which will promote and put in operation the legislative intent." As above stated, the fund advancement by the Commodity C | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority
green
1 sentence2020In doing so, the court first noted that an offer should be “evaluated in light of all of its terms and conditions,” (Fassberg, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 766 ) before explaining that the release truly only affected two parties and specifically defined the subject matter of the settlement “as ‘[a]ny and all claims, causes of action, matters alleged or which could have been alleged in [this action], including the cross-complaint by the Housing Authority.’ ” (Id. at p. 767.) This later language was particularly important, as the court explained it constituted an “attempt to define the subject m | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Concerned Citizens of Carderock v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence2000The Ordinance envelops a broad circle of beneficiaries designating some 41 categories of permitted uses in the RE-2 zone, into which `churches . . . and other places of religious worship' naturally fit." ( Id. at p. 674, first ellipsis added.) Renzi was distinguished as involving a law "the operative characteristic [of which] was religion." ( Concerned Citizens, supra, at p. 675 , italics omitted.) Both cases seem to me correctly decided, and, as discussed below, I find the present case more like Renzi than Concerned Citizens. [12] Here, too, the law's operative characteristic is religion, for | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Finley v. Orr
green
1 sentence1969(Finley v. Orr, supra, 262 Cal.App.2d 656, 665 .) The intention of the Legislature was to reduce the carnage on our highways caused by operation of motor vehicles by intoxicated persons. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
McNeil v. City of South Pasadena
green
2 sentences1914"The improvement, regulation and control of the highways within a *Page 75 municipality call for the exercise of a delegated governmental power, a function which the municipality itself, neither by an ordinance nor by contract, can surrender or impair." ( McNeil v. City of South Pasadena, 166 Cal. 153 , [ 135 P. 32 ].) But the parties to the said franchise saw fit to stipulate expressly that the valuable privilege granted should be subject to all laws and municipal regulations that might be adopted in pursuance of this power of control and regulation that is committed to the municipal authorit 1914"The improvement, regulation and control of the highways within a *Page 75 municipality call for the exercise of a delegated governmental power, a function which the municipality itself, neither by an ordinance nor by contract, can surrender or impair." ( McNeil v. City of South Pasadena, 166 Cal. 153 , [ 135 P. 32 ].) But the parties to the said franchise saw fit to stipulate expressly that the valuable privilege granted should be subject to all laws and municipal regulations that might be adopted in pursuance of this power of control and regulation that is committed to the municipal authorit | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.