State to rebut presumption in Connecticut

1991The Castaneda court cited with approval the language from Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976) that: With a prima facie case made out, `the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.' Castaneda at 430 U.S. 494 . 1.

1991The Castaneda court cited with approval the language from Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976) that: With a prima facie case made out, `the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.' Castaneda at 430 U.S. 494 . 1.

2024It does not follow that a defendant is statutorily or constitutionally entitled to 12 See State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17 State v. Carlson use evidence of retreat after using deadly force to bol- ster a claim of self-defense without permitting the jury to consider other possible reasons for the flight.

2024It does not follow that a defendant is statutorily or constitutionally entitled to 12 See State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17 State v. Carlson use evidence of retreat after using deadly force to bol- ster a claim of self-defense without permitting the jury to consider other possible reasons for the flight.

2017The language, structure and legislative history of a statute can provide evidence of this intent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greco , supra, 216 Conn. at 293 , 579 A.2d 84 ; accord Missouri v. Hunter , 459 U.S. 359 , 368, 103 S.Ct. 673 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (stating that the Blockburger test "is not a constitutional rule requiring courts to negate clearly expressed legislative intent"). 34 In the present case, the burden is on the state to rebut the presumption created under the Blockburger test that aggravated sexual assault of a minor is the same offens

2017The language, structure and legislative history of a statute can provide evidence of this intent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greco , supra, 216 Conn. at 293 , 579 A.2d 84 ; accord Missouri v. Hunter , 459 U.S. 359 , 368, 103 S.Ct. 673 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (stating that the Blockburger test "is not a constitutional rule requiring courts to negate clearly expressed legislative intent"). 34 In the present case, the burden is on the state to rebut the presumption created under the Blockburger test that aggravated sexual assault of a minor is the same offens

2017State v. Alvaro F. , 291 Conn. 1 , 13 n.14, 966 A.2d 712 , cert. denied, 558 U.S. 882 , 130 S.Ct. 200 , 175 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009).

2017State v. Alvaro F. , 291 Conn. 1 , 13 n.14, 966 A.2d 712 , cert. denied, 558 U.S. 882 , 130 S.Ct. 200 , 175 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009).

2011This standard requires evidence of a “highly and truly persuasive” nature; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745, 798 , 700 A.2d 1108 (1997); and is satisfied only “if the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true [and] that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794 .

2011This standard requires evidence of a “highly and truly persuasive” nature; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745, 798 , 700 A.2d 1108 (1997); and is satisfied only “if the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true [and] that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794 .

2010The defendant notes properly that this conclusion stands in contradiction to our subsequent decision in State v. Rhodes, 248 Conn. 39, 48 , 726 A.2d 513 (1999), wherein we declined to revisit “our precedent that places the burden on the defendant to show that he or she was actually prejudiced by the juror misconduct when the trial court is in no way responsible for the impropriety.” Relying primarily on Remmer , which had imposed a rebuttable presumption of juror prejudice in cases of improper communication, contact or tampering with jurors, the defendant contends perfunctorily that we should

2010The defendant notes properly that this conclusion stands in contradiction to our subsequent decision in State v. Rhodes, 248 Conn. 39, 48 , 726 A.2d 513 (1999), wherein we declined to revisit “our precedent that places the burden on the defendant to show that he or she was actually prejudiced by the juror misconduct when the trial court is in no way responsible for the impropriety.” Relying primarily on Remmer , which had imposed a rebuttable presumption of juror prejudice in cases of improper communication, contact or tampering with jurors, the defendant contends perfunctorily that we should

2008This court has noted: "In the exercise of a wise discretion, the court should ascertain by inquiry, if counsel do not develop it, the character of the evidence to be offered by the [s]tate affecting one and not the rest of the accused, in order to see whether the introduction of evidence against one accused will be antagonistic to the defenses of the other accused, and whether the joint trial will be prejudicial to the rights of any of the accused." State v. Klein, 97 Conn. 321, 324 , 116 A. 596 (1922). [7] For the same reason, the reviewing court cannot consider the remedial effect of a curat

2008This court has noted: "In the exercise of a wise discretion, the court should ascertain by inquiry, if counsel do not develop it, the character of the evidence to be offered by the [s]tate affecting one and not the rest of the accused, in order to see whether the introduction of evidence against one accused will be antagonistic to the defenses of the other accused, and whether the joint trial will be prejudicial to the rights of any of the accused." State v. Klein, 97 Conn. 321, 324 , 116 A. 596 (1922). [7] For the same reason, the reviewing court cannot consider the remedial effect of a curat

1999The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.” Id., 229 ; see also State v. Rodriguez, 210 Conn. 315, 326 , 554 A.2d 1080 (1989) (“[w]here an accused makes a plausible claim that his constitutional right to a fair trial may be violated because the jury is not impartial, the burden is upon the state to rebut the presumption of prejudice that denies a fair trial”).

1991Although not every instance of juror misconduct requires a new trial; Williams v. Salamone, 192 Conn. 116, 122 , 470 A.2d 694 (1984); if “an accused makes a plausible claim that his constitutional right to a fair trial may be violated because the jury is not impartial, the burden is upon the state to rebut the presumption of prejudice that denies a fair trial.” State v. Rodriguez, 210 Conn. 315, 326 , 554 A.2d 1080 (1989).

1991Although not every instance of juror misconduct requires a new trial; Williams v. Salamone, 192 Conn. 116, 122 , 470 A.2d 694 (1984); if “an accused makes a plausible claim that his constitutional right to a fair trial may be violated because the jury is not impartial, the burden is upon the state to rebut the presumption of prejudice that denies a fair trial.” State v. Rodriguez, 210 Conn. 315, 326 , 554 A.2d 1080 (1989).

1991The trial court is allowed wide discretion in deciding mistrial motions; Speed v. DeLibero, 215 Conn. 308, 315 , 575 A.2d 1021 (1990); a denial of such a motion will be reversed only where it can fairly be said that the court abused its discretion; State v. Rodriguez, supra, 326 .

1991The trial court is allowed wide discretion in deciding mistrial motions; Speed v. DeLibero, 215 Conn. 308, 315 , 575 A.2d 1021 (1990); a denial of such a motion will be reversed only where it can fairly be said that the court abused its discretion; State v. Rodriguez, supra, 326 .

1977Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 548 , 363 A.2d 49 .

1977Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 548 , 363 A.2d 49 .