Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Benn v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Id. at 141, 145 (citations and editing omitted). 2010Id. at 141, 145 (citations and editing omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007Therefore, because “the error [was] of constitutional dimension, ... the Chapman harmless error standard should apply.” Id. at 843 (citing Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ). 2007Therefore, because “the error [was] of constitutional dimension, ... the Chapman harmless error standard should apply.” Id. at 843 (citing Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ). | 1 | 2 |
Lewis v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024See Lewis v. United States, 483 A.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. 1984) (endorsing use of the Chapman harmless error standard for Miranda violations). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bagleyred2 sentences2012See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ("[Tjhe standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard.”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 299 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring) (same). 12 . 2012See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ("[Tjhe standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard.”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 299 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring) (same). 12 . | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012Similarly, even when there has been a violation of discovery rules, “not every error by the trial court in applying sanctions under Rule 16 requires reversal.” Lee v. United States, 385 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Springer v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982See Springer, supra at 856 . | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982See Fox v. United States, D.C.App., 421 A.2d 9, 12 (1980); Clark, supra at 30 ; Campbell v. United States, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 283, 288 (1978). . | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982See Fox v. United States, D.C.App., 421 A.2d 9, 12 (1980); Clark, supra at 30 ; Campbell v. United States, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 283, 288 (1978). . 1982See Fox v. United States, D.C.App., 421 A.2d 9, 12 (1980); Clark, supra at 30 ; Campbell v. United States, D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickler v. Greene
green
2 sentences2012See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ("[Tjhe standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard.”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 299 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring) (same). 12 . 2012See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ("[Tjhe standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard.”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 299 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring) (same). 12 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Wilson-Bey v. United States
green
1 sentence2007Therefore, because “the error [was] of constitutional dimension, ... the Chapman harmless error standard should apply.” Id. at 843 (citing Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Kitt v. United States
green
2 sentences2007And, in Kitt, supra, the appellant objected to the instruction that he could be found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder “even if he did not intend it, so long as it was a ‘natural and probable consequence of the other crimes (robbery, kidnapping, carjacking he did intend to commit”.) Id at 354. “[B]ecause the government failed to present and the jury instruction failed to require the necessary proof of specific intent to kill, premeditation and deliberation by [appellant], we reverse[d] his first-degree premeditated murder conviction for insufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 355 . 2007And, in Kitt, supra, the appellant objected to the instruction that he could be found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder “even if he did not intend it, so long as it was a ‘natural and probable consequence of the other crimes (robbery, kidnapping, carjacking he did intend to commit”.) Id at 354. “[B]ecause the government failed to present and the jury instruction failed to require the necessary proof of specific intent to kill, premeditation and deliberation by [appellant], we reverse[d] his first-degree premeditated murder conviction for insufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 355 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Chapman v. California
yellow
2 sentences2003Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 2003Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Coy v. Iowa
green
2 sentences1994Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), which specifically held that any error stemming from the denial of face-to-face confrontation was subject to the Chapman harmless error analysis, provides the following guidance in assessing whether the denial of face-to-face confrontation constitutes harmless error: As assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and ha 1994Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), which specifically held that any error stemming from the denial of face-to-face confrontation was subject to the Chapman harmless error analysis, provides the following guidance in assessing whether the denial of face-to-face confrontation constitutes harmless error: As assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and ha | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdall
green
2 sentences1987In Van Arsdall , the Court held that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other confrontation clause errors, is subject to the Chapman harmless error analysis: "[t]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 106 S.Ct. at 1438 . 1987In Van Arsdall , the Court held that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other confrontation clause errors, is subject to the Chapman harmless error analysis: “[t]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 106 S.Ct. at 1438 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Clark v. United States
green
2 sentences1982See Fox v. United States, D.C.App., 421 A.2d 9, 12 (1980); Clark, supra at 30 ; Campbell v. United States, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 283, 288 (1978). . 1982See Fox v. United States, D.C.App., 421 A.2d 9, 12 (1980); Clark, supra at 30 ; Campbell v. United States, D.C. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.