Chapman harmless error in California

2026Even assuming arguendo that the trial court should have instructed that reckless indifference to human life includes consideration of whether the defendant “engages in criminal activity that a reasonable person would know involves a grave risk of death” (CALCRIM 540B & 703), the circumstances of the instant case lead us to conclude the error was harmless under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1976) 386 U.S. 18 .10 (See People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 [holding that a jury instruction omitting elements of robbery was subject to the Chapman harmless err

2026The use of the adjective ‘every’ in the definition indicates that a broad meaning was intended.” (Baniqued, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 21 .) 16 Relatedly, Madruga contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to modify the instruction on count 2 to include section 599c’s exception for killing an animal for food because that “exception directly bears on an element of animal cruelty: the intent of the person killing the animal.” Madruga further asserts that the court’s failure to modify the animal cruelty instruction to include the section 599c exception was prejudicial under the Chapman harml

2007Our high court has recently confirmed that the deprivation of the right to a jury trial on the issue of aggravating circumstances for sentencing is reviewed under a Chapman harmless error standard. ( Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 838, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ; *248 see also Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [Blakely sentencing error is not structural error mandating reversal without consideration of whether error is harmless].) Under this analysis, "we must determine whether, if the question of the existence of an aggravating circumsta

2007Our high court has recently confirmed that the deprivation of the right to a jury trial on the issue of aggravating circumstances for sentencing is reviewed under a Chapman harmless error standard. ( Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 838, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ; *248 see also Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [Blakely sentencing error is not structural error mandating reversal without consideration of whether error is harmless].) Under this analysis, "we must determine whether, if the question of the existence of an aggravating circumsta

2022While Sandoval directs that at least one aggravating circumstance must be proved to the Chapman harmless error standard to satisfy the Sixth Amendment (i.e., for it to be permissible for the trial court to impose the upper term consistent with the Sixth Amendment), ordinary errors of state law are subject to review pursuant to Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 .5 (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 171 [when a state statutory right to a jury determination is violated, such error “is state law error alone, and thus subject, under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, to the

2022While Sandoval directs that at least one aggravating circumstance must be proved to the Chapman harmless error standard to satisfy the Sixth Amendment (i.e., for it to be permissible for the trial court to impose the upper term consistent with the Sixth Amendment), ordinary errors of state law are subject to review pursuant to Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 .7 (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 171 [when a state statutory right to a jury determination is violated, such error “is state law error alone, and 7 The test under Watson is whether, “ ‘after an examination of the entire cause, i

2012(Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 583 .) We note in this regard that a Chapman harmless error analysis for instructional error typically includes review of the strength of the prosecution‘s case.

2012(Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 583 .) We note in this regard that a Chapman harmless error analysis for instructional error typically includes review of the strength of the prosecution’s case.

2023(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209, citing People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 .) However, like the appellant in Tran, Daniel and Elias have not persuaded us that the failure to bifurcate the gang enhancements created a fundamentally unfair trial within the meaning of the federal due process clause.

2023(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209, italics omitted.) The court’s denial of bifurcation in this case did not cause fundamental unfairness such that the Chapman harmless error standard would apply.

2007The United States Supreme Court “has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range of errors and has recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless.” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 306 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) As relevant here, in United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 96 , 103 S.Ct. 1974 ], the Supreme Court evaluated the prosecutor’s improper comments on the defendant’s silence at trial, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right, under the Chapman harmless error standard.

2007The United States Supreme Court “has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range of errors and has recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless.” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 306 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) As relevant here, in United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 96 , 103 S.Ct. 1974 ], the Supreme Court evaluated the prosecutor’s improper comments on the defendant’s silence at trial, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right, under the Chapman harmless error standard.

2014(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; see also In re J.F. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 321, 336 [assessing prejudice where due process violations occurred]; In re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 387 [“when there is error in a notice the question is whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”]; In re Mark A. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1144-1146 [acknowledging that the weight of California authority applies the Chapman harmless error analysis to federal constitutional questions raised in juvenile dependency proceedings].) Father contends he was not afforded an opportunit

2013(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; In re Mark A. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1146 [“the weight of authority in California applies the Chapman harmless error standard in juvenile dependency proceedings where the error is of constitutional dimension”].) Had the court postponed setting the section 366.26 hearing until the paternity testing was complete, the outcome here would have been no different.

2023(Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 408–409.) Moreover, Dunn noted that the California Supreme Court in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 holds that at least one aggravating factor must be proven to the Chapman harmless error standard to satisfy the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but ordinary errors of state law are subject to review pursuant to Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 .

2023(Dunn, supra, at pp. 398, 405-410.) The court in Dunn disagreed with the Flores standard, concluding that “[a] reviewing court concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the facts underlying a single circumstance in aggravation true beyond a reasonable doubt is insufficient to conclude that any error under section 1170, subdivision (b) was harmless.” (Dunn, supra, at pp. 405-406; see also Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 38 465-468.) And the Dunn court disagreed with Lopez that the Chapman harmless error standard must be applied in the first step of analysis to dete

2018(See People v. Ochoa (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 575 , 584, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 703 ( Ochoa ) [defendant's confrontation clause argument rejected on appeal because defendant's failure to object to the expert's testimony on confrontation clause grounds resulted in an "undeveloped record" about the testimonial nature of the statements upon which the prosecutor's gang expert relied].) *937 Furthermore, as we note post , when an evidentiary error is forfeited and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has been made, we apply the less burdensome Strickland standard for prejudice instead of the stricter Ch

2018(See People v. Ochoa (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 575 , 584, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 703 ( Ochoa ) [defendant's confrontation clause argument rejected on appeal because defendant's failure to object to the expert's testimony on confrontation clause grounds resulted in an "undeveloped record" about the testimonial nature of the statements upon which the prosecutor's gang expert relied].) *937 Furthermore, as we note post , when an evidentiary error is forfeited and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has been made, we apply the less burdensome Strickland standard for prejudice instead of the stricter Ch

2024(See, e.g., Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 726 [arguments not raised on appeal are forfeited].) In any case, Robert has not established that the denial of a continuance gave rise to a violation of the United States Constitution and thus has not demonstrated that the Chapman harmless error standard should apply.

2024(See, e.g., Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 726 [arguments not raised on appeal are forfeited].) In any case, Robert has not established that the denial of a continuance gave rise to a violation of the United States Constitution and thus has not demonstrated that the Chapman harmless error standard should apply.

2026The use of the adjective ‘every’ in the definition indicates that a broad meaning was intended.” (Baniqued, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 21 .) 16 Relatedly, Madruga contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to modify the instruction on count 2 to include section 599c’s exception for killing an animal for food because that “exception directly bears on an element of animal cruelty: the intent of the person killing the animal.” Madruga further asserts that the court’s failure to modify the animal cruelty instruction to include the section 599c exception was prejudicial under the Chapman harml

2023(Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 408–409.) Moreover, Dunn noted that the California Supreme Court in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 holds that at least one aggravating factor must be proven to the Chapman harmless error standard to satisfy the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but ordinary errors of state law are subject to review pursuant to Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 .

2023(Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 408–409.) Moreover, Dunn noted that the California Supreme Court in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 holds that at least one aggravating factor must be proven to the Chapman harmless error standard to satisfy the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but ordinary errors of state law are subject to review pursuant to Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 .

2022(Dunn, at p. 408.) Dunn relied on People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 (Sandoval), in which our high court held that a defendant’s federal constitutional right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors used to enhance a sentence imposed under the former determinate sentencing law is not violated so long as one aggravating factor meets the Chapman harmless error standard.

2024(In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 602.) “In other words, if ‘“[n]o reasonable jury”’ would have found in favor of the defendant on the missing fact [or invalid theory], given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 580, quoting People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 15 .) “‘To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is … to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’”

2023We explained that “a reviewing court may hold the error harmless where it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings that would support a valid theory of liability. ( Aledamat, supra, 11 Defendant repeatedly refers to the Chapman harmless error standard in his briefing.

2026Even assuming arguendo that the trial court should have instructed that reckless indifference to human life includes consideration of whether the defendant “engages in criminal activity that a reasonable person would know involves a grave risk of death” (CALCRIM 540B & 703), the circumstances of the instant case lead us to conclude the error was harmless under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1976) 386 U.S. 18 .10 (See People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 [holding that a jury instruction omitting elements of robbery was subject to the Chapman harmless err

2024(In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 602.) “In other words, if ‘“[n]o reasonable jury”’ would have found in favor of the defendant on the missing fact [or invalid theory], given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 580, quoting People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 15 .) “‘To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is … to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’”

2020(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 .) Under the Chapman harmless-error standard of review, “[t]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2016As discussed in the factual background, ante, witnesses identified defendants' and Ross's clothing as the clothing the perpetrators wore, the defendants were stopped in a red Camaro similar to the one seen leaving the scene of the robbery, 8 Under the Watson harmless error standard, the trial court's judgment may be overturned only if "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error." (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Under the Chapman harmless error standard, "an otherwise valid conviction should not be

2015(People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 214 .) That inquiry requires us to ask “whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.]” (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 448 ].) A reviewing court conducting a Chapman harmless error analysis “looks to the ‘whole record’ to evaluate the error’s effect on the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 .) Looking at the record as a whole, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error here did not contribute to the verdic

2015(Cf. People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 621 .) In Aranda, our Supreme Court stated, “The reviewing court conducting a harmless error analysis under [Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (Chapman)] looks to the ‘whole record’ to evaluate the error’s effect on the jury’s verdict. [Citation.] We note in this regard that a Chapman harmless error analysis for instructional error typically includes review of the strength of the prosecution’s case. [Citation.] Indeed, the harmless error inquiry for the erroneous omission of instruction on one or more elements of a crime

2006(Chapman, supra, at p. 24 .) The nature of the Chapman harmless error inquiry was clarified in Yates, and addressed in Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ] (Sullivan).

2006(Chapman, supra, at p. 24 .) The nature of the Chapman harmless error inquiry was clarified in Yates, and addressed in Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ] (Sullivan).

1995Therefore, to quote the aforementioned analysis in Pope v. Illinois, supra, 481 U.S. at page 503 , footnote 6 [ 95 L.Ed.2d at page 447 ], and to apply it: “[T]he facts found by the jury were such that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that if the jury had never heard the impermissible instruction its verdict would have been the same.” Further, the application of the Chapman harmless error standard to the present case is consistent with the policy concerns underlying such a test as articulated by the United States Supreme Court.

1995Therefore, to quote the aforementioned analysis in Pope v. Illinois, supra, 481 U.S. at page 503 , footnote 6 [ 95 L.Ed.2d at page 447 ], and to apply it: “[T]he facts found by the jury were such that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that if the jury had never heard the impermissible instruction its verdict would have been the same.” Further, the application of the Chapman harmless error standard to the present case is consistent with the policy concerns underlying such a test as articulated by the United States Supreme Court.

2025(See People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260, fn.7 [the Chapman harmless error standard3 applies in reviewing failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory].) Here, the guilty verdict and the jury’s finding that Hernandez committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated first degree murder precluded any possibility of also finding that Hernandez acted under heat of passion because “voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion is ‘manifestly inconsistent’ with premeditation and deliberation.” (Schuller, supra, at p. 265 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); see People

2025(See People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260, fn.7 [the Chapman harmless error standard3 applies in reviewing failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory].) Here, the guilty verdict and the jury’s finding that Hernandez committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated first degree murder precluded any possibility of also finding that Hernandez acted under heat of passion because “voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion is ‘manifestly inconsistent’ with premeditation and deliberation.” (Schuller, supra, at p. 265 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); see People

1997(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]; People v. McArthur (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 619, 628-630 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 ]; People v. Wilder (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 489, 496-505 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 ].) The United States Supreme Court in Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 583 [ 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 ] described the Chapman harmless error test as follows: “ ‘ Chapman mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless.’ [Citation.] The question is whether, ‘on t

1997(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]; People v. McArthur (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 619, 628-630 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 ]; People v. Wilder (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 489, 496-505 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 ].) The United States Supreme Court in Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 583 [ 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 ] described the Chapman harmless error test as follows: “ ‘ Chapman mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless.’ [Citation.] The question is whether, ‘on t

2024(In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 602.) “In other words, if ‘“[n]o reasonable jury”’ would have found in favor of the defendant on the missing fact [or invalid theory], given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 580, quoting People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 15 .) “‘To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is … to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’”

2021Under Chapman, “[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13 (Aledamat).) Under Chapman, the People must show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24; Aledamat, at pp. 12-13.) “ ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to

2024(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 383–384 [unauthorized ex parte communications between the judge and jury are subject to the Chapman harmless error standard of review].) Here, the ex parte communication was not prejudicial because the court’s response was neutral, did not favor either side, and properly stated the law.

2024(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 383–384 [unauthorized ex parte communications between the judge and jury are subject to the Chapman harmless error standard of review].) Here, the ex parte communication was not prejudicial because the court’s response was neutral, did not favor either side, and properly stated the law.