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11 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences2021See Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 2020Id. at 4 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966)). | 2 | 3 |
Sullivan v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2006“There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). 2006“There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 2 |
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021See Brecht, 507 U.S at 637 (citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776 .) (“The imbalance of the costs and benefits of applying the Chapman harmless-error standard on collateral review counsels in favor of applying a less onerous standard on habeas review of constitutional error. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Love v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence." Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . [23] 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). [24] Id. at 547 . [25] See, | 1 | 1 |
Draheim v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence." Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . [23] 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). [24] Id. at 547 . [25] See, | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence." Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . [23] 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). [24] Id. at 547 . [25] See, | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence." Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . [23] 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). [24] Id. at 547 . [25] See, | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence." Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . [23] 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). [24] Id. at 547 . [25] See, | 1 | 1 |
Gutierrez v. Stategreen1 sentence2006And in Gutierrez v. State, 150 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.), the Van Arsdall analysis and assumption were applied to a Crawford error. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bagleyred2 sentences1996See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. at 3382 n. 9. 1996See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. at 3382 n. 9. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2006In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), the Supreme Court recognized that the Chapman harmless-error rule is applicable only to “trial errors,” i.e., isolated and limited errors which occurred during the presentation of the case to the trier of fact, and which may, therefore, be “quantitatively assessed” in the context of the entire trial. 2006In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), the Supreme Court recognized that the Chapman harmless-error rule is applicable only to “trial errors,” i.e., isolated and limited errors which occurred during the presentation of the case to the trier of fact, and which may, therefore, be “quantitatively assessed” in the context of the entire trial. | 4 | 1994–2006 |
Neder v. United States
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 4 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Coy v. Iowa
green
2 sentences2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence.” Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . . 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). . 2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence.” Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . . 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Shelby v. State
green
2 sentences2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence." Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . [23] 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). [24] Id. at 547 . [25] See, 2006Nevertheless, the court agreed that, like the other Confrontation Clause violations, this one was subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but it noted that "[a]n assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence.” Id. at 1021-22 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 . . 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences1996Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. -, - and -n. 9, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 1567 and 1567 n. 9, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 , 507 and 507 n. 9 (1995). 8 But, because the materiality standard for the knowing use of perjured testimony is the Chapman harmless error standard, the materiality standard is more stringent (on the State) than either the state or federal habeas harmless error standards. 1996Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. -, - and -n. 9, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 1567 and 1567 n. 9, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 , 507 and 507 n. 9 (1995). 8 But, because the materiality standard for the knowing use of perjured testimony is the Chapman harmless error standard, the materiality standard is more stringent (on the State) than either the state or federal habeas harmless error standards. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Satterwhite v. Texas
green
2 sentences1989Given the single question presented, see ante at n. 1, the Supreme Court first decided that “the use of Dr. Grigson’s testimony at the capital sentencing proceeding on the issue of future dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment,” id., at -, 108 S.Ct., at 1797 , 100 L.Ed.2d, at 293 ; then it held that “the Chapman harmless error rule applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith,” id., at -, 108 S.Ct., at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 295 ; finally, it concluded, “Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we find it impossibl 1989Given the single question presented, see ante at n. 1, the Supreme Court first decided that “the use of Dr. Grigson’s testimony at the capital sentencing proceeding on the issue of future dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment,” id., at -, 108 S.Ct., at 1797 , 100 L.Ed.2d, at 293 ; then it held that “the Chapman harmless error rule applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith,” id., at -, 108 S.Ct., at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 295 ; finally, it concluded, “Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we find it impossibl | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences1989Thereafter, on June 30, 1988, in ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2891 , 101 L.Ed.2d 926 David Lee Powell, Petitioner, v. Texas, the Supreme Court ordered a summary disposition of this cause under Rule 23.1. [3] First it granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and granted his petition for writ of certiorari; then it entered a separate order stating in pertinent part, viz: THIS CAUSE having been submitted on the petition for writ of certiorari and response thereto, ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the above court in this cause is vacated, and tha 1989Thereafter, on June 30, 1988, in — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2891 , 101 L.Ed.2d 926 David Lee Powell, Petitioner, v. Texas, the Supreme Court ordered a summary disposition of this cause under Rule 23.1. 3 First it granted leave to proceed in forma pauper-is and granted his petition for writ of cer-tiorari; then it entered a separate order stating in pertinent part, viz: THIS CAUSE having been submitted on the petition for writ of certiorari and response thereto, ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the above court in this cause is vacated, and that th | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.