reasonable efforts instruction in District of Columbia

2019See In re J.M. , 193 A.3d at 785 ("the reasonable efforts standard does not burden the agency with the additional responsibility of holding the hand of a recalcitrant parent" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ).

2019Still, even accepting that D.C did complete many of the steps required by the plan, 14 See In re J.M., 193 A.3d at 785 (“the reasonable efforts standard does not burden the agency with the additional responsibility of holding the hand of a recalcitrant parent” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 49 as noted, both the magistrate judge and the reviewing judge specifically addressed this argument, finding that it is not enough for a parent to simply go through the motions of a plan, as participation does not equal progress; rather, the parent must meaningfully progress toward remedy

2000Id. at 262 ; see Cosby v. United States, 614 A.2d 1291 , 1296 & n. 6 (D.C.1992) (noting that defendant [is] entitled to reasonable efforts [re]instruction upon request).

1996Id. at 262 ; see Cosby v. United States, 614 A.2d 1291 , 1296 & n. 6 (D.C.1992) (noting that defendant entitled to reasonable efforts re instruction upon request).

2012Although the standard practice is to charge the jury initially with an "acquittal first” instruction, "a defendant who timely requests the reasonable efforts instruction is entitled to it at the time of the initial charge to the juiy.” Jackson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1379, 1382 (D.C.1996) (citing Wright v. United States, 588 A.2d 260, 262 (D.C.1991)). .

2000Subsequently, because each instruction presents distinct tactical advantages and disadvantages, and because the defendant’s liberty is at stake, we held in Wright v. United States, 588 A.2d 260 (D.C.1991), that a defendant who timely requests the reasonable efforts instruction is entitled to it at the time of the initial charge to the jury.

2014The trial court disagreed: “I see it beneficial to judicial economy to attempt to get a unanimous verdict[.]” In the trial court’s view, “the case law is clear,” and this court’s decision in Jackson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1379, in particular, stands for the proposition “that the court has discretion to order additional deliberations after a reasonable efforts instruction has been given and a verdict has been reached on the lesser.” While the court thought it “more prudent” to give Mr. Douglas’s jury *1049 the milder “Gallagher” anti-deadlock instruction, 4 it concluded firmly that the law

2014When the jury believes it has exhausted all reasonable efforts and the trial court, disagreeing with the jury's self-assessment, still orders it to further deliberate on the greater charge, "a danger exists that, from the juiy’s perspective, the trial court may appear to be withdrawing the reasonable efforts instruction and insisting upon a verdict on the greater offense.” Jackson, 683 A.2d at 1384-85 .

1996Jurors favoring conviction on the lesser offense are thereby relieved of the pressure of a zero-sum choice between “throw[ing] in the sponge” on the greater offense and holding *1383 out for a mistrial “that would leave the defendant with no conviction at all.” Wright, supra, 588 A.2d at 261 (quoting United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 , 98 S.Ct. 1647 , 56 L.Ed.2d 84 (1978)).

1996It also acknowledged that the instruction conformed "to the procedure approved by this court and the District of Columbia Circuit when greater and lesser included offenses are charged." Id. [3] Finally the Wright court observed that the acquittal first instruction was not "wrong as a matter of law." Id. at 262 (citing United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 , (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 , 98 S.Ct. 1647 , 56 *384 L.Ed.2d 84 (1978)).

2019See also In re Tw.P. , 756 A.2d 402 , 411 (D.C. 2000) (where mother did not fully comply with the plan, "the goal was changed to adoption [because] [i]t was decided that despite efforts to provide [the mother] with the services necessary to remedy her parenting deficiencies, she had made little progress towards reunification [and] lacked an understanding of the special needs of the children.").

2019In light of the record of J.T.’s repeated non-objections to the court’s “reasonable efforts” findings described above, and especially given J.T.’s assertion that permanent guardianship rather than reunification is an appropriate permanency goal for D.T.,17 we accept the District’s argument that J.T. forfeited the issue of whether the agency made reasonable efforts to help J.T. achieve reunification, except insofar as the reasonable-efforts requirement entailed providing J.T. with a reasonable plan for achieving reunification.18 Whether J.T. forfeited her no- reasonable-case-plan claim and whet

2018As other courts have reasoned, the reasonable efforts standard does not "burden the agency with the additional responsibility of holding the hand of a recalcitrant parent," In re Rosalie H ., 889 A.2d 199 , 208 (R.I. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), and when a parent has refused to cooperate with the child welfare agency in its efforts to achieve reunification, that refusal to cooperate can be a consideration in support of a finding of reasonable efforts.

2018See id. at 209 . 13 We also agree with other courts that "the issue is not whether there was anything more that [the agency] could have done, but whether the agency's case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of this case." E.g. , In re V.B.-S ., No. 13AP-478, 2013-Ohio-5448 , 2013 WL 6569857 , at *P47 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2013) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

2018See id. at 209 . 13 We also agree with other courts that "the issue is not whether there was anything more that [the agency] could have done, but whether the agency's case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of this case." E.g. , In re V.B.-S ., No. 13AP-478, 2013-Ohio-5448 , 2013 WL 6569857 , at *P47 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2013) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

2005Rather, the trial court “g[a]ve a temperate prod to a ‘hung jury’ so as to bring out a verdict.” Id. at 380 (citing Epperson v. United States, 495 A.2d 1170, 1174 (D.C.1985) (quotations omitted)).

1996(Robert) Jones v. United States, 620 A.2d 249, 251 (D.C.1993). 8 .

1996See, e.g., (Robert) Jones, supra note 8, 620 A.2d at 252 (reasonable efforts instruction may increase the probability that the jury will convict on the lesser offense); (Nathan) Jones, supra, 544 A.2d at 1253 (instruction may cause conviction of an offense less serious than the government wanted).

1996See, e.g., (Robert) Jones, supra note 8, 620 A.2d at 252 (reasonable efforts instruction may increase the probability that the jury will convict on the lesser offense); (Nathan) Jones, supra, 544 A.2d at 1253 (instruction may cause conviction of an offense less serious than the government wanted).