reasonable efforts inquiry in Oregon

2022W., 277 Or App 37 , 44 & n 4, 370 P3d 543 (2016); how- ever, we also consider “whether a parent has attempted to make appropriate changes in his or her life” and “whether parents ignored or refused to participate in plans sug- gested by the state,” Dept. of Human Services v. S. W., 267 Or App 277, 286 , 340 P3d 675 (2014); see also id. at 292 n 7 (“[A] parent’s conduct and response to services that are offered is relevant to the juvenile court’s determination of whether DHS has made ‘reasonable efforts’ under the total- ity of the circumstances.”).

2017While a juvenile court may consider the “length and circumstances of a parent’s incarceration” in assessing DHS’s efforts, see, e.g., id. at 294, the reasonable-efforts inquiry focuses on whether DHS provided the parent with an opportunity to demonstrate improvement regarding the jurisdictional bases, see M.

2017Put bluntly, when a parent contends that DHS’s efforts have not been reasonable because the agency has declined to provide a particular service, the court’s ‘reasonable efforts’ determination should include something resembling a cost-benefit analysis, at least when—as here—the agency itself has deemed that service to be ‘key’ to the reunification plan.” Id. at 418 (emphasis in original).

2017K., 257 Or App at 417 (explaining that “DHS must at least attempt to engage and work with parents, even those who are incarcerated,” in order to “give the parents a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate their ability to adjust their conduct and become minimally adequate parents” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

2016Specifically, she notes that we adhered to the reasoning of Nagle in Vockrodt, 147 Or App at 7 (“[T]he repeal, renumbering and reenactment of ORS 419.561(1) [as ORS 419B.200(1)] do not abrogate the analysis in Nagle”).

2016K., 230 Or App at 78 (the assistance offered by DHS before and right after the children’s removal was a factor in the reasonable efforts analysis).