reasonable efforts requirement in New Mexico

2018Kim, supra, at 316-17. {40} The New Mexico Legislature has adopted the same approach to the reasonable efforts requirement: “Reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify the family, with the paramount concern being the child’s health and safety.” See § 32A-4-22(C) (2009, amended 2016); see also In re Grace H., 2014-NMSC-034 , ¶ 45, 335 P.3d 746 (“A child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.” (quoting NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-3(A) (2009))).

2018Kim, supra , at 316-17. {40} The New Mexico Legislature has adopted the same approach to the reasonable efforts requirement: "Reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify the family, with the paramount concern being the child's health and safety." See § 32A-4-22(C) (2009, amended 2016) ; see also In re Grace H. , 2014-NMSC-034 , ¶ 45, 335 P.3d 746 ("A child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern." (quoting NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-3(A) (2009) ) ).

2016See generally In re Kenny F., 1990-NMCA-004 , ¶ 15, 109 N.M. 472 , 786 P.2d 699 (“The reasonable-efforts requirement is a central feature of recent legislation governing the protection of children.”), overruled on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1993-NMCA-145 , ¶ 28, 117 N.M. 31 , 868 P.2d 1256 , aff’d in part and rev’d in part by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1995-NMSC-026 .

2016See generally In re Kenny F., 1990-NMCA-004 , ¶ 15, 109 N.M. 472 , 786 P.2d 699 (“The reasonable-efforts requirement is a central feature of recent legislation governing the protection of children.”), overruled on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1993-NMCA-145 , ¶ 28, 117 N.M. 31 , 868 P.2d 1256 , aff’d in part and rev’d in part by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1995-NMSC-026 .

2016See generally In re Kenny F., 1990-NMCA-004 , ¶ 15, 109 N.M. 472 , 786 P.2d 699 (“The reasonable-efforts requirement is a central feature of recent legislation governing the protection of children.”), overruled on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1993-NMCA-145 , ¶ 28, 117 N.M. 31 , 868 P.2d 1256 , aff’d in part and rev’d in part by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1995-NMSC-026 .

2016See generally In re Kenny F., 1990-NMCA-004 , ¶ 15, 109 N.M. 472 , 786 P.2d 699 (“The reasonable-efforts requirement is a central feature of recent legislation governing the protection of children.”), overruled on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1993-NMCA-145 , ¶ 28, 117 N.M. 31 , 868 P.2d 1256 , aff’d in part and rev’d in part by In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1995-NMSC-026 .

2024As indicated in our calendar notice, the termination of Father’s parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing nature. [CN 2-5] Moreover, Children were placed with relatives and Father has failed to identify any inadequacies in that placement. [CN 7-8; 3 RP 593] See generally Laura J., 2013-NMCA-057 , ¶ 61 (acknowledging that CYFD is required to locate, identify, and consider relatives with whom Children might be placed); see also State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v

2024As indicated in our calendar notice, the termination of Father’s parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing nature. [CN 2-5] Moreover, Children were placed with relatives and Father has failed to identify any inadequacies in that placement. [CN 7-8; 3 RP 593] See generally Laura J., 2013-NMCA-057 , ¶ 61 (acknowledging that CYFD is required to locate, identify, and consider relatives with whom Children might be placed); see also State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v

2024As indicated in our calendar notice, the termination of Father’s parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing nature. [CN 2-5] Moreover, Children were placed with relatives and Father has failed to identify any inadequacies in that placement. [CN 7-8; 3 RP 593] See generally Laura J., 2013-NMCA-057 , ¶ 61 (acknowledging that CYFD is required to locate, identify, and consider relatives with whom Children might be placed); see also State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v

2019Our courts have interpreted the term “foreseeable future” to refer to corrective change within “a reasonably definite time or within the near future.” Patricia H., 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {33} Testimony at the TPR hearing established that at the time the hearing was held, Mother was not engaged in services, had not made any progress in addressing her substance abuse or mental health issues, was not under the care of any medical providers, had not seen Child in over four months, and did not demonstrate any improvement in her parenting skills when she

2015Giving the parent a treatment plan and waiting for him to complete it would constitute passive efforts.”); In re J.S., 2008 OIC CIV APP 15, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 590 (stating that active efforts requires more than pointing the parent in the right direction, it “requires ‘leading the horse to water’ ”). {18} Many jurisdictions have held that the active efforts requirement imposes a greater burden than the reasonable efforts requirement of various states.

2015See In re J.S., 2008 OK CIV APP 15 , ¶ 14 (recognizing that the majority of other states’ courts that have interpreted the ICWA have held that the “active efforts” standard requires more effort than the “reasonable efforts” standard in non-ICWA cases); In re C.D., 2008 UT App 477, ¶ 34 , 200 P.3d 194 (accord).

2002We understand Mother’s first argument to be a contention that the due process requirement of clear and convincing evidence established by Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), is violated.

2002We understand Mother’s first argument to be a contention that the due process requirement of clear and convincing evidence established by Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), is violated.

2002See In re Custody & Guardianship of Marino S., 181 Misc.2d 264 , 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 825 (Fam.Ct.1999).

2002See In re Custody & Guardianship of Marino S., 181 Misc.2d 264 , 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 825 (Fam.Ct.1999).

2002See State v. Chandler, 119 N.M. 727, 735 , 895 P.2d 249, 257 (Ct.App.1995) (holding that actions of counsel in failing to raise an issue are not prejudicial when the issue has no merit). {10} Second, Mother complains that the 1999 reasonable efforts amendments, both on their face and as applied to her, violate due process because (1) they eliminate a required burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, (2) they eliminate the necessity of specifically proving that reasonable efforts would actually be futile, and (3) they allow the use of stale evidence, i.e., once a parent’s rights are te

2002See State v. Chandler, 119 N.M. 727, 735 , 895 P.2d 249, 257 (Ct.App.1995) (holding that actions of counsel in failing to raise an issue are not prejudicial when the issue has no merit). {10} Second, Mother complains that the 1999 reasonable efforts amendments, both on their face and as applied to her, violate due process because (1) they eliminate a required burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, (2) they eliminate the necessity of specifically proving that reasonable efforts would actually be futile, and (3) they allow the use of stale evidence, i.e., once a parent’s rights are te