strength presumption in Iowa

1933The facts and circumstances surrounding each disappearance which tend to affect the inference of continued life or early death that the minds of reasonable men, anxious only to arrive at the truth, would draw, should be received in evidence in the trial of these eases; and then, guided by the established presumption that one who disappears under ordinary circumstances is presumed to live for seven years thereafter, the fact of continued life or previous death at the important date should be determined by the jury if there is sufficient evidence in the case to warrant a finding that the establi

1927The *560 undisputed record sufficiently sustains the plaintiff’s case in this respect.” In Lemire v. National Life Assn., 194 Iowa 1245 , we said: ‘ ‘ The burden is upon the plaintiff to establish by a fair preponderance the essentials inhering in the presumption, and it must be made to affirmatively appear: (1) That the person has been absent from his home or usual place of abode for seven years. (2) That no intelligence has been received concerning him during said period by those persons who would naturally or likely have heard of of from him, if living. (3) That the person invoking the pres

1963Co., 64 Vt. 221 [ 24 A. 992 ]." Judge Weaver concludes: "The attitude of this court with reference to the strength of the presumption against suicide is shown in the Stephenson case, from which we hereinbefore quoted.

1963Co., 64 Vt. 221 .” Judge Weaver concludes: “The attitude of this court with reference to the strength of the presumption against suicide is shown in the Stephenson case, from which we hereinbefore quoted.

1957Co., 204 Mo. App. 76 , 221 S.W. 142 , all supra. As previously stated, plaintiff’s Count II asks judgment against the Casualty company on the strength of rule 3, Rules of Civil Procedure (which supersedes section 10982, Code of 1939, and similar prior statutes in effect since Code of 1851), providing: “Public bond.

1957Co., 204 Mo. App. 76 , 221 S.W. 142 , all supra. As previously stated, plaintiff’s Count II asks judgment against the Casualty company on the strength of rule 3, Rules of Civil Procedure (which supersedes section 10982, Code of 1939, and similar prior statutes in effect since Code of 1851), providing: “Public bond.

1949As to the strength of such presumption, see Craven v. Selway, 216 Iowa 505, 508 , 246 N. W. 821 , and cases therein cited.

1949As to the strength of such presumption, see Craven v. Selway, 216 Iowa 505, 508 , 246 N. W. 821 , and cases therein cited.

1926In that case, where it appeared that the testator had had a *591 stroke of apoplexy three years before the will was made, we said: “But this court has never held (and, so far as we have examined the eases, no other) that proof of insanity at a stated period, without reference to the particular circumstances connected therewith, is sufficient to authorize the inference of insanity at a remote subsequent period.” In Jones v. Schaffner, supra, we said that the strength of the presumption arising from a prior adjudication of unsoundness of mind is lessened in proportion to the remoteness of the ad

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1920In re Will of Fenton, 97 Iowa 192 ; Linkmeyer v. Brandt, 107 Iowa 750 ; In re Estate of Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242 ; Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72 ( 206 S. W. 55 ); Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 484 ; State v. McMurry, 61 Kan. 87 ( 58 Pac. 961 ); Sergeson v. Sealy, 2 Atk. 412 (26 English Reprint 648); Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507 ; Mutual Life Ins.

1916In re Estate of Colton, 129 Iowa 542 ; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa 331 .

1916In re Estate of Colton, 129 Iowa 542 ; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa 331 .

1915In Gulliver’s case, 163 Iowa 123 , an instruction does charge that the testimony in support of an alibi must show that defendant was so far away that he could not be present at the scene of the crime.

1898In the case of White v. Hampton, 10 Iowa, 238 , we said: “What will amount to a stated account from the presumed acquiesence of the parties arising from lapse of time, and their failure to object to the same within a reasonable period, must depend upon circumstances to be judged- of by the nature of the transaction and the habitsi of business and course of trade.” It was a fair question for the jury to-determine whether there was such acquiescence by lapse of time as that there was an account stated, and, if there was, whether the items of the account were correct. 8 IV.