strength claim in Texas

2024The United States Supreme Court held in Brady that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 12 Nevertheless, “a defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim.” Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim.

2023But “a defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant[] and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim.” Id. (citing Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim.

2006"Although a motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of the speedy trial claim, a defendant's motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim." Phillips , 650 S.W.2d at 401 (citing McCarty , 498 S.W.2d at 216 ); see also Marquez v. State , 165 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd).

2002In McCarty v. State, 498 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978), the Court noted: [a]lthough a motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of the speedy trial claim, a defendant's motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim.

2009App. 1983) (“[A] defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim.”); Parkerson v. State , 942 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (holding that appellant’s request for dismissal, rather than speedy trial, weakened his speedy-trial claim).

2009App. 1983) (“[A] defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim.”); Parkerson v. State, 942 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (holding that appellant’s request for dismissal, rather than speedy trial, weakened his speedy-trial claim).

2005Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck , 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984), overruled on other grounds , 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989); Griffin v. Rowden , 702 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1985One may not recover in an action for malicious prosecution because the opposing party was mistaken about the strength of a claim. 669 S.W.2d at 107 (emphasis added and citations omitted).

2007A defendant’s request for a dismissal rather than a prompt trial setting “may attenuate the strength of his claim.” State v. Rangel, 980 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2007A defendant’s request for a dismissal rather than a prompt trial setting “may attenuate the strength of his claim.” State v. Rangel, 980 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2002See also Mabra v. State, 997 S.W.2d 770, 777-78 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. ref'd).

2002See also Mabra v. State, 997 S.W.2d 770, 777-78 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1999, pet. ref’d).

2005Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck , 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984), overruled on other grounds , 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989); Griffin v. Rowden , 702 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2005Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984), overruled on other grounds, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989); Griffin v. Rowden, 702 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2005See Gilbert v. State , 874 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. App. C Houston [1 Dist.] 1994, pet. ref = d) (stating the number of factors present is less important than the strength of the factors in establishing the elements of the crime).

2005See Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290, 298 (TexApp.-Houston [1 Dist.] 1994, pet. refd) (stating the number of factors present is less important than the strength of the factors in establishing the elements of the crime).

2005Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck , 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984), overruled on other grounds , 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989); Griffin v. Rowden , 702 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2005Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984), overruled on other grounds, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989); Griffin v. Rowden, 702 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2017Davis filed two more motions that also prayed only for dismissal of the indictment: a November 19, 2014 "Motion to Set Aside Indictment for Failure to Afford Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial," and a July 14, 2015 amended "Motion to Set Aside Indictment for Failure to Afford Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial." See Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 281 (noting that "[t]he constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not dismissal of the charges"); Phillips , 650 S.W.2d at 401 ("Although a motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of the speedy trial claim, a defendant's motivation in aski

2011Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 .

2015See De Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 159 (Tex. Crim.App.1993) (under Ake , an expert is appointed to "provide technical assistance to the accused, to help evaluate the strength of his defense, to offer his own expert diagnosis at trial if it is favorable to that defense, and to identify the weaknesses in the State’s case, if any, by testifying himself and/or preparing counsel to cross-examine opposing experts.”).

2003This expert is to provide “technical assistance to the accused, to help evaluate the strength of his defense, to offer his own expert diagnosis at trial if it is favorable to the defense and to identify the weaknesses in the State’s case, if any, by testifying himself and/or preparing counsel to cross-examine opposing experts.” De Freece , 848 S.W.2d at 159 .

2006"A motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of a speedy-trial claim, but a defendant's motivation in asking for a dismissal rather than a prompt trial is, clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim." Ervin , 125 S.W.3d at 547 (citing Phillips v. State , 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim.

2005“A motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of a speedy-trial claim, but a defendant’s motivation in asking for a dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim.” Ervin , 125 S.W.3d at 547 ( citing Phillips v. State , 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim.

2024Our discussion about the arguments that Allen and Crown raise about how the Tax Code applies in this case are addressed in the Court’s discussion of Allen’s first and second issues. 21City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005). 28 According to Allen, the trial court erred in granting Crown’s motion for two reasons.

2024App. 1983); see Parkerson v. State, 942 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (“Appellant’s request for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial weakens his claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy trial.”). 28 where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S. Ct. at 1196– 97.

2024App. 1983); see Parkerson v. State, 942 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (“Appellant’s request for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial weakens his claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy trial.”). 28 where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S. Ct. at 1196– 97.

2015Specifically, he contends that he was entitled to a hearing “to develop his claim that he would have gone to trial before a jury but for trial counsel providing insufficient information about the nature of the proceedings and the strength of the defense.” “The purposes of a new trial hearing are (1) to determine whether the case should be retried or (2) to complete the record for presenting issues on appeal.” Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.2009).

2015See id.; Lafleur v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91, 100 (Tex. Crim.

2006Furthermore, an accused's "sparse and delinquent assertions of his right to a speedy trial weigh in favor of the State's position." See Emery v. State , 881 S.W.2d 702, 709 (Tex. Crim.

2006"Although a motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of the speedy trial claim, a defendant's motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim." Phillips , 650 S.W.2d at 401 (citing McCarty , 498 S.W.2d at 216 ); see also Marquez v. State , 165 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd).

1998The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “a defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim.” Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), cited in Oliver v. State, 731 S.W.2d 149, 159 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, pet. ref'd).

1996Phillips, 650 S.W.2d at 401 ; Orosco v. State, 827 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 960 , 113 S.Ct. 425 , 121 L.Ed.2d 347 (1992).

1996Orosco, 827 S.W.2d at 577 .