strength presumption in Pennsylvania

2001John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 317-19 , 571 A.2d 1380, 1386 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 , 111 S.Ct. 140 , 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990).

1992The strength of this presumption is evidenced by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306 , 571 A.2d 1380 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 140 , 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990).

2001John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 317-19 , 571 A.2d 1380, 1386 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 , 111 S.Ct. 140 , 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990).

1992The strength of this presumption is evidenced by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306 , 571 A.2d 1380 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 140 , 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990).

2001John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 317-19 , 571 A.2d 1380, 1386 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 , 111 S.Ct. 140 , 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990).

2001John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 317-19 , 571 A.2d 1380, 1386 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 , 111 S.Ct. 140 , 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990).

2020The “clear mandate of the statutory privilege” under the MHPA “is not overcome even by the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.” See Wilson, supra, at 295 ; V.B.T., supra, at 1329 . ____________________________________________ 19 The trial court in its opinion, along with D.G., the Commonwealth, and Segerra in their briefs, all cite to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality).

2020The “clear mandate of the statutory privilege” under the MHPA “is not overcome even by the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.” See Wilson, supra, at 295 ; V.B.T., supra, at 1329 . ____________________________________________ 19 The trial court in its opinion, along with D.G., the Commonwealth, and Segerra in their briefs, all cite to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality).

2020The “clear mandate of the statutory privilege” under the MHPA “is not overcome even by the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.” See Wilson, supra, at 295 ; V.B.T., supra, at 1329 . ____________________________________________ 19 The trial court in its opinion, along with D.G., the Commonwealth, and Segerra in their briefs, all cite to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality).

2020The “clear mandate of the statutory privilege” under the MHPA “is not overcome even by the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.” See Wilson, supra, at 295 ; V.B.T., supra, at 1329 . ____________________________________________ 19 The trial court in its opinion, along with D.G., the Commonwealth, and Segerra in their briefs, all cite to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality).

2020The “clear mandate of the statutory privilege” under the MHPA “is not overcome even by the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.” See Wilson, supra, at 295 ; V.B.T., supra, at 1329 . ____________________________________________ 19 The trial court in its opinion, along with D.G., the Commonwealth, and Segerra in their briefs, all cite to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality).

2020The “clear mandate of the statutory privilege” under the MHPA “is not overcome even by the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.” See Wilson, supra, at 295 ; V.B.T., supra, at 1329 . ____________________________________________ 19 The trial court in its opinion, along with D.G., the Commonwealth, and Segerra in their briefs, all cite to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality).

2020As Moyer, supra, made - 27 - J-A27035-19 clear, disclosure in criminal proceedings is not among the MHPA’s exceptions.19 The very existence of the unambiguous legislation of the MHPA signifies the strength of the privilege, and the legislature clearly determined that disclosure of mental health treatment records in legal actions or other proceedings is only relevant in “involuntary and voluntary mental health commitment proceedings.” Moyer, supra, at 1179 .

2020As Moyer, supra, made - 27 - J-A27035-19 clear, disclosure in criminal proceedings is not among the MHPA’s exceptions.19 The very existence of the unambiguous legislation of the MHPA signifies the strength of the privilege, and the legislature clearly determined that disclosure of mental health treatment records in legal actions or other proceedings is only relevant in “involuntary and voluntary mental health commitment proceedings.” Moyer, supra, at 1179 .

1971Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 210 , 166 A.2d 60 (1960), ‘One of the strongest presumptions in our law is that a mother has a prima facie right to her children over any other person.’ (p. 215) “The strength of the presumption has been demonstrated, for example, even in those cases where there has been a moral lapse which does not directly involve the care and treatment of the children.

1971Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 210 , 166 A.2d 60 (1960), ‘One of the strongest presumptions in our law is that a mother has a prima facie right to her children over any other person.’ (p. 215) “The strength of the presumption has been demonstrated, for example, even in those cases where there has been a moral lapse which does not directly involve the care and treatment of the children.

1996Kohler, supra at 391 , 654 A.2d at 572 .

1995O’Brien v. O’Brien, 390 Pa. 551 , 136 A.2d 451 (1957)).

1995O’Brien v. O’Brien, 390 Pa. 551 , 136 A.2d 451 (1957)).

1991Parker v. Washington Electric Street Railway Company, 207 Pa. 438 , 56 A. 1001 (1904).

1991Parker v. Washington Electric Street Railway Company, 207 Pa. 438 , 56 A. 1001 (1904).

1981I The defense of double jeopardy could be sustained here if, and only if, an “implied acquittal” had occurred under the rationale of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).

1981I The defense of double jeopardy could be sustained here if, and only if, an “implied acquittal” had occurred under the rationale of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).

1977On the strength of this analysis the court held that the decision not to divert a given case was "judicially cognizable." 71 N.J. at 109 , 363 A.2d at 334 .

1977On the strength of this analysis the court held that the decision not to divert a given case was "judicially cognizable." 71 N.J. at 109 , 363 A.2d at 334 .

1977In support of this holding, the court said, id. n. 13: Our determination in this regard is supported by two recent California cases which interpreted that state's statutory pretrial intervention scheme, in Cal.Penal Code, § 1000 et seq., People v. Reed, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 369 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 493 (1974); People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 520 P.2d 405 (Sup.Ct. 1974). . . .

1977In support of this holding, the court said, id. n. 13: Our determination in this regard is supported by two recent California cases which interpreted that state's statutory pretrial intervention scheme, in Cal.Penal Code, § 1000 et seq., People v. Reed, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 369 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 493 (1974); People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 520 P.2d 405 (Sup.Ct. 1974). . . .

1975The differentiation arose from the facts of Boyd v. Boyd, supra , which could have relied upon the tripartite test but chose to incorporate the six elements of the older rule because the additional elements were present in that case, and they naturally enhanced the strength of the presumption of undue influence.

1975The differentiation arose from the facts of Boyd v. Boyd, supra, which could have relied upon the tripartite test but chose to incorporate the six elements of the older rule because the additional elements were present in that case, and they naturally enhanced the strength of the presumption of undue influence.

1953This duty of the husband is unaffected by the married women’s property acts.” The case of Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 (1951), casts some doubt on the strength of the presumption, in view of the emancipation of women, but the general rule is only questioned, not rejected.

1951Sec. 25, p. 232, “. . . recovery rests upon the strength of the claim of one, rather than upon the weakness of the other.” The learned trial judge relied on Hamilton v. Police Beneficiary Association, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 210, 212 , 40 A. 2d 152 (1944) and Garland v. Craven, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 351 , 41 A. 2d 140 (1944).

1951Sec. 25, p. 232, “. . . recovery rests upon the strength of the claim of one, rather than upon the weakness of the other.” The learned trial judge relied on Hamilton v. Police Beneficiary Association, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 210, 212 , 40 A. 2d 152 (1944) and Garland v. Craven, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 351 , 41 A. 2d 140 (1944).

1951Sec. 25, p. 232, “. . . recovery rests upon the strength of the claim of one, rather than upon the weakness of the other.” The learned trial judge relied on Hamilton v. Police Beneficiary Association, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 210, 212 , 40 A. 2d 152 (1944) and Garland v. Craven, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 351 , 41 A. 2d 140 (1944).

1951Sec. 25, p. 232, “. . . recovery rests upon the strength of the claim of one, rather than upon the weakness of the other.” The learned trial judge relied on Hamilton v. Police Beneficiary Association, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 210, 212 , 40 A. 2d 152 (1944) and Garland v. Craven, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 351 , 41 A. 2d 140 (1944).

1923Whether this alleged a technical “misbranding” within the 8th and 9th sections of the act of Congress aforesaid, or not, it set up an unlawful act by the plaintiff, — the shipment of an adulterated drug, within the meaning of the act, and contrary to its provisions,— and while it might have been more clearly and concisely stated, we think it was sufficiently alleged to prevent a summary judgment and send the case to a jury: Lengert v. Chaninel, 205 Pa. 280 .

1916The strength of this presumption has been well stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fell in Woodside’s Est., 188 Pa. 45 , in these words: “A partial intestacy is not to be presumed if the words used will carry the whole estate, and a construction is to be given a will which will avoid a partial intestacy unless the contrary is unavoidable: Reimer’s Est., 159 Pa. 212 , and cases there cited.” This is but another way of stating that the presumed intent of the testator cannot be effectuated Avhere the will he actually executes will give it no support or discloses an intent contrary to that which

1916The strength of this presumption has been well stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fell in Woodside’s Est., 188 Pa. 45 , in these words: “A partial intestacy is not to be presumed if the words used will carry the whole estate, and a construction is to be given a will which will avoid a partial intestacy unless the contrary is unavoidable: Reimer’s Est., 159 Pa. 212 , and cases there cited.” This is but another way of stating that the presumed intent of the testator cannot be effectuated Avhere the will he actually executes will give it no support or discloses an intent contrary to that which