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12 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richmond v. Christiangreen2 sentences2020Establishing the fairness of a transaction can vary in difficulty “depending on the circumstances of a particular case and the strength of the presumption of undue influence.” Id. at *3 (citing Richmond v. Christian, 555 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1977)). 2017“The difficulty in proving the fairness of a transaction varies depending on the circumstances of a particular case and the strength of the presumption of undue influence.” In re Estate of Murdaugh, No. W2011-00041-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 6141067 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2011) (citing Richmond, 555 S.W.2d at 108 ). | 1 | 5 |
Roberts v. Chasegreen1 sentence2009The strength of the presumption of undue influence varies with the circumstances of each case, and therefore, “the strength of the rebutting evidence must vary proportionally.”7 Richmond, 555 S.W.2d at 108 (citing Roberts v. Chase, 166 S.W.2d 641, 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942)). | 1 | 1 |
Howell v. Davisgreen2 sentences1988Parsley v. Harlan, 702 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985); Howell v. Davis, 43 Tenn.App. 52, 59-60 , 306 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1957). 1988Parsley v. Harlan, 702 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985); Howell v. Davis, 43 Tenn.App. 52, 59-60 , 306 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1957). | 1 | 1 |
Parsley v. Harlangreen1 sentence1988Parsley v. Harlan, 702 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985); Howell v. Davis, 43 Tenn.App. 52, 59-60 , 306 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1957). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1988The strength of the presumption varies according to the circumstances of each case, Williams v, Jones, 54 Tenn.App. 189, 207 , 388 S.W.2d 665, 673 (1963), but once the presumption arises, the burden shifts to the dominant party to demonstrate that the transaction is proper. 1988The strength of the presumption varies according to the circumstances of each case, Williams v, Jones, 54 Tenn.App. 189, 207 , 388 S.W.2d 665, 673 (1963), but once the presumption arises, the burden shifts to the dominant party to demonstrate that the transaction is proper. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Proctor
green
2 sentences1983Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn.App. 439 , 145 S.W.2d 807 (1940); Roberts v. Chase, supra; Hollis v. Thomas, supra. In Roberts v. Chase, supra, Mr. Justice Felts explained that the strength of the presumption of invalidity varies with the circumstances of each case and, therefore, that the strength of the rebutting evidence must vary proportionally: “The circumstances of some transactions are such that the only way in which the fiduciary can rebut the presumption of invalidity is by showing that his principal had the benefit of independent advice (citations omitted). 1983Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn.App. 439 , 145 S.W.2d 807 (1940); Roberts v. Chase, supra; Hollis v. Thomas, supra. In Roberts v. Chase, supra, Mr. Justice Felts explained that the strength of the presumption of invalidity varies with the circumstances of each case and, therefore, that the strength of the rebutting evidence must vary proportionally: “The circumstances of some transactions are such that the only way in which the fiduciary can rebut the presumption of invalidity is by showing that his principal had the benefit of independent advice (citations omitted). | 2 | 1977–1983 |
Southern Motors, Inc. v. Morton
green
2 sentences1967If the challenged testimony be rejected by the jury, then upon the strength of the presumption the finding on that question ought to be for the plaintiff: for the rejection of the testimony would leave no counter-evidence in the case; conversely, if the testimony be accepted notwithstanding the attack upon its source, the finding ought to be for the defendant; for such acceptance validates the testimony so that it destroys the presumption and renders it unavailable for weighing against the counter-evidence or for any purpose.” 25 Tenn. App. at 214 , 154 S.W.2d at 807 . 1967If the challenged testimony be rejected by the jury, then upon the strength of the presumption the finding on that question ought to be for the plaintiff: for the rejection of the testimony would leave no counter-evidence in the case; conversely, if the testimony be accepted notwithstanding the attack upon its source, the finding ought to be for the defendant; for such acceptance validates the testimony so that it destroys the presumption and renders it unavailable for weighing against the counter-evidence or for any purpose.” 25 Tenn. App. at 214 , 154 S.W.2d at 807 . | 2 | 1965–1967 |
Parish v. Kemp
green
1 sentence2019We have noted, however, that “the strength of rebutting the presumption varies with the circumstances of each case and the strength of the presumption of undue influence.” Parish, 308 S.W.3d at 890 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Pewitt v. Pewitt
green
2 sentences1953The defendant and cross-complainant seems to have rested their case squarely upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227 , 240 S. W. (2d) 521 , and the cases therein referred to, but particularly that part of the opinion printed on *174 page 231 of 192, Tenn. on page 522 of 240 S. W. (2d), wherein the Court said: “The fact that a person formerly married was not divorced before purporting to marry another person is established, prima facie, by evidence that no divorce decree is disclosed by the records of the Courts having jurisdiction in any of the coun 1953The defendant and cross-complainant seems to have rested their case squarely upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227 , 240 S. W. (2d) 521 , and the cases therein referred to, but particularly that part of the opinion printed on *174 page 231 of 192, Tenn. on page 522 of 240 S. W. (2d), wherein the Court said: “The fact that a person formerly married was not divorced before purporting to marry another person is established, prima facie, by evidence that no divorce decree is disclosed by the records of the Courts having jurisdiction in any of the coun | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Gamble v. Rucker
neutral
1 sentence1953The defendant and cross-complainant seems to have rested their case squarely upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227 , 240 S. W. (2d) 521 , and the cases therein referred to, but particularly that part of the opinion printed on *174 page 231 of 192, Tenn. on page 522 of 240 S. W. (2d), wherein the Court said: “The fact that a person formerly married was not divorced before purporting to marry another person is established, prima facie, by evidence that no divorce decree is disclosed by the records of the Courts having jurisdiction in any of the coun | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Payne v. Payne
neutral
1 sentence1953The defendant and cross-complainant seems to have rested their case squarely upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227 , 240 S. W. (2d) 521 , and the cases therein referred to, but particularly that part of the opinion printed on *174 page 231 of 192, Tenn. on page 522 of 240 S. W. (2d), wherein the Court said: “The fact that a person formerly married was not divorced before purporting to marry another person is established, prima facie, by evidence that no divorce decree is disclosed by the records of the Courts having jurisdiction in any of the coun | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.