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11 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1884–1990 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wood v. Stricklandgreen2 sentences1976In this respect the rule here stated differs from that stated in §766 as to intentional interference with existing contracts.” 3 The United States Supreme Court has defined malice as consisting of two elements involving both objective and subjective criteria. “[I]n the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action wi 1976In this respect the rule here stated differs from that stated in §766 as to intentional interference with existing contracts.” 3 The United States Supreme Court has defined malice as consisting of two elements involving both objective and subjective criteria. “[I]n the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action wi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. People
green
2 sentences1990In this respect the instruction was clearly erroneous.” (Graham, 181 Ill. at 494 , 55 N.E. at 183 .) Given these deficiencies, the action of the supreme court is significant: it reversed the judgment and remanded “for further proceedings in accordance with the views here expressed.” (Graham, 181 Ill. at 494 , 55 N.E. at 183-84 .) Again, the supreme court, finding a failure to prove appropriate venue, chose not to reverse outright, but instead reversed and remanded for a new trial. 1990In this respect the instruction was clearly erroneous.” (Graham, 181 Ill. at 494 , 55 N.E. at 183 .) Given these deficiencies, the action of the supreme court is significant: it reversed the judgment and remanded “for further proceedings in accordance with the views here expressed.” (Graham, 181 Ill. at 494 , 55 N.E. at 183-84 .) Again, the supreme court, finding a failure to prove appropriate venue, chose not to reverse outright, but instead reversed and remanded for a new trial. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Kubulis
green
2 sentences1990The first hint from the supreme court that proof of venue was a substantive element of the charge appears to arise in People v. Kubulis (1921), 298 Ill. 523 , 131 N.E. 595 . 1990The first hint from the supreme court that proof of venue was a substantive element of the charge appears to arise in People v. Kubulis (1921), 298 Ill. 523 , 131 N.E. 595 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, Illinois
green
1 sentence1976Ed. 2d 214 , 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975). 4 Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148, 159 , states that even where government officials are granted qualified immunity they are still absolutely immune “to damages in the absence of malice ° * * whenever at the time of the action a substantial question could be raised as to whether or not the action in question creates a deprivation of constitutional rights.” | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Sopchak v. Kadulski
neutral
2 sentences1959Sopchak v. Kadulski, 213 Wis. 293 , 251 N. W. 232 ; Domm v. Hollenbeck, 259 Ill. 382 . 1959Sopchak v. Kadulski, 213 Wis. 293 , 251 N. W. 232 ; Domm v. Hollenbeck, 259 Ill. 382 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Domm v. Hollenbeck
neutral
1 sentence1959Sopchak v. Kadulski, 213 Wis. 293 , 251 N. W. 232 ; Domm v. Hollenbeck, 259 Ill. 382 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Hacken v. Isenberg
green
2 sentences1938Hacken v. Isenberg, 288 Ill. 589, 595 , 124 N. E. 306 ; Glover v. Insull, 213 Ill. 1938Hacken v. Isenberg, 288 Ill. 589, 595 , 124 N. E. 306 ; Glover v. Insull, 213 Ill. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Glover v. Insull
neutral
1 sentence1938Hacken v. Isenberg, 288 Ill. 589, 595 , 124 N. E. 306 ; Glover v. Insull, 213 Ill. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Lyons v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son
neutral
1 sentence1910Lyons v. Ryerson, 242 Ill. 409 . | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Langdon v. People
neutral
1 sentence1907In Langdon v. People, 133 Ill. 382 , this court, in discussing an instruction somewhat similar in wording, said (p. 403) : “The instruction, however, seems to convey the idea that before the jury can acquit the defendant on the ground of his insanity they must entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether or not such affliction was the efficient cause of the act. * * * In this respect the instruction is incorrect, but such defect in it was favorable to the accused and unfavorable to the prosecution. * * * A jury might not be willing to find that insanity was really the cause of an act and yet mig | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Kranz v. Thieben
neutral
1 sentence1906In this respect the instruction in question differs materially from the one in Kranz v. Thieben, 15 Ill. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Bow v. People
green
1 sentence1904It seems now, however, to be the better opinion that the judge has .no right to reject the testimony of a witness who has remained in court after an 'order to withdraw.” In Bow v. People, 160 Ill. 438 , the trial court had permitted a witness to testify for the people after being in the court room contrary to an order of the court excluding witnesses. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Chambers v. People
green
1 sentence1899As held in Chambers v. People, 105 Ill. 409 (on p. 418): “The fact that the court assumes to state the law applicable to particular states of case is of itself an assumption that those states of case exist, for it is not to be presumed a court would give the law to a jury while trying a case, with reference to questions ^not believed to be before them.” In the absence of evidence as to any delusion or mania there was no basis on which the jury could find that the will was made under the evidence of partial insanity, and it was error to give this instruction. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence1885In fact it was conceded upon the argument that they did not comply in this respect with the rule generally stated in the adjudicated cases, but it was insisted that the terms slight and gross of themselves sufficiently instituted the comparison under the Johnson case, 103 Ill. 512 ; that if the negligence of plaintiff was found to be but slight, and that of the defendant gross, them relative degree could not be changed by comparing the one with the other. | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Harwood
neutral
1 sentence1884Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Harwood, 80 Ill. 88 ; Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Dimick, 96 id. 42; Wabash, St. | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.