11 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hilen v. Haysgreen2 sentences2015Because the Manis rule was established under contributory negligence principles, and the law of the Commonwealth has been since 1984 by case law, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984), and since 1988 by statute, KRS 411.182, that all tort actions must provide for the apportionment of fault among all parties to an action, the Manis rule is no longer viable, and we hold ’ that all ■ open and obvious hazard cases, including obvious natural outdoor hazard cases, are subject to the comparative fault doctrine. 2014Our Supreme Court replaced contributory negligence concepts with the doctrine of comparative fault in Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky.1984), an automobile negligence action. | 2 | 6 |
Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc.red2 sentences2017Under the comparative fault doctrine, since Speedway could reasonably be thought to have breached its duty to the careful, Teresa’s claim remained viable even though by her own admission she was careless. 11 The Court of Appeals, citing Lugo v. Ameritech Corp. Inc., 464 Mich. 512 , 629 N.W.2d 384, 389 (2001), another “pothole” case, also suggested that because potholes and other minor flaws in walkways are so common, pedestrians should anticipate them and those minor flaws should be deemed, as a matter of law, not to pose an unreasonable risk of injury. 2017Under the comparative fault doctrine, since Speedway could reasonably be thought to have breached its duty to the careful, Teresa’s claim remained viable even though by her own admission she was careless. 11 The Court of Appeals, citing Lugo v. Ameritech Corp. Inc., 464 Mich. 512 , 629 N.W.2d 384, 389 (2001), another “pothole” case, also suggested that because potholes and other minor flaws in walkways are so common, pedestrians should anticipate them and those minor flaws should be deemed, as a matter of law, not to pose an unreasonable risk of injury. | 2 | 2 |
Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLCgreen2 sentences2017As the Carter Court held, “all open and obvious hazard cases, including obvious natural outdoor hazard cases, are subject to the comparative fault doctrine.” 471 S.W.3d at 289-90 . 2017As the Carter Court held, “all open and obvious hazard cases, including obvious natural outdoor hazard cases, are subject to the comparative fault doctrine.” 471 S.W.3d at 289-90 . | 1 | 4 |
Lonny Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, Third-Party v. Trailer Train Company, a Corporation, Third-Partygreen1 sentence2017Since here, in our view, the Court of Appeals panel clearly violated that “doctrine,” by substituting its view of reasonably debatable facts for that of the fact-finder, we must reverse its decision. - In concluding that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals panel suggests that this case involves either or both of the exceptions noted above, i.e., either no rational fact-finder-co_uld deem Teresa’s injuries the result -of anything but her own fault, or, as a general matter of public policy, small, “everyday” paving flaws such as the one at issue Venters’ | 1 | 1 |
Elstun v. Spangles, Inc.green2 sentences2017Along these lines, a number of jurisdictions have adopted so-called trivial-defect rules, under which pavement flaws satisfying some standard of minimalness are deemed not unreasonable. 12 The rationale for such rules, generally, is that, because there is no such thing as a flawless pavement, to impose a requirement on land possessors to address minor flaws “would be to place upon them too great a financial burden.” Elstun v. Spangles, Inc., 289 Kan. 754 , 217 P.3d 450, 454 (2009). 13 Kentucky has not adopted a “trivial defect” rule, but in Shelton , as Defendants point out, the Court noted th 2017Along these lines, a number of jurisdictions have adopted so-called trivial-defect rules, under which pavement flaws satisfying some standard of minimalness are deemed not unreasonable. 12 The rationale for such rules, generally, is that, because there is no such thing as a flawless pavement, to impose a requirement on land possessors to address minor flaws “would be to place upon them too great a financial burden.” Elstun v. Spangles, Inc., 289 Kan. 754 , 217 P.3d 450, 454 (2009). 13 Kentucky has not adopted a “trivial defect” rule, but in Shelton , as Defendants point out, the Court noted th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reda Pump Co., a Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Finck
green
2 sentences1996Reda Pump Co., A Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Finch, Ky., 713 S.W.2d 818 (1986). 1991This would be a complete bar to the award of damages for the second roof collapse, or a partial bar, depending on whether the comparative negligence principle announced in Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984), applies to this case. 3) Nucor contends that the jury finding of contributory fault against General Electric in connection with the second roof collapse should be a complete bar to recovery for the compensatory damages assigned to the second roof collapse, rather than only a 20% bar under the comparative fault principle established in Hilen v. Hays, supra. Reda Pump Co., a Div. of T | 2 | 1991–1996 |
Maupin v. Tankersley
green
1 sentence2020“A dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused when his dog attacks a person.” Maupin, 540 S.W.3d at 360 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sawyers v. Beller
green
1 sentence2020Tony further argues that “any negligence (if any) in coming onto the Curtises’ property unannounced would not be a total bar to his claim as found herein by the trial Court [sic].” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Mayfield v. Hamlett
neutral
2 sentences2017Since here, in our view, the Court of Appeals panel clearly violated that “doctrine,” by substituting its view of reasonably debatable facts for that of the fact-finder, we must reverse its decision. - In concluding that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals panel suggests that this case involves either or both of the exceptions noted above, i.e., either no rational fact-finder-co_uld deem Teresa’s injuries the result -of anything but her own fault, or, as a general matter of public policy, small, “everyday” paving flaws such as the one at issue Venters’ 2017Since here, in our view, the Court of Appeals panel clearly violated that “doctrine,” by substituting its view of reasonably debatable facts for that of the fact-finder, we must reverse its decision. - In concluding that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals panel suggests that this case involves either or both of the exceptions noted above, i.e., either no rational fact-finder-co_uld deem Teresa’s injuries the result -of anything but her own fault, or, as a general matter of public policy, small, “everyday” paving flaws such as the one at issue Venters’ | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bonn v. Sears, Roebuck & Company
green
1 sentence2017Since here, in our view, the Court of Appeals panel clearly violated that “doctrine,” by substituting its view of reasonably debatable facts for that of the fact-finder, we must reverse its decision. - In concluding that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals panel suggests that this case involves either or both of the exceptions noted above, i.e., either no rational fact-finder-co_uld deem Teresa’s injuries the result -of anything but her own fault, or, as a general matter of public policy, small, “everyday” paving flaws such as the one at issue Venters’ | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Standard Oil Company v. Manis
green
1 sentence2016The Court specifically overruled Standard Oil v. Manis, 433 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1968), holding that “all open and obvious hazard cases, including obvious natural outdoor hazard cases, are subject to the comparative fault doctrine.” Carter, 471 S.W.3d at 295 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.