10 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc.green2 sentences2021See Barrientos v. Hyre, 805 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("The error requiring a new trial affected only the issue of comparative fault, and the new trial must be limited to that issue." (citing Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1263-64 (Fla. 1996))); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Martin, 262 So. 3d 769, 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (noting that "it is well established that a reversal based on a comparative fault error does not affect or require a new trial on a jury's determination of compensatory damages" but "[i]nstead such an error simply requires a remand for apportionment 2018E.g., Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1996). | 1 | 3 |
O'CONNELL v. Walt Disney World Companygreen1 sentence2025L.J. 1059 , 1074 (1984) (“[T]he plaintiff’s knowledge of the risk is simply another circumstance to be weighed against the plaintiff in the comparative fault analysis.”) (citing Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 293 ); see also O’Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (reversing summary judgment where the movant “did not carry its burden of establishing . . . that [the non-movants] fully understood the risks and dangers involved in riding a horse” or demonstrating that they “understood and agreed to assume the risk of [the movant]’s negligence in conducting the ride”) | 1 | 1 |
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Arnitzgreen1 sentence2025L.J. 1059 , 1074 (1984) (“[T]he plaintiff’s knowledge of the risk is simply another circumstance to be weighed against the plaintiff in the comparative fault analysis.”) (citing Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 293 ); see also O’Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (reversing summary judgment where the movant “did not carry its burden of establishing . . . that [the non-movants] fully understood the risks and dangers involved in riding a horse” or demonstrating that they “understood and agreed to assume the risk of [the movant]’s negligence in conducting the ride”) | 1 | 1 |
Preciado v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Barrientos v. Hyre, 805 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("The error requiring a new trial affected only the issue of comparative fault, and the new trial must be limited to that issue." (citing Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1263-64 (Fla. 1996))); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Martin, 262 So. 3d 769, 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (noting that "it is well established that a reversal based on a comparative fault error does not affect or require a new trial on a jury's determination of compensatory damages" but "[i]nstead such an error simply requires a remand for apportionment | 1 | 1 |
Barrientos v. Hyregreen1 sentence2021See Barrientos v. Hyre, 805 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("The error requiring a new trial affected only the issue of comparative fault, and the new trial must be limited to that issue." (citing Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1263-64 (Fla. 1996))); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Martin, 262 So. 3d 769, 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (noting that "it is well established that a reversal based on a comparative fault error does not affect or require a new trial on a jury's determination of compensatory damages" but "[i]nstead such an error simply requires a remand for apportionment | 1 | 1 |
Mazzilli v. Doudgreen1 sentence2014Hiott asserts that the trial court erred-when it applied comparative fault to reduce the compensatory damages award, because Florida law provides that a comparative fault defense does not apply to intentional torts, and she asserts that this precludes waiver. § 768.81(4)(b), Fla. Stat.; Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So.2d 477, 480 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.green1 sentence2013Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748 , 808 (Mo.Ct.App.2008); Thompson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 207 S.W.3d 76, 122 (Mo.Ct.App.2006); Rudin v. Parkway Sch. | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. PROGRESSIVE EXP. INS. CO.green1 sentence2006See Lee, 909 So.2d at 477 . | 1 | 1 |
McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co.green1 sentence1984As we said in Summers with *915 regard to the liability of independent tortfeasors, where a correct division of liability cannot be made "the trier of fact may make it the best it can." [Citation omitted.] Id.; accord McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983); Hardy (applying the same principles to asbestos-related injuries); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blackburn v. Dorta
green
1 sentence2025L.J. 1059 , 1074 (1984) (“[T]he plaintiff’s knowledge of the risk is simply another circumstance to be weighed against the plaintiff in the comparative fault analysis.”) (citing Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 293 ); see also O’Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (reversing summary judgment where the movant “did not carry its burden of establishing . . . that [the non-movants] fully understood the risks and dangers involved in riding a horse” or demonstrating that they “understood and agreed to assume the risk of [the movant]’s negligence in conducting the ride”) | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gouty v. Schnepel
green
1 sentence2025Nor do we find this case appropriate to certify a question of great public importance regarding the applicability of the setoff statutes in light of section 768.81. 7 These are being cited generally as sections 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (2023), 768.31(5), and 768.041(2). 8 Under a comparative fault analysis, "as long as a defendant does not pay more than his or her percentage of fault, that defendant is not entitled to contribution from another tortfeasor or entitled to a setoff from a settling defendant." Gouty, 795 So. 2d at 964 . 22 This is because Bartley failed to seek to add the other | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Coates v. Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Suzlon Energy, A/S v. Ventus de Nicaragua, S.A.
green
1 sentence2014Hiott relies on this court’s decision in Sury , where we held that section 768.81(4)(b), Florida Statutes, precluded a reduction of damages where, much like here, the case was essentially based on intentional misconduct. 118 So.3d at 852 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
green
1 sentence2013Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748 , 808 (Mo.Ct.App.2008); Thompson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 207 S.W.3d 76, 122 (Mo.Ct.App.2006); Rudin v. Parkway Sch. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co.
green
1 sentence1984As we said in Summers with *915 regard to the liability of independent tortfeasors, where a correct division of liability cannot be made "the trier of fact may make it the best it can." [Citation omitted.] Id.; accord McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983); Hardy (applying the same principles to asbestos-related injuries); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.