comparative fault doctrine in New York

2018Determinations of degrees of fault should be made as a whole, and assessing one party's fault with a preconceived idea of the other party's liability is inherently unfair; or, as the Appellate Division characterized it, a defendant would "enter[ ] the batter's box with two strikes already called" ( 142 A.D.3d at 782 , 37 N.Y.S.3d 93 ).

2018Determinations of degrees of fault should be made as a whole, and assessing one party's fault with a preconceived idea of the other party's liability is inherently unfair; or, as the Appellate Division characterized it, a defendant would "enter[ ] the batter's box with two strikes already called" ( 142 A.D.3d at 782 , 37 N.Y.S.3d 93 ).

2013This rule — the Barker/ Manning rule — is based on public policy that denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, “and it exists independently of, and supersedes, the doctrine of comparative fault” (Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C1411:3 at 98; Manning, 91 NY2d at 120 ; Barker, 63 NY2d at 24, 27-29 ).

2013The rule does not bar recovery in every instance where a plaintiff has engaged in conduct prohibited by law; rather, it precludes recovery “only where the plaintiffs injuries ‘were a direct result of a serious violation of the law involving hazardous activities which were not justified under the circumstances’ ” (Manning, 91 NY2d at 121 , quoting Barker, 63 NY2d at 26 ).

2003Although the state and federal statutes differ on the doctrine of vicarious liability, the doctrine of comparative fault, which is considered a characteristic feature of maritime law (see Pope & Talbot v Hawn, 346 US 406 [1953]; Cammon v City of New York, supra at 593 [Rosenblatt, J., dissenting in part]), is common to both statutes.

1987To escape the confines of the rule enunciated in TNT (supra) and related cases, Coopers argues that its pleading should be sustained under the comparative fault doctrine established in CPLR article 14-A. CPLR 1411 provides: "In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to th

1987In support of that contention, Coopers cites Lippes v Atlantic Bank ( 69 AD2d 127 ) as authority for the proposition that plaintiffs’ culpable conduct may diminish or extinguish recovery in a setting involving commercial loss.

1987More specifically, the evidence created issues of fact with respect to whether Mr. Cincotta exercised that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the circumstances presented (see, Williams v City of New York, supra).

1984Such a determination is almost invariably a question of fact (see Wartels v County Asphalt, 29 NY2d 372, 379 ) and is for the jury to determine “in all but the clearest cases” {MacDowall v Koehring Basic Constr.

1982It is true, of course, that in the absence of an emergency or other special circumstances, a motorist who travels upon a road shoulder will be chargeable with negligence (see Pace v State of New York, 14 AD2d 957 ) and prior to the institution of the comparative fault standard that negligence barred recovery for damages resulting from a nonemergency use of defective shoulders irrespective of the State’s negligence in maintaining the shoulders (see, e.g., Rolando v Department of Transp. of State of N. Y., 58 AD2d 694 ; Goes v State of New York, 46 AD2d 697 ; Guyotte v State of New York, 22 AD2d

1982It is true, of course, that in the absence of an emergency or other special circumstances, a motorist who travels upon a road shoulder will be chargeable with negligence (see Pace v State of New York, 14 AD2d 957 ) and prior to the institution of the comparative fault standard that negligence barred recovery for damages resulting from a nonemergency use of defective shoulders irrespective of the State’s negligence in maintaining the shoulders (see, e.g., Rolando v Department of Transp. of State of N. Y., 58 AD2d 694 ; Goes v State of New York, 46 AD2d 697 ; Guyotte v State of New York, 22 AD2d

1982It is true, of course, that in the absence of an emergency or other special circumstances, a motorist who travels upon a road shoulder will be chargeable with negligence (see Pace v State of New York, 14 AD2d 957 ) and prior to the institution of the comparative fault standard that negligence barred recovery for damages resulting from a nonemergency use of defective shoulders irrespective of the State’s negligence in maintaining the shoulders (see, e.g., Rolando v Department of Transp. of State of N. Y., 58 AD2d 694 ; Goes v State of New York, 46 AD2d 697 ; Guyotte v State of New York, 22 AD2d

1982It is true, of course, that in the absence of an emergency or other special circumstances, a motorist who travels upon a road shoulder will be chargeable with negligence (see Pace v State of New York, 14 AD2d 957 ) and prior to the institution of the comparative fault standard that negligence barred recovery for damages resulting from a nonemergency use of defective shoulders irrespective of the State’s negligence in maintaining the shoulders (see, e.g., Rolando v Department of Transp. of State of N. Y., 58 AD2d 694 ; Goes v State of New York, 46 AD2d 697 ; Guyotte v State of New York, 22 AD2d

1982It is true, of course, that in the absence of an emergency or other special circumstances, a motorist who travels upon a road shoulder will be chargeable with negligence (see Pace v State of New York, 14 AD2d 957 ) and prior to the institution of the comparative fault standard that negligence barred recovery for damages resulting from a nonemergency use of defective shoulders irrespective of the State’s negligence in maintaining the shoulders (see, e.g., Rolando v Department of Transp. of State of N. Y., 58 AD2d 694 ; Goes v State of New York, 46 AD2d 697 ; Guyotte v State of New York, 22 AD2d