comparative fault analysis in Indiana

2025But that reading is incompatible with the operation of the statute and broader tort principles. [16] The Comparative Fault Act’s core operative provisions—Ind. Code §§ 34-51-2-5 and -6—confirm that its system is built around “relative degrees of causation attributable among the responsible actors.” Santelli v. Rahmatullah, 993 N.E.2d 167, 179 (Ind. 2013).

2025Santelli v. Rahmatullah, 993 N.E.2d 167, 178 (Ind. 2013) (“The Indiana legislature has the authority to expressly permit joint and several liability[.]”), reh’g denied; see, e.g., Everhart, 960 N.E.2d at 138 (citing I.C. § 34-51-2-1(b)(1) (2008)) (“Because the [CFA] expressly exempted medical malpractice claims from its ambit . . . the historical rule of joint and several liability would appear to still apply[.]”). [38] We find that the legislature did just that in enacting the Securities Act, which creates a statutory right of action available to a purchaser against a “person [who] sells a se

2025He relies solely on Coffman v. Rohrman, 811 N.E.2d 868, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), and Becker v. Fisher, 852 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [8] In Coffman, this Court found that the Comparative Fault Act applies to intentional torts.

2025He relies solely on Coffman v. Rohrman, 811 N.E.2d 868, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), and Becker v. Fisher, 852 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [8] In Coffman, this Court found that the Comparative Fault Act applies to intentional torts.

2025Santelli v. Rahmatullah, 993 N.E.2d 167, 178 (Ind. 2013) (“The Indiana legislature has the authority to expressly permit joint and several liability[.]”), reh’g denied; see, e.g., Everhart, 960 N.E.2d at 138 (citing I.C. § 34-51-2-1(b)(1) (2008)) (“Because the [CFA] expressly exempted medical malpractice claims from its ambit . . . the historical rule of joint and several liability would appear to still apply[.]”). [38] We find that the legislature did just that in enacting the Securities Act, which creates a statutory right of action available to a purchaser against a “person [who] sells a se

2016Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind. 2002). [55] Under the plain language of the statute, KS&E cannot be found liable for the alleged harm regardless of its degree of fault.

2016Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind.2002). [55] Under the plain language of the statute, KS & E cannot be found liable for the alleged harm regardless of its degree of fault.

2013See, e.g., Pederson v. Barnes, 139 P.3d 552, 559-60 (Alaska 2006) (observing Alaska’s comparative fault act includes intentional torts and requires entry of judgment on the basis of “several” liability only); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80 , 14 P.3d 1074, 1081-82 (Ct.App.2000) (recognizing Idaho legislature’s express limitations on joint and several liability in a comparative fault statute that requires comparison of all “responsibility”, including intentional torts); Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D.2002) (observing that under North Dakota’s comparative fault act “a neg

2013See, e.g., Pederson v. Barnes, 139 P.3d 552, 559-60 (Alaska 2006) (observing Alaska’s comparative fault act includes intentional torts and requires entry of judgment on the basis of “several” liability only); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80 , 14 P.3d 1074, 1081-82 (Ct.App.2000) (recognizing Idaho legislature’s express limitations on joint and several liability in a comparative fault statute that requires comparison of all “responsibility”, including intentional torts); Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D.2002) (observing that under North Dakota’s comparative fault act “a neg

2013See, e.g., Pederson v. Barnes, 139 P.3d 552, 559-60 (Alaska 2006) (observing Alaska’s comparative fault act includes intentional torts and requires entry of judgment on the basis of “several” liability only); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80 , 14 P.3d 1074, 1081-82 (Ct.App.2000) (recognizing Idaho legislature’s express limitations on joint and several liability in a comparative fault statute that requires comparison of all “responsibility”, including intentional torts); Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D.2002) (observing that under North Dakota’s comparative fault act “a neg

2013See, e.g., Pederson v. Barnes, 139 P.3d 552, 559-60 (Alaska 2006) (observing Alaska’s comparative fault act includes intentional torts and requires entry of judgment on the basis of “several” liability only); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80 , 14 P.3d 1074, 1081-82 (Ct.App.2000) (recognizing Idaho legislature’s express limitations on joint and several liability in a comparative fault statute that requires comparison of all “responsibility”, including intentional torts); Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D.2002) (observing that under North Dakota’s comparative fault act “a neg

2007Edwards v. Sisler, 691 N.E.2d 1252, 1254-55 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing Holden v. Balko, 949 F.Supp. 704, 709-14 (S.D.Ind.1996)). *1100 Furthermore, we find it purely academic to engage in an analysis of the Act and whether it could or could not apply to the case at hand because, regardless of whether Palmer could have proceeded to trial seeking a verdict under a comparative fault analysis, 6 she never sought to do so.

2007Edwards v. Sisler, 691 N.E.2d 1252, 1254-55 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing Holden v. Balko, 949 F.Supp. 704, 709-14 (S.D.Ind.1996)). *1100 Furthermore, we find it purely academic to engage in an analysis of the Act and whether it could or could not apply to the case at hand because, regardless of whether Palmer could have proceeded to trial seeking a verdict under a comparative fault analysis, 6 she never sought to do so.

1982See Alvis v. Ribar, (1981) 85 Ill.2d 1 , 52 Ill.Dec. 23 , 421 N.E.2d 886 .

1982See Alvis v. Ribar, (1981) 85 Ill.2d 1 , 52 Ill.Dec. 23 , 421 N.E.2d 886 .