comparative fault doctrine in Washington

2011Finding that the legislature intended the comparative fault doctrine to apply to all actions based on fault, including strict liability and product liability claims, the court held that there is "no reason to distinguish between negligence and strict liability actions for purposes of instructing a jury on the plaintiff's comparative fault." Lundberg, 55 Wash.App. at 186 , 777 P.2d 15 .

2011Finding that the legislature intended the comparative fault doctrine to apply to all actions based on fault, including strict liability and product liability claims, the court held that there is "no reason to distinguish between negligence and strict liability actions for purposes of instructing a jury on the plaintiff's comparative fault." Lundberg, 55 Wash.App. at 186 , 777 P.2d 15 .

2007See Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 , 95 S.Ct. 1708 , 44 L.Ed.2d 251 ; Woodford, 779 F.Supp. at 829 .

2007See Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 ; Woodford, 779 F. Supp. at 829 .

2002See Lucas, 34 Wash.2d at 597 , 209 P.2d 279 (finding that defendants' actions, even though negligent, were not superseding causes with respect to county's negligence, if under circumstances county should have realized that drivers might act as they did); Berglund, 4 Wash.2d at 321 , 103 P.2d 355 ; WPI 11.01 (Supp. 1994) ("Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of a person claiming injury or damage which is a proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of."); WPI 11.07 (Supp. 1994) (determining degree of contributory negligence in order to determine damages owed).

2002See Lucas, 34 Wn.2d at 597 (finding that defendants’ actions, even though negligent, were not superseding causes with respect to county’s negligence, if under circumstances county should have realized that drivers might act as they did); Berglund, 4 Wn.2d at 321 ; WPI 11.01 (Supp. 1994) (“Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of a person claiming injury or damage which is a proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of.”); WPI 11.07 (Supp. 1994) (determining degree of contributory negligence in order to determine damages owed).

1999Bachelor, Inc., 101 Or.

1992App. 670 , 792 P.2d 1232 , review denied, 310 Or. 475 (1990), the Oregon court recently explained that a skier is barred from recovery from a ski area operator for injury caused solely by the inherent risks of skiing, but if the injury was caused by a combination of the inherent risks of skiing and operator negligence, the doctrine of comparative fault applies.

2025PROVAIL points out that the criminal statute under which Lansana was charged, RCW 9A.44.050(1)(d), states that a person is guilty of rape in the second degree when the perpetrator is a health care provider and the victim is a client or patient, and the sexual intercourse occurs during a treatment session, consultation, interview, or examination, but allows an affirmative defense “that the client or patient consented to the sexual intercourse with the knowledge that the 14 PROVAIL argues that, under Christensen, “although the fact of consent could not serve as a comparative fault defense, it wa

1999Further, “if the injury was caused by a combination of the inherent risks of skiing and operator negligence, the doctrine of comparative fault applies.” Scott, 119 Wn.2d at 502 .

1999As we have already noted, where injury is “caused by a combination of the inherent risks of skiing and operator negligence, the doctrine of comparative fault applies.” Id. at 502 (citing Jessup v. Mt.

1993However, neither party makes that argument here. 2 Nothing in Barnes v Cornerstone Invs., Inc., 54 Wn.