ejusdem generis rule in Louisiana

1964The further contention is made that the general leasing statute under its terms applies only to leases for purposes similar to trapping, grazing, hunting and agricultural purposes (and not to leases for airport or commercial purposes) because the statutory authority to ‘lease for trapping, hunting, agricultural and (sic) other legitimate purposes whatsoever’ should be interpreted according to the ejusdem generis rule * * * which view the police jury believes is implicitly if not explicitly supported by a statement and the holding in Gorham v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 210 La. 462 , 27 So.2d 299

1964The further contention is made that the general leasing statute under its terms applies only to leases for purposes similar to trapping, grazing, hunting and agricultural purposes (and not to leases for airport or commercial purposes) because the statutory authority to ‘lease for trapping, hunting, agricultural and (sic) other legitimate purposes whatsoever’ should be interpreted according to the ejusdem generis rule * * * which view the police jury believes is implicitly if not explicitly supported by a statement and the holding in Gorham v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 210 La. 462 , 27 So.2d 299

1964The doctrine of ejusdem generis, i. e., that general words, such as “other, etc.” following an enumeration of particular classes or things should not be construed tO' their widest extent but are to be applied only to such classes or things of the same general kind as those specifically mentioned (see Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. 1951, page 609), is not one of universal applica tion and, as we stated in S. A. Harris Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 240 La. 1059 , 127 So.2d 148 , “Its value as a guide to ascertain legislative intent is limited to cases in which the

1964The doctrine of ejusdem generis, i. e., that general words, such as “other, etc.” following an enumeration of particular classes or things should not be construed tO' their widest extent but are to be applied only to such classes or things of the same general kind as those specifically mentioned (see Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. 1951, page 609), is not one of universal applica tion and, as we stated in S. A. Harris Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 240 La. 1059 , 127 So.2d 148 , “Its value as a guide to ascertain legislative intent is limited to cases in which the

1964Fitzpatrick v. Grace, 187 La. 1028 , 175 So. 656 .

1964Fitzpatrick v. Grace, 187 La. 1028 , 175 So. 656 .

1964It is contended that the ejusdem generis rule is not a hard and fast rule and is only helpful where the true legislative intent cannot be discovered from the language of the-statute itself (S. A. Harris Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 240 La. 1059 , 127 So.2d 148 , McHugh v. Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511 , 19 So.2d 221 ), whereas in the present case the legislature has clearly and unambiguously intended for the competitive leasing procedure to be followed in leases of public lands for “any other legitimate purposes whatsoever, other than for oil, gas or other m

1964It is contended that the ejusdem generis rule is not a hard and fast rule and is only helpful where the true legislative intent cannot be discovered from the language of the-statute itself (S. A. Harris Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 240 La. 1059 , 127 So.2d 148 , McHugh v. Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511 , 19 So.2d 221 ), whereas in the present case the legislature has clearly and unambiguously intended for the competitive leasing procedure to be followed in leases of public lands for “any other legitimate purposes whatsoever, other than for oil, gas or other m

2008In Regency Motors of Metairie, L.L.C., supra, 03-1312, p. 1, 868 So.2d at 905 , the court construed the meaning of "eviction" in a personal injury coverage provision.

1989The trial court ruled in favor of the Wests, finding: (1) Holloway Gravel Co., Inc. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917 , 9 So.2d 228 (1942), and Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197 , 91 So. 676 (1922), jurisprudence interpreting the doctrine of ejusdem generis [1] , inapplicable to the case sub judice; and, (2) extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties concerning the mineral reservation was not helpful, since there was no discussion *324 among the parties regarding this subject.

1989The trial court ruled in favor of the Wests, finding: (1) Holloway Gravel Co., Inc. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917 , 9 So.2d 228 (1942), and Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197 , 91 So. 676 (1922), jurisprudence interpreting the doctrine of ejusdem generis [1] , inapplicable to the case sub judice; and, (2) extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties concerning the mineral reservation was not helpful, since there was no discussion *324 among the parties regarding this subject.

1989Consequently there has arisen the principle that the proper interpretation is that which least restricts ownership of the land conveyed ( McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758 , 125 So.2d 154 (1960)) and the rule of ejusdem generis." (Footnote omitted.) In the present case it is clear that the ejusdem generis rule relied upon in Holloway Gravel Co. Inc. and Huie Hodge Lumber Co., and refered to in Continental Group, Inc., is inapplicable, and as such, was properly rejected by the trial court.

1989Consequently there has arisen the principle that the proper interpretation is that which least restricts ownership of the land conveyed ( McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758 , 125 So.2d 154 (1960)) and the rule of ejusdem generis." (Footnote omitted.) In the present case it is clear that the ejusdem generis rule relied upon in Holloway Gravel Co. Inc. and Huie Hodge Lumber Co., and refered to in Continental Group, Inc., is inapplicable, and as such, was properly rejected by the trial court.

1975Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387 , 240 P. 208 (1925), the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated: "The term `public works' is said to be defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canals, waterworks, roads,' etc. Ellis v. Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 ; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 127 , 84 N. W. 788 ." Finally, in Ellis v. Common Council of the City of Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 (1900), the Supreme Court of Michigan defined the term as follows: "The term `public works' is defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canal

1975Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387 , 240 P. 208 (1925), the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated: "The term `public works' is said to be defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canals, waterworks, roads,' etc. Ellis v. Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 ; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 127 , 84 N. W. 788 ." Finally, in Ellis v. Common Council of the City of Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 (1900), the Supreme Court of Michigan defined the term as follows: "The term `public works' is defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canal

1975Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387 , 240 P. 208 (1925), the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated: "The term `public works' is said to be defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canals, waterworks, roads,' etc. Ellis v. Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 ; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 127 , 84 N. W. 788 ." Finally, in Ellis v. Common Council of the City of Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 (1900), the Supreme Court of Michigan defined the term as follows: "The term `public works' is defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canal

1975Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387 , 240 P. 208 (1925), the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated: "The term `public works' is said to be defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canals, waterworks, roads,' etc. Ellis v. Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 ; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 127 , 84 N. W. 788 ." Finally, in Ellis v. Common Council of the City of Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 (1900), the Supreme Court of Michigan defined the term as follows: "The term `public works' is defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canal

1975Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387 , 240 P. 208 (1925), the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated: "The term `public works' is said to be defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canals, waterworks, roads,' etc. Ellis v. Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 ; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 127 , 84 N. W. 788 ." Finally, in Ellis v. Common Council of the City of Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 (1900), the Supreme Court of Michigan defined the term as follows: "The term `public works' is defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canal

1975Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387 , 240 P. 208 (1925), the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated: "The term `public works' is said to be defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canals, waterworks, roads,' etc. Ellis v. Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 ; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 127 , 84 N. W. 788 ." Finally, in Ellis v. Common Council of the City of Grand Rapids, 123 Mich. 567 , 82 N.W. 244 (1900), the Supreme Court of Michigan defined the term as follows: "The term `public works' is defined as `all fixed works constructed for public use, as railways, docks, canal

1974See Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917 , 9 So.2d 228 (1942); Boyd v. Hendrickson, 175 La. 377 , 143 So. 332 (1932).

1974See Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917 , 9 So.2d 228 (1942); Boyd v. Hendrickson, 175 La. 377 , 143 So. 332 (1932).

1958The case of Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419 , 93 So. 490, 493 , involved the alleged taking of oil illegally from land claimed by the plaintiff.

1958The case of Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419 , 93 So. 490, 493 , involved the alleged taking of oil illegally from land claimed by the plaintiff.

1958Defendant by way of note in his brief states: "Plaintiff's argument that the last paragraph of Article 3537 should apply was not treated by the trial judge but appellants submit that Article 10, Revised Civil Code, (should be Article 16) and the ejusdem generis rule of interpretation as applied in McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., [5 Cir.], 299 F. 48 and Colley v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., [D.C.], 64 F.Supp. 1016 , refute the application of that paragraph to this case." We agree with the defendant's argument that the second quoted portion of Article 3537, supra, which was placed in this article by Act

1958Defendant by way of note in his brief states: "Plaintiff's argument that the last paragraph of Article 3537 should apply was not treated by the trial judge but appellants submit that Article 10, Revised Civil Code, (should be Article 16) and the ejusdem generis rule of interpretation as applied in McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., [5 Cir.], 299 F. 48 and Colley v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., [D.C.], 64 F.Supp. 1016 , refute the application of that paragraph to this case." We agree with the defendant's argument that the second quoted portion of Article 3537, supra, which was placed in this article by Act