ejusdem generis doctrine in Illinois

2026See People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002) (“The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of -8- persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ”). ¶ 21 We decline to depart from Woods.

2024An assistant finance director is chosen to assist the finance director, and the appointment implies that the assistant finance director is required to have technical training or knowledge similar to that of the finance director. ¶ 30 Our interpretation of this catchall phrase is supported by the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which provides that “when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or 9 No. 1-23-0834 things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ” People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002)

2024An assistant finance director is chosen to assist the finance director, and the appointment implies that the assistant finance director is required to have technical training or knowledge similar to that of the finance director. ¶ 30 Our interpretation of this catchall phrase is supported by the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which provides that “when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or 9 No. 1-23-0834 things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ” People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002)

2019“The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ” Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 138 (quoting Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975)).

2024The trouble is, it is unclear that this conduct is comparable to “a forcible felony, the obstruction of justice, intimidation, injury, or [domestic] abuse.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022); see Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of Human Rights, 159 Ill. 2d 206, 211 (1994) (“The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statute lists several classes of persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the class of unarticulated persons or things will be interpreted as those ‘others such like’ the named persons or things.”) -8- ¶ 31 The rec

2003Our supreme court has held that the doctrine of ejusdem generis should be applied, which provides: “when a statute lists several classes of persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the class of unarticulated persons or things will be interpreted as those ‘others such like’ the named persons or things.” Board of Trustees, 159 Ill. 2d at 211 .

2025See Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 492 (2009) (“Under the ejusdem generis doctrine, when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted to mean ‘other such like.’ ”).

2023See Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (“ejusdem generis *** attribute[s] to the last item *** the same characteristic of discreteness shared by all the preceding items”); Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 492 (2009) (“Under the ejusdem generis doctrine, when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted to mean ‘other such like.’ ”). ¶ 59 We emphasize, however, that the canon ejusdem generis is not some inexorable command t

2007In Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975), quoting People v. Capuzi, 20 Ill. 2d 486, 493-94 (1960), our Illinois Supreme Court stated: “ ‘The doctrine of ejusdem generis is that where a statute or document specifically enumerates several classes of persons or things and immediately following, and classed with such enumeration, the clause embraces “other” persons or things, the word “other” will generally be read as “other such like,” so that the persons or things therein comprised may be read as ejusdem generis “with,” and not of a quality superior to or different from,

2007In Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975), quoting People v. Capuzi, 20 Ill. 2d 486, 493-94 (1960), our Illinois Supreme Court stated: 7 No. 1-05-2329 " <The doctrine of ejusdem generis is that where a statute or document specifically enumerates several classes of persons or things and immediately following, and classed with such enumeration, the clause embraces "other" persons or things, the word "other" will generally be read as "other such like," so that the persons or things therein comprised may be read as ejusdem generis "with," and not of a quality superior to or

2016See also People v. Rutledge, 104 Ill. 2d 394, 397 (1984) (acknowledging that, pursuant to, inter alia, the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the legislature did not intend that firearms be included in the term “or any other dangerous or deadly weapon,” as used in section of unlawful use of weapons statute under which the defendant was charged (internal quotation marks omitted)). - 11 - ¶ 25 Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s finding below, the elements of AVH/DW, which require, inter alia, proof that defendant was “armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm” in violation of section 18

2016See also People v. Rutledge, 104 Ill. 2d 394, 397 (1984) (acknowledging that, pursuant to, inter alia, the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the legislature did not intend that firearms be included in the term “or any other dangerous or deadly weapon,” as used in section of unlawful use of weapons statute under which the defendant was charged (internal quotation marks omitted)). -8- ¶ 24 Therefore, as in Davis, the BB gun with which defendant herein was armed cannot be considered a bludgeon or other dangerous weapon of like character under the armed violence statute.

2021See Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 309-10 (1949) (“A counterclaim is an independent cause of action.”). -7- Unlike a contract, rule, or regulation that can be rendered “void,” a counterclaim, while subject to dismissal, would not suffer the same fate as being void. ¶ 40 The Seventh Circuit also dismissed the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which states that, “when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted to mean ‘other such like.’ ” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232

2020Unlike a contract, rule, or regulation that can be rendered “void,” a counterclaim, while subject to dismissal, would not suffer the same fate as being void. ¶ 40 The Seventh Circuit also dismissed the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which states that, “when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted to mean ‘other such like.’ ” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 492 (2009) (quoting People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002)); see also Bullman v. City of C

2002See also People v. Rutledge, 104 Ill. 2d 394, 397 (1984) (acknowledged that, pursuant to doctrine of ejusdem generis, the clause “any other dangerous or deadly weapon,” as used in statute defining the offense of unlawful use of weapons, was not intended to include firearms), quoting People v. Sheldon, 322 Ill. 70, 73 (1926).

2002See also People v. Rutledge , 104 Ill. 2d 394, 397 (1984) (acknowledged that, pursuant to doctrine of ejusdem generis , the clause “any other dangerous or deadly weapon,” as used in statute defining the offense of unlawful use of weapons, was not intended to include firearms), quoting People v. Sheldon , 322 Ill. 70, 73 (1926).

1996People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill.2d 368, 379 , 178 Ill.Dec. 400 , 604 N.E.2d 923 (1992).

1996People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379 (1992).

2016Therefore, as in Ligon and Davis, the tin snips with which defendant herein was armed cannot be considered a bludgeon “or other dangerous weapon of like character” under the armed violence statute. ¶ 15 However, the tin snips defendant used do qualify as a dangerous weapon under the common-law definition applicable to the statutory offense of armed robbery, as they are essentially a craftsman’s tool (Carlson v. Moline Board of Education, School District No. 40, Moline, 124 Ill.

2016Therefore, as in Ligon and Davis, the tin snips with which defendant herein was armed cannot be considered a bludgeon “or other dangerous weapon of like character” under the armed violence statute. ¶ 15 However, the tin snips defendant used do qualify as a dangerous weapon under the common-law definition applicable to the statutory offense of armed robbery, as they are essentially a craftsman’s tool (Carlson v. Moline Board of Education, School District No. 40, Moline, 124 Ill.

2007Since “otherwise” is not interpreted to extend to things of a different quality, it cannot apply to a different recovery when a written agreement limits itself to a single action, as it normally will not be expanded beyond its terms. “ ‘[A]n agreement, when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it.’ ” Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (1999), quoting Western Illinois Oil Co. v. Thompson, 26 Ill. 2d 287, 291 (1962). “ ‘It speaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from the langu

2007Since “otherwise” is not interpreted to extend to things of a different quality, it cannot apply to a different recovery when a written agreement limits itself to a single action, as it normally will not be expanded beyond its terms. “ ‘[A]n agreement, when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it.’ ” Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (1999), quoting Western Illinois Oil Co. v. Thompson, 26 Ill. 2d 287, 291 (1962). “ ‘It speaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from the langu

2007Since “otherwise” is not interpreted to extend to things of a different quality, it cannot apply to a different recovery when a written agreement limits itself to a single action, as it normally will not be expanded beyond its terms. “ ‘[A]n agreement, when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it.’ ” Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (1999), quoting Western Illinois Oil Co. v. Thompson, 26 Ill. 2d 287, 291 (1962). “ ‘It speaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from the langu

2007Since “otherwise” is not interpreted to extend to things of a different quality, it cannot apply to a different recovery when a written agreement limits itself to a single action, as it normally will not be expanded beyond its terms. “ ‘[A]n agreement, when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it.’ ” Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (1999), quoting Western Illinois Oil Co. v. Thompson, 26 Ill. 2d 287, 291 (1962). “ ‘It speaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from the langu

1995Section 10 of the Act specifically provides that the court may order the defendant to “attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction or residence of defendants on probation.” (720 ILCS 550/10 (West 1992).) Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes "other persons or things,” the word "other” is interpreted as meaning "other such like.” (Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 389, 396 , 475 N.E.2d 536, 539 ; City of Chicago

1995Section 10 of the Act specifically provides that the court may order the defendant to “attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction or residence of defendants on probation.” (720 ILCS 550/10 (West 1992).) Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes "other persons or things,” the word "other” is interpreted as meaning "other such like.” (Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 389, 396 , 475 N.E.2d 536, 539 ; City of Chicago

2020See Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶¶ 23-24 (finding that a BB gun cannot be considered a bludgeon or other dangerous weapon of like character under section 33A-1(c) given that a BB gun is not typically identified as a bludgeon, notwithstanding that it was capable of being used as a bludgeon and that it would constitute a dangerous weapon under the common law definition); Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 141 (finding that “although a metal pellet/BB pistol might be capable of being used as a bludgeon, it is not typically identified as such and, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, cannot be interpreted to be ‘

2016“Furthermore, although a metal pellet/BB pistol might be capable of being used as a bludgeon, it is not typically identified as such and, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, cannot be interpreted to be ‘of like character’ to the bludgeon-type weapons included in the category [III] listing.” Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 141 ; Ligon, 2016 IL 118023 , ¶ 23 n.4.

2024See West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2021 IL 125978, ¶ 57 (“ ‘where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are *** to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned’ ” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 517 (6th ed. 1990))).

2023Id. ¶ 50 BIPA, “on the other hand, does not regulate methods of communication but regulates the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and information.” Id. ¶ 55.

2008People v. Diggins, 379 Ill.

2008People v. Diggins, 379 Ill.App.3d 994, 996 , 320 Ill.Dec. 912 , 888 N.E.2d 129, 132-33 (2008).

2007"A contract is ambiguous when its language is `"susceptible to more than one meaning [citation] or is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression."'" Berryman Transfer & Storage Co., Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 345 Ill.App.3d 859, 862 , 280 Ill.Dec. 764 , 802 N.E.2d 1285 (2004), quoting Shields Pork Plus, Inc. v. Swiss Valley Ag Service, 329 Ill.App.3d 305, 310 , 263 Ill.Dec. 219 , 767 N.E.2d 945 (2002), quoting Wald v. Chicago Shippers *521 Ass'n, 175 Ill.App.3d 607, 617 , 125 Ill.Dec. 62 , 529 N.E.2d 1138 (1988). "`Ambiguous provisions or equivocal expressions whereby an insurer see

2007"A contract is ambiguous when its language is `"susceptible to more than one meaning [citation] or is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression."'" Berryman Transfer & Storage Co., Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 345 Ill.App.3d 859, 862 , 280 Ill.Dec. 764 , 802 N.E.2d 1285 (2004), quoting Shields Pork Plus, Inc. v. Swiss Valley Ag Service, 329 Ill.App.3d 305, 310 , 263 Ill.Dec. 219 , 767 N.E.2d 945 (2002), quoting Wald v. Chicago Shippers *521 Ass'n, 175 Ill.App.3d 607, 617 , 125 Ill.Dec. 62 , 529 N.E.2d 1138 (1988). "`Ambiguous provisions or equivocal expressions whereby an insurer see

2023See Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (“ejusdem generis *** attribute[s] to the last item *** the same characteristic of discreteness shared by all the preceding items”); Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 492 (2009) (“Under the ejusdem generis doctrine, when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted to mean ‘other such like.’ ”). ¶ 59 We emphasize, however, that the canon ejusdem generis is not some inexorable command t

2023See, e.g., Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. ___ , ___, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1791-92 (2022) (“Ejusdem generis neither demands nor permits that we limit a broadly worded catchall phrase based on an attribute that inheres in only one of the list’s preceding specific terms.”); Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227 (2008) (“we do not woodenly apply limiting principles every time Congress includes a specific example along with a general phrase”); McReynolds v. People, 230 Ill. 623, 633 (1907) (“The rule ejusdem generis, moreover, does not apply ‘where the specific words signify su

2023See, e.g., Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. ___ , ___, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1791-92 (2022) (“Ejusdem generis neither demands nor permits that we limit a broadly worded catchall phrase based on an attribute that inheres in only one of the list’s preceding specific terms.”); Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227 (2008) (“we do not woodenly apply limiting principles every time Congress includes a specific example along with a general phrase”); McReynolds v. People, 230 Ill. 623, 633 (1907) (“The rule ejusdem generis, moreover, does not apply ‘where the specific words signify su