ejusdem generis rule in New York

1985The words of a general bequest followed by enumerated articles are not limited to things similar to the specific items listed (see, Matter of Reynolds, 124 NY 388, 397 ).

1953Cash is not ordinarily thought of as “ tangible personal property ” and here, under the familiar doctrine of ejusdem generis, the words “ tangible personal property” should be limited to property of the same or similar character as that described by the preceding words, to wit, personal effects, household effects and automobiles (Matter of Reynolds, 124 N. Y. 388 ; Ludwig v. Bungart, 33 Misc. 177 ; Matter of Minniss, 200 Misc. 353 ; Matter of Greene, 81 N. Y.

1983The answer to the first of these contentions is that, while the ejusdem generis rule, by which a series of specific words describing things or concepts of a particular sort are used to explain the meaning of a general one in the same series (see People v Illardo, 48 NY2d 408, 416 ) frequently is resorted to as an interpretative rule, it is rare that a single word, though illustrative of a particular genus or idea will reliably reveal the intent behind a general one (Alexander v Tredegar Iron & Steel Co. [1945] AC 286, 297 [L.

1980Further, the ejusdem generis rule dictates that the general phrase "other crime dangerous to life [or] limb”, since it follows words of a particular meaning, is to be construed as applying only to crimes of the same kind as those precisely stated (see People v Illardo, 48 NY2d 408, 416 ; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 239; Black, Interpretation of Laws, p 141).

1957(Matter of Minniss, 200 Misc. 353, 354 .) The attorney for Mary Biker feels that the ejusdem generis rule should not apply here and that personal effects can mean anything without such application of the rule.

1953Cash is not ordinarily thought of as “ tangible personal property ” and here, under the familiar doctrine of ejusdem generis, the words “ tangible personal property” should be limited to property of the same or similar character as that described by the preceding words, to wit, personal effects, household effects and automobiles (Matter of Reynolds, 124 N. Y. 388 ; Ludwig v. Bungart, 33 Misc. 177 ; Matter of Minniss, 200 Misc. 353 ; Matter of Greene, 81 N. Y.

1947In the consideration of this claim, we have not overlooked the rule of interpretation set forth in Matter of Robinson ( 203 N. Y. 380 ) in which case the rule of construction known as the ejusdem generis rule is stated and applied.

1917Matter of Robinson, 203 N. Y. 380, 386 ; Matter of Aylesworth v. Phoenix Cheese Co., 170 App. Div. 34, 36 ; Lantry v. Mede, 127 id. 557.

1929(People v. Phyfe, 136 N. Y. 554 ),” and citing as sustaining the doctrine of ejusdem generis: People v. Richards ( 108 N. Y. 137 ); People v. N. Y. & Manhattan Beach R.

1927(People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137 .) Although that case deals with a different state of facts, the following quotations from the opinion are pertinent here: “ Finding it [the word ‘ building ’] used in a statute defining burglary, two courses suggest themselves: (1) to regard the term as limited to those structures which the common law as amended and enlarged by our statutes relative to the crime, made capable of being broken and entered burglariously; or, (2), to take the widest signification which has ever been given to the term building, and hold that every structure within such meaning is

2024Id.

1995This ruling, which construed the release to have a limited effect, in accordance with the doctrine of ejusdem generis, was the law of the case, and should not have been relitigated (Karasik v Karasik, 172 AD2d 294 ; Stroock & Stroock & Lavan v Beltramini, 157 AD2d 590, 591 ).

1995This ruling, which construed the release to have a limited effect, in accordance with the doctrine of ejusdem generis, was the law of the case, and should not have been relitigated (Karasik v Karasik, 172 AD2d 294 ; Stroock & Stroock & Lavan v Beltramini, 157 AD2d 590, 591 ).

1995Co., 178 AD2d 1001, 1002 ).

1992The ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction requires the court to limit the general language of a statute (or, in this case, a regulation) by specific phrases which have preceded the general language (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 239; Barsh v Town of Union, 126 AD2d 311 ).

1990However, the rule must yield "where it contradicts the evident intent” of the body enacting the legislation being construed (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 239; see also, Mark v Colgate Univ., 53 AD2d 884 ; Matter of Blatnicky v Ciancimino, 1 AD2d 383 , affd 2 NY2d 943 ).

1990However, the rule must yield "where it contradicts the evident intent” of the body enacting the legislation being construed (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 239; see also, Mark v Colgate Univ., 53 AD2d 884 ; Matter of Blatnicky v Ciancimino, 1 AD2d 383 , affd 2 NY2d 943 ).

1986In Matter of Golden v Planning Bd. ( 30 NY2d 359, 370-371 ) the court declared that the delega tion of police power, even if couched in the broadest terms, could not be read as conferring the entire police power of the State.

1982The devices particularly mentioned are medical aids (see Matter of De Croix v Sumergrade & Sons, 20 AD2d 735 ; Matter of Carniato v Wheeler Corp., 7 AD2d 328 ).

1982The devices particularly mentioned are medical aids (see Matter of De Croix v Sumergrade & Sons, 20 AD2d 735 ; Matter of Carniato v Wheeler Corp., 7 AD2d 328 ).

1982The ejusdem generis rule dictates that the general phrase “other-devices or appliances”, since it follows words of a particular meaning, be construed as applying to devices or appliances of the same kind or class as those particularly stated (cf. People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747, 764-765 ; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 239).

1980People v Bronski, 76 Misc 2d 341 . .

1980It is also not irrelevant to observe that a narrow reading is in harmony with our own sensitivity to the dangers inherent in electronic eavesdropping (see People v Washington, 46 NY2d 116, 121-122 ).

1978While the phrase "other waste matter" is not defined in the Town Law, it is well settled that, under the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, the general language of a statute ("other waste matter") must be read in conjunction with the specific phrases ("garbage, ashes, rubbish") which precede the general language ( Mtr. of Konver v. Procaccino, 45 A.D.2d 551 , 553 [3rd Dept., 1974]; McKinney's Cons.

1953Cash is not ordinarily thought of as “ tangible personal property ” and here, under the familiar doctrine of ejusdem generis, the words “ tangible personal property” should be limited to property of the same or similar character as that described by the preceding words, to wit, personal effects, household effects and automobiles (Matter of Reynolds, 124 N. Y. 388 ; Ludwig v. Bungart, 33 Misc. 177 ; Matter of Minniss, 200 Misc. 353 ; Matter of Greene, 81 N. Y.

1945In numerous decisions, expressions such as “ personal effects ” and “ household goods ” have received a wider or narrower interpretation, by reason of other provisions in the will, the doctrine of ejusdem generis being applied (see Lippincott’s Estate, Reakert’s Appeal, 173 Pa. 368 ; Matter of Steimes, 150 Misc. 279 ; Child v. Orton, 119 N. J.

1945In numerous decisions, expressions such as “ personal effects ” and “ household goods ” have received a wider or narrower interpretation, by reason of other provisions in the will, the doctrine of ejusdem generis being applied (see Lippincott’s Estate, Reakert’s Appeal, 173 Pa. 368 ; Matter of Steimes, 150 Misc. 279 ; Child v. Orton, 119 N. J.

1937An example of the latter is to be found in the case of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes ( 131 Ohio St. 501 ; 3 N. E. [2d] 415), where the rule is stated as follows: “ ‘ The violation of the pure food laws of this State by the sale of unwholesome meat is negligence per se, and may be the basis of recovery for damages by the user of said unwholesome meat, who suffers injury proximately resulting therefrom, provided the user is not himself guilty of negligence in the care, preparation, cooking, or in any other manner which contributes directly to his injury.’ ” The words “ in any other

1937In McKinney’s Consolidated Laws, book 1, “ Statutes and Statutory Construction,” page 201, it is said: “ Where a statute enumerates several classes of persons or things, and immediately following and classed with such enumeration the clause embraces ' other ’ persons or things, the word ' other ’ will generally be read as ' other such' like,’ so that persons or things therein comprised may be read as ejusdem generis with, and not of a quality superior to or different from, those specifically enumerated.” The case of People v. Visarities ( 220 App. Div. 657 ), relied upon by the appellant, is d

1935(Matter of United States Trust Co., 189 App. Div. 75 ; Baumann & Co. v. Manwit Cory., 213 id. 300.) The defendants tacitly concede this, when they seek to give an entirely distinct meaning to this clause and find in it authorization to invest in corporate and individual notes.

1934Such legacies of “ house and contents,” like Matter of Delaney ( 133 App. Div. 409 ), differ widely from the one now in hand, although they also come under the ejusdem generis rule; and this court recently held in Matter of Miller. (unreported; affd., 239 App. Div. 883 ), that personal jewelry in the house did not pass as “ contents.” The restrictive particulars in the context of the will now in question — aside from the general or presumably omnibus class of property exclusively given by the words, “ all the rest, residue and remainder of my property, both real and personal, of every kind and

1934Such legacies of “ house and contents,” like Matter of Delaney ( 133 App. Div. 409 ), differ widely from the one now in hand, although they also come under the ejusdem generis rule; and this court recently held in Matter of Miller. (unreported; affd., 239 App. Div. 883 ), that personal jewelry in the house did not pass as “ contents.” The restrictive particulars in the context of the will now in question — aside from the general or presumably omnibus class of property exclusively given by the words, “ all the rest, residue and remainder of my property, both real and personal, of every kind and