81 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1911–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County of Harris v. Eatongreen2 sentences2023“The Act does not define special defect, and so, [u]nder the ejusdem generis rule, we are to construe special defect to include those defects of the same kind or class as the ones expressly mentioned—that is, excavations and obstructions on roadways.” Reyes v. City of Laredo, 335 S.W.3d 605 , 607–08 (Tex. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Fraley, 664 S.W.3d at 98. 2012Thus, "[u]nder the ejusdem generis rule, we are to construe ‘special defect’ to include those defects of the same kind or class as [excavations or obstructions]." County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. 1978). | 19 | 26 |
City of San Antonio v. City of Boernegreen2 sentences2023Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we limit the application of the general phrase “otherwise artistic work” to the type of artistic work characterized 18 by “dramatic, literary, musical, political, [and] journalistic [works].” See City of San Antonio, 111 S.W.3d at 29 . 2013See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003). | 5 | 6 |
Perez v. Stategreen2 sentences2011One canon of statutory construction that aids us in determining plain meaning is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which the court of appeals employed: “in interpreting general words which follow an enumeration of particular or specific things, the meaning of those general words should be confined to things of the same kind.” Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. 2011One canon of statutory construction that aids us in determining plain meaning is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which the court of appeals employed: "in interpreting general words which follow an enumeration of particular or specific things, the meaning of those general words should be confined to things of the same kind." Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (en banc); see Shipp v. State, 292 S.W.3d 267, 274-75 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009). | 4 | 4 |
Stanford v. Butlergreen2 sentences2025Her argument contradicts the principles of the well-settled doctrine of ejusdem generis, a statutory construction aid that says where general words follow a designation of particular subjects in a statute, the meaning of the general words is restricted by the particular designation in that statute.3 See Farmers’ Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank v. Hanks, 137 S.W. 1120 (Tex. 1911); Stanford v. Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1944); Hammond v. City of Dallas, 712 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. 1986). 3 See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199–213 (2012). 1995“Under the ejusdem generis rule, we are to construe ‘special defect’ to include those defects of the same kind or class as the ones expressly mentioned.” Eaton, 573 S.W.2d at 179 , citing Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692 , 181 S.W.2d 269 (1944); Farmers & Mechanics’ National Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320 , 137 S.W. 1120 (1911). | 3 | 6 |
Hilco Electric Cooperative v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co.green2 sentences2019Co-op., Inc. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co. , 111 S.W.3d 75 , 81 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that when words of general nature are used in connection with designation of particular objects or classes of persons or things, meaning of general words will be restricted to particular designation). 2016Coop., Inc. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co., 111 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 2003) (stating that “when words of a general nature are used in connection with the designation of particular objects or classes of persons or things, the meaning of the general words will be restricted to the particular designation” (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 , 67 S. Ct. 13, 15 (1946) (explaining that in applying the ejusdem generis rule “the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it”))).7 The terms “money” and “property” describe two types of final relief that are typica | 3 | 4 |
Shipp v. Stategreen2 sentences2011App. 2000) (en banc); see Shipp v. State, 292 S.W.3d 267, 274-75 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009). 2011One canon of statutory construction that aids us in determining plain meaning is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which the court of appeals employed: "in interpreting general words which follow an enumeration of particular or specific things, the meaning of those general words should be confined to things of the same kind." Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (en banc); see Shipp v. State, 292 S.W.3d 267, 274-75 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009). | 3 | 3 |
Lezlea Ross v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospitalgreen2 sentences2016Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 504 (Tex. 2015) (applying doctrine of ejusdem generis to hold that the a broad term in a list was constrained by the meaning of the remaining, narrower terms). 35 See Ill. 2016Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496 , 504 & n.1 (Tex. 2015) (applying doctrine of ejusdem generis—“ when words of a general nature are used in the connection with the designation of particular objects or classes of persons or things, the meaning of the general words will be restricted to the particular designation”—in construing “catchall” reference to claims for “other claimed departure from accepted standards of . . . safety” in Medical Liability Act’s definition of “health care liability claim” to require “a substantive relationship with the providing 14 the sense of the pleading through | 2 | 4 |
Roach v. Ingramgreen2 sentences2021Based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we held in Deepwell Energy that, in order to fall within this catch-all provision, a filing must be a “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim” similar to a “lawsuit,” “cause of action,” “petition,” “complaint,” “cross-claim,” or “counterclaim.” Deepwell Energy, 574 S.W.3d at 929 ; see also Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 217 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 . 2020Id. at 217–18. | 2 | 3 |
Cleveland v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Coop., Inc. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co., 111 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 2003) (stating that “when words of a general nature are used in connection with the designation of particular objects or classes of persons or things, the meaning of the general words will be restricted to the particular designation” (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 , 67 S. Ct. 13, 15 (1946) (explaining that in applying the ejusdem generis rule “the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it”))).7 The terms “money” and “property” describe two types of final relief that are typica 2016Coop., Inc. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co., 111 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 2003) (stating that “when words of a general nature are used in connection with the designation of particular objects or classes of persons or things, the meaning of the general words will be restricted to the particular designation” (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 , 67 S. Ct. 13, 15 (1946) (explaining that in applying the ejusdem generis rule “the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it”))).7 The terms “money” and “property” describe two types of final relief that are typica | 2 | 2 |
Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.green2 sentences2009Under that rule, when a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows."). (4) In applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis , we look at the specific items listed in Section 32.21(d) before the general term "other commercial instrument," those being "will, codicil, deed, deed of trust, mortgage, security instrument, security agreement, credit card, check, authorization to debit an account at a financial institution, or similar sight order for payment of money, contract, release, or 2009Under that rule, when a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows.").4 In applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we look at the specific items listed in Section 32.21(d) before the general term "other commercial instrument," those being "will, codicil, deed, deed of trust, mortgage, security instrument, security agreement, credit card, check, authorization to debit an account at a financial institution, or similar sight order for payment of money, contract, release, or oth | 2 | 2 |
Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappellgreen2 sentences2006Op. No. JC-0410 (2001) at 3; see also Jackson Law Office v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15 , 26 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) (stating that the term "include" marks an illustrative list); cf. County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177 , 179 (Tex. 1978) (construing the phrase "such as" in a statute listing "special defects such as . . ." in light of the ejusdem generis doctrine to "include those defects of the same kind or class as the ones expressly mentioned"). 2006Op. No. JC-0410 (2001) at 3; see also JacksonLaw Of$ce v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15,26 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) (stating that the term “include” marks an illustrative list); c$ County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177,179 (Tex. 1978) (construing the phrase “such as” in a statute listing “special defects such as .” in light of the ejusdem generis doctrine to “include those defects ‘See Act ofMay 30, 1999,76th Leg., R.S., ch..1340, 5 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. | 2 | 2 |
Carr v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2003Carr v. Rogers, 383 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.1964); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 , 67 S.Ct. 13 , 91 L.Ed. 12 (1946) ("Under the ejusdem generis rule of construction, the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it."). 2000See Carr v. Rogers, 383 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.1964); Erwin v. Steele, 228 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 2 | 2 |
Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyergreen2 sentences1947See also Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574 , 136 S.W.2d 800 , 127 A.L.R. 1217 (not cited by either party), for a case in which the ejusdem generis rule was not applied. 1947See also Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574 , 136 S.W.2d 800 , 127 A.L.R. 1217 (not cited by either party), for a case in which the ejusdem generis rule was not applied. | 2 | 2 |
Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Hanksgreen2 sentences2025Her argument contradicts the principles of the well-settled doctrine of ejusdem generis, a statutory construction aid that says where general words follow a designation of particular subjects in a statute, the meaning of the general words is restricted by the particular designation in that statute.3 See Farmers’ Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank v. Hanks, 137 S.W. 1120 (Tex. 1911); Stanford v. Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1944); Hammond v. City of Dallas, 712 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. 1986). 3 See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199–213 (2012). 1995“Under the ejusdem generis rule, we are to construe ‘special defect’ to include those defects of the same kind or class as the ones expressly mentioned.” Eaton, 573 S.W.2d at 179 , citing Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692 , 181 S.W.2d 269 (1944); Farmers & Mechanics’ National Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320 , 137 S.W. 1120 (1911). | 1 | 6 |
Paulsen v. Yarrellgreen2 sentences2021Based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we held in Deepwell Energy that, in order to fall within this catch-all provision, a filing must be a “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim” similar to a “lawsuit,” “cause of action,” “petition,” “complaint,” “cross-claim,” or “counterclaim.” Deepwell Energy, 574 S.W.3d at 929 ; see also Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 217 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 . 2019See Paulsen v. Yarrell , 537 S.W.3d 224 , 233 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (applying doctrine of ejusdem generis to TCPA's definition of "legal action" and observing that list within definition "is best characterized by observation that each element of this [enumerated] class is a procedural vehicle for vindication of a legal claim"). | 1 | 4 |
Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences2015Co. of Ind., 158 Ind.App. 204 , 301 tion line or system” did not allow the easement N.E.2d 863, 865 (1973) (indicating that before to be used for cable-television lines); Right of instituting condemnation proceedings, there Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. must be negotiations for the property to be con- Co., 106 Tex. 94 , 157 S.W. 737 , 739–40 (1913) demned, which requires a “meeting of the (applying the ejusdem generis rule of construc- minds” as to the physical property “and not ne- tion to conclude that the phrase “all the timber, cessarily upon any of the more incorporeal earth, 2015Co. of Ind., 158 Ind.App. 204 , 301 tion line or system” did not allow the easement N.E.2d 863, 865 (1973) (indicating that before to be used for cable-television lines); Right of instituting condemnation proceedings, there Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. must be negotiations for the property to be con- Co., 106 Tex. 94 , 157 S.W. 737 , 739–40 (1913) demned, which requires a “meeting of the (applying the ejusdem generis rule of construc- minds” as to the physical property “and not ne- tion to conclude that the phrase “all the timber, cessarily upon any of the more incorporeal earth, | 1 | 3 |
Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2018Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. , 896 S.W.2d 320 , 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) ("The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies only when the contract is ambiguous."); see Dimotsis v. State Farm Lloyds , 5 S.W.3d 808 , 811-12 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (Rickhoff, J., concurring) (stating that courts do not resort to doctrine of ejusdem generis "unless we have already determined that a term is ambiguous," and concluding that party improperly relied on doctrine of ejusdem generis "to create an ambiguity where none exists."). 1999See Hussong v. Schwan’s Sales Enters., 896 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). | 1 | 2 |
Hurt v. Oak Downs, Inc.green2 sentences2000The doctrine of ejusdem generis is "only a rule of construction, to be applied as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, and cannot control where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered or defeated." Hurt v. Oak Downs, Inc., 85 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1935, writ dism'd w.o.j.). 1950From 59 C.J. 981-4, as copied in Hurt v. Oak Downs, Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 294 , loc. cit. 298, suit dismissed by Supreme Court, 128 Tex. 218 , 97 S.W.2d 673 , we quote a statement of the rule upon which we base our action in overruling appellants’first point: “*. * * The doctrine of ejusdem generis, however, is only a rule of construction, to be ápplied as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, and can not control where the plain purpose and intent of the legislature would thereby be hindered or defeated;. nor does this doctrine apply where the specific words of a statute signify sub | 1 | 2 |
City of Denton v. Rachel Papergreen1 sentence2023“Factors helpful to ascertaining whether a premises condition is a special defect include the condition’s size, whether the condition unexpectedly impairs a vehicle’s ability to travel on the road, or whether it presents an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of the roadway.” - 10 - 04-22-00453-CV Fraley, 664 S.W.3d at 98; see City of Denton v. Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Lefevers v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Lefevers v. State, 20 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
In re Elliottgreen1 sentence2021In reaching this conclusion, we specifically noted the Paulsen’s court’s holding that, if the catch-all provision of the statutory definition was interpreted to include all motions filed during the course of litigation: [T]he proliferation of “piecemeal or seriatim ‘motions to dismiss’ attacking myriad ‘legal actions’ that consist merely of individual filings within or related to a lawsuit, as opposed to the underlying lawsuit and substantive claims that are the [TCPA’s] core focus” would result in application of the TCPA that “strays from—and, indeed, undermines through cost and delay—its man | 1 | 1 |
Karen Misko v. Tracy Johnsgreen1 sentence2021In reaching this conclusion, we specifically noted the Paulsen’s court’s holding that, if the catch-all provision of the statutory definition was interpreted to include all motions filed during the course of litigation: [T]he proliferation of “piecemeal or seriatim ‘motions to dismiss’ attacking myriad ‘legal actions’ that consist merely of individual filings within or related to a lawsuit, as opposed to the underlying lawsuit and substantive claims that are the [TCPA’s] core focus” would result in application of the TCPA that “strays from—and, indeed, undermines through cost and delay—its man | 1 | 1 |
Wendy Jeanelle Hennig v. Matthew Michael Didykgreen1 sentence2018See Hennig v. Didyk, 438 S.W.3d 177, 188 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (explaining that the doctrine of ejusdem generis applies only to an ambiguous document). | 1 | 1 |
Dimotsis v. State Farm Lloydsgreen1 sentence2018Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. , 896 S.W.2d 320 , 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) ("The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies only when the contract is ambiguous."); see Dimotsis v. State Farm Lloyds , 5 S.W.3d 808 , 811-12 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (Rickhoff, J., concurring) (stating that courts do not resort to doctrine of ejusdem generis "unless we have already determined that a term is ambiguous," and concluding that party improperly relied on doctrine of ejusdem generis "to create an ambiguity where none exists."). | 1 | 1 |
| University of Texas at Arlington v. Sandra Williams and Steve Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boykin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. La Pointegreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Corpus Christi v. Bayfront Associates, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dawkins v. Meyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Erwin v. Steele
green
2 sentences2015However, we think, in the light of the ejusdem generis rule of construction, the words ‘such as the office of a physician, surgeon, dentist, musician, or artist’ limit and contract the broader term ‘home occupation.’ Erwin v. Steele, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 882 . 1951However, we think, in the light of the ejusdem generis rule of construction, the words “such as the office of a physician, surgeon, dentist, musician, or artist” limit and contract the broader term “home occupation.” Erwin v. Steele, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 882 . | 3 | 1951–2015 |
State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Kitchen
green
2 sentences2009A condition may be a special defect only if it is an excavation, obstruction, or some other condition that presents "an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways." Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 . 2009A condition may be a special defect only if it is an excavation, obstruction, or some other condition that presents “an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways.” Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 . | 3 | 2009–2009 |
Hammond v. City of Dallas
green
1 sentence2025Her argument contradicts the principles of the well-settled doctrine of ejusdem generis, a statutory construction aid that says where general words follow a designation of particular subjects in a statute, the meaning of the general words is restricted by the particular designation in that statute.3 See Farmers’ Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank v. Hanks, 137 S.W. 1120 (Tex. 1911); Stanford v. Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1944); Hammond v. City of Dallas, 712 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. 1986). 3 See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199–213 (2012). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Reyes v. City of Laredo
green
1 sentence2023“The Act does not define special defect, and so, [u]nder the ejusdem generis rule, we are to construe special defect to include those defects of the same kind or class as the ones expressly mentioned—that is, excavations and obstructions on roadways.” Reyes v. City of Laredo, 335 S.W.3d 605 , 607–08 (Tex. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Fraley, 664 S.W.3d at 98. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Deepwell Energy Services, LLC v. Aveda Transportation and Energy Services, Jared Brown, Linda Clark, Tom Halliday, and Mickey Sims
green
2 sentences2021In reaching this conclusion, we specifically noted the Paulsen’s court’s holding that, if the catch-all provision of the statutory definition was interpreted to include all motions filed during the course of litigation: [T]he proliferation of “piecemeal or seriatim ‘motions to dismiss’ attacking myriad ‘legal actions’ that consist merely of individual filings within or related to a lawsuit, as opposed to the underlying lawsuit and substantive claims that are the [TCPA’s] core focus” would result in application of the TCPA that “strays from—and, indeed, undermines through cost and delay—its man 2021Based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we held in Deepwell Energy that, in order to fall within this catch-all provision, a filing must be a “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim” similar to a “lawsuit,” “cause of action,” “petition,” “complaint,” “cross-claim,” or “counterclaim.” Deepwell Energy, 574 S.W.3d at 929 ; see also Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 217 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Defendant-Appellee-Cross
green
1 sentence2018The court was invited, but declined, to apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis because, by using the term "including but not being limited to" in the clause, "the parties intended to excuse all delays coming within the general descripti *186 on regardless of their similarity to the listed excuses." Id. at 989 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Board of Adjustment v. Levinson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Blaize v. Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Thomas v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| The People v. Capuzi green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. McBride green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Lundy v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Miranda v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Chappell Ex Rel. Chappell v. Dwyer green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| El Paso County v. Jeffers green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Urban v. Fossati green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Phillips v. Houston Nat. Bank green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Ex Parte Hamer neutral | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Galveston, H. & H. R. Co. v. Anderson green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| State v. Eckhardt green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Bailey v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Ex Parte Lingenfelter green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| People v. Vázquez Rosario neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Cutshaw v. City of Denver green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Spalding v. People green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Bills v. Putnam green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Misch v. Russell green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.