ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Arizona

2026Sajovic reiterates that counsel pressured him to sign the plea agreement and he did not have sufficient time to read the agreement or discuss it with counsel. ¶12 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant “must show both that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced [him].” State v. Bennet, 213 Ariz. 562 , 567 ¶ 21 (2006); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2026“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567, ¶ 21 (2006). ¶9 First, Lawrence argues counsel pressured him to accept the plea by saying he would likely be sentenced to life in prison if convicted at trial.

2026Sajovic reiterates that counsel pressured him to sign the plea agreement and he did not have sufficient time to read the agreement or discuss it with counsel. ¶12 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant “must show both that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced [him].” State v. Bennet, 213 Ariz. 562 , 567 ¶ 21 (2006); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2025“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562 , 567 ¶ 21 (2006). ¶9 Regarding deficiency, a “strong presumption” exists that “counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and thus “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 .

2025State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002) (“[I]neffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32 proceedings.

2007If the appellate courts cannot consider “[a]ny such claims ... raised in a direct appeal,” id., it necessarily follows that the superior court should not address such claims before trial. *415 Any other result would mean that a pretrial order rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not be considered by an appellate court until a post-conviction relief proceeding has been completed by the very court that issued the pretrial ruling.

2015As a result of these alleged failures, Father claims he was prejudiced. ¶33 We will review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal only if “we may clearly determine from the record that the ineffective assistance claim is meritless.” State v. Whalen, 192 Ariz. 103, 110 (App. 1997) (quoting State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989)).

1997Ineffective Assistance of Counsel We do not review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal unless “we may clearly determine from the record that the ineffective assistance claim is meritless.” State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 , 771 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1989); see also Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, 17 A.R.S.

2024We “will not resolve an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal unless the record clearly indicates that the claim is meritless.” State v. Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 133 (1994).

2017This Court noted it had stated previously that it would not “‘resolve an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal unless the record clearly indicates that the claim is meritless.’” Id. (quoting State v. Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 133 (1994)).

1992To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must prove (1) that his counsel lacked minimal competence as determined by prevailing professional norms, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985); and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984).

1992To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must prove (1) that his counsel lacked minimal competence as determined by prevailing professional norms, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985); and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984).

2026Under the first prong, this Court “must presume counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance that might be considered sound trial strategy.” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quotations omitted). ¶8 When the State “engages in plea bargaining, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be adequately informed of the consequences before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.” State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 413, ¶ 14 (App. 2000).

2026Under the first prong, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441 , 444 ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ). 7 STATE v. NORRIS Decision of the Court A. Grand Jury ¶24 Norris argues the court erred by relying on a minute entry instead of the grand jury transcript to reject his claim that his trial counsel should have challenged whether the required number of grand jurors were present. “[A]t least [nine] grand jurors” must agree to an indic

2026We grant relief regarding the voluntariness of the guilty plea and whether Petkovic required an interpreter, and we remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing under Rule 33.13. 10 STATE v. PETKOVIC Foster, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part F O S T E R, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: ¶26 I concur with the Majority’s analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim but dissent on the issue of whether the superior erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing. ¶27 “The relevant inquiry for determining whether the petitioner is entitled to an evidentia

2024Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 220, ¶ 11 (2016) (“The relevant inquiry for determining whether the [PCR] petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing is whether he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have changed the verdict or sentence.

2014Thomas v. Rayes, 214 Ariz. 411, 414, ¶ 16 , 153 P.3d 1040, 1043 (2007) (claim based on Donald is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which may be brought only pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 32). ¶5 Finally, Powels suggests the superior court erred by ruling the State could offer into evidence tape recordings of Powels's jail telephone calls because the State did not disclose the evidence until after trial began.

2014Thomas v. Rayes, 214 Ariz. 411, 414, ¶ 16 , 153 P.3d 1040, 1043 (2007) (claim based on Donald is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which may be brought only pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 32). ¶5 Finally, Powels suggests the superior court erred by ruling the State could offer into evidence tape recordings of Powels's jail telephone calls because the State did not disclose the evidence until after trial began.

2017Id.; State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 541 (1985). ¶7 King did not present evidence as to how appellate counsel was deficient and ineffective by not raising the confrontation issue.

2006Id.; State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 541 , 707 P.2d 944, 945 (1985). ¶ 22 A strong presumption exists that appellate counsel provided effective assistance.

1992To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must prove (1) that his counsel lacked minimal competence as determined by prevailing professional norms, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985); and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984).

1992To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must prove (1) that his counsel lacked minimal competence as determined by prevailing professional norms, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985); and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984).

2026Under the first prong, this Court “must presume counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance that might be considered sound trial strategy.” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quotations omitted). ¶8 When the State “engages in plea bargaining, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be adequately informed of the consequences before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.” State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 413, ¶ 14 (App. 2000).

2025“To establish deficient performance during plea negotiations, a petitioner must prove that the lawyer either (1) gave erroneous advice or (2) failed to give information necessary to allow the petitioner to make an informed decision whether to accept the plea.” State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406 , 413 ¶ 16 (App. 2000).

2023When weighing the due process rights of a parent against the child’s best interests, however, this court has held that reversal of a termination order is not justified by inadequacy of counsel unless, “at a minimum,” a parent demonstrates that the alleged errors “undermine confidence in the outcome” of the termination proceeding, and shows a “reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.” Id. at 325 ¶ 18 (adapting the ineffective assistance of counsel test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) to Arizona termination of parental ri

2021See John M., 217 Ariz. at 323–25, ¶¶ 12–17.

2015In denying Cameron’s request on July 2, 2001, the superior court noted Cameron had failed to explain why he waited over one year to file his first notice or why he had waited six more years to file a second request for post-conviction relief. ¶5 On April 26, 2013, Cameron filed a notice of post-conviction relief and stated that he intended to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, his failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was not his fault, and Martinez v. Ryan, —U.S.—, 132 S. Ct. 1309 , 182 L.

2015In denying Cameron’s request on July 2, 2001, the superior court noted Cameron had failed to explain why he waited over one year to file his first notice or why he had waited six more years to file a second request for post-conviction relief. ¶5 On April 26, 2013, Cameron filed a notice of post-conviction relief and stated that he intended to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, his failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was not his fault, and Martinez v. Ryan, —U.S.—, 132 S. Ct. 1309 , 182 L.

1997This court will not “resolve an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal unless the record clearly indicates that the claim is meritless.” State v. Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 133 , 882 P.2d 933, 940 (1994) (citing State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 599 , 832 P.2d at 616 ).

1997This court will not “resolve an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal unless the record clearly indicates that the claim is meritless.” State v. Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 133 , 882 P.2d 933, 940 (1994) (citing State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 599 , 832 P.2d at 616 ).

2025To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the appeal would have been different.” State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz. 642, 647 (App. 1995).

2025A strategic decision by counsel will not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless the decision has no “reasoned basis.” State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 455 (1985); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 690– 91 (1984) (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”). ¶9 Here, the superior court appropriately determined that defense counsel’s conduct was within professional norms.

2025Id. at 407, ¶ 8 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88 (1984)).

2023When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[i]t is not only the integrity of the attorney which is at stake but that of the entire fact-finding process,” and “the court must have before it all relevant facts relating to the claim.” State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 260 (1981); see also State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 52 (1992) (holding the trial court must have all relevant facts relating to a claim questioning the competency of an attorney). ¶29 We have held “[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a direct attack on the competence of an attorney and constit

2023When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[i]t is not only the integrity of the attorney which is at stake but that of the entire fact-finding process,” and “the court must have before it all relevant facts relating to the claim.” State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 260 (1981); see also State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 52 (1992) (holding the trial court must have all relevant facts relating to a claim questioning the competency of an attorney). ¶29 We have held “[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a direct attack on the competence of an attorney and constit

2023Sup. Ct. 42, Ethical Rule (“ER”) 1.6(d)(4).” 3 Likewise, our precedent provides that a party who asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has waived the attorney-client privilege as “to the particular contentions asserted.” Cuffle, 171 Ariz. at 51–52 (holding “an attorney should be allowed to defend himself, at least with regard to the particular contentions asserted, by revealing ‘at least that much of what was previously privileged as is necessary’” (quoting Moreno, 128 Ariz. at 260 )); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509 , 515–16 (1982) (stating an “attack on counsel’s competency[] has w

2023When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[i]t is not only the integrity of the attorney which is at stake but that of the entire fact-finding process,” and “the court must have before it all relevant facts relating to the claim.” State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 260 (1981); see also State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 52 (1992) (holding the trial court must have all relevant facts relating to a claim questioning the competency of an attorney). ¶29 We have held “[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a direct attack on the competence of an attorney and constit

2023Sup. Ct. 42, Ethical Rule (“ER”) 1.6(d)(4).” 3 Likewise, our precedent provides that a party who asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has waived the attorney-client privilege as “to the particular contentions asserted.” Cuffle, 171 Ariz. at 51–52 (holding “an attorney should be allowed to defend himself, at least with regard to the particular contentions asserted, by revealing ‘at least that much of what was previously privileged as is necessary’” (quoting Moreno, 128 Ariz. at 260 )); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509 , 515–16 (1982) (stating an “attack on counsel’s competency[] has w

2022State v. Bowers, 192 Ariz. 419, 424, ¶ 19 (App. 1998) (holding that to satisfy the prejudice requirement of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” (citation omitted)).

2021See In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62 , 64–65, ¶ 6 (2013) (“arguments not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority” are waived).

2019See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322-25 (1999) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea and statements at plea colloquy did not function as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim on review); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a petitioner from raising a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, ¶ 12 (2002) (holding a