ineffective assistance of counsel claim in District of Columbia

2020To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant “must demonstrate both that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Bost v. United States, 178 A.3d 1156 , 1210 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) 4 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

2020Accordingly, it is not always necessary to evaluate both the performance and the prejudice prongs of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim; “[i]f it is easier to 5 dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Id. at 697 .

2012Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see also Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C.2007).

2012We review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo.” Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C.2007) (en banc) (citations omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

1995Smith, supra, 608 A.2d at 131 (a presumption exists that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a hearing); Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142, 147 (D.C.1990) (same).

1990In Ramsey v. United States, supra, a case also involving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we set forth the principles which control the application of this provision: There is a presumption that a trial court presented with a § 23-110 motion should conduct a hearing.

2026See, e.g., Dugger, 295 A.3d at 1119-20. 47 preparation is “well within the range of reasonable attorney performance.” 93 A.3d 1237, 1272 (D.C. 2014); see also Lane v. United States, 737 A.2d 541, 551 (D.C. 1999) (dismissing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where an “uncontroverted affidavit established that [the trial lawyer] met with [the defendant] on numerous occasions to prepare his testimony and to discuss impeachment and cross examination”).

2026See, e.g., Dugger, 295 A.3d at 1119-20. 47 preparation is “well within the range of reasonable attorney performance.” 93 A.3d 1237, 1272 (D.C. 2014); see also Lane v. United States, 737 A.2d 541, 551 (D.C. 1999) (dismissing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where an “uncontroverted affidavit established that [the trial lawyer] met with [the defendant] on numerous occasions to prepare his testimony and to discuss impeachment and cross examination”).

2025See Faltz v. United States, 318 A.3d 338 , 345-46 (D.C. 2024) (declining to address the performance prong because appellant could not prove prejudice); see also Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 259 (D.C. 1999) (disposing of the Strickland claim solely on prejudice).

2024E.g., Sims v. United States, 963 A.2d 147, 149 (D.C. 2008) (“[A] panel of this court may not ignore the court’s own past decisions holding that Second Amendment claims . . . may be . . . waived by a defendant’s guilty plea.”). 6 “foreclose[d]” by appellant’s unconditional guilty plea.

2020As to the deficiency prong, “Strickland does not guarantee perfect representation, only a reasonably competent attorney[,]” and “there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician[.]” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020See Breest v. Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1978) (acknowledging that a due process right to finality might arise when an illegal sentence is corrected so as to “postpone[] parole eligibility or release date far beyond that originally set”); cf. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 , 202- 04 (2001) (stating that “any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance” and rejecting argument that increase of prison term by “anywhere between 6 and 21 months” was not significant enough to constitute prejudice in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim).

2020“Ordinarily, there is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing on a § 23- 110 motion asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Little v. United States, 748 A.2d 920, 922 (D.C. 2000).

2020Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Appellant may overcome a trial court’s procedural bar and still raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by showing both cause for failure to raise such claim in direct appeal and “actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which [appellant] complains.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

2020In our review of a trial court’s denial of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they lack evidentiary support in the record[,]” but “[o]ur review of the trial court’s legal determinations, including its conclusions with respect to deficient performance and prejudice, is de novo.” Blakeney v. United States, 77 A.3d 328, 341 (D.C. 2013).

2020In our review of a trial court’s denial of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they lack evidentiary support in the record[,]” but “[o]ur review of the trial court’s legal determinations, including its conclusions with respect to deficient performance and prejudice, is de novo.” Blakeney v. United States, 77 A.3d 328, 341 (D.C. 2013).

2016Turner v. United States, 116 A.3d 894, 934 (D.C. 2015).

2013However, we do not agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Strickland “clear[ly]” held “that in all but three exceptional circumstances prejudice must be shown before an ineffective assistance of counsel claim merits relief.” Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir.2006).

2013Nor are we persuaded that there is much significance in the distinction that Waller "came in a direct appeal presenting the pure closure issue, not in a collateral attack on the conviction presenting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim stemming from the failure to object to the closure.” Purvis, 451 F.3d at 740 .

2013The Supreme Court’s discussion of three instances in which the violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is presumptively prejudicial — (1) actual or constructive denial of counsel; (2) state interference with counsel’s assistance; and (3) counsel operating under a conflict of interest, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052—is not necessarily an exclusive list of the rare occasions when prejudice may be presumed. 7 Requiring Littlejohn to prove actual prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s waiver of his public trial right would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings

2013The Supreme Court’s discussion of three instances in which the violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is presumptively prejudicial — (1) actual or constructive denial of counsel; (2) state interference with counsel’s assistance; and (3) counsel operating under a conflict of interest, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052—is not necessarily an exclusive list of the rare occasions when prejudice may be presumed. 7 Requiring Littlejohn to prove actual prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s waiver of his public trial right would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings

2013I am aware that there is a difference of views on this question among some of the federal courts of appeal, ie., Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir.2009) (applying structural-error presumption of prejudice to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1st Cir.2007) (presuming prejudice when counsel’s deficient performance resulted in a structural error); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (same).

2013I am aware that there is a difference of views on this question among some of the federal courts of appeal, ie., Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir.2009) (applying structural-error presumption of prejudice to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1st Cir.2007) (presuming prejudice when counsel’s deficient performance resulted in a structural error); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (same).

2013I am aware that there is a difference of views on this question among some of the federal courts of appeal, ie., Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir.2009) (applying structural-error presumption of prejudice to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1st Cir.2007) (presuming prejudice when counsel’s deficient performance resulted in a structural error); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (same).

2012See Strozier v. United States, 991 A.2d 778, 786 (D.C.2010) (rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a § 23-110 motion "because [appellant] did not submit with his motion a statement, declaration, or affidavit of the potential [expert] witness setting forth in detail what his testimony would have been”).