defendant raises claim in Connecticut

2016"A defendant in a criminal prosecution may waive one or more of his or her fundamental rights. ... [I]n the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal [that], while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial. ... [A] constitutional claim that has been waived does not satisfy the third prong of the Golding test because, in such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to either party ... or that the alleged constitutional violation ... exists and ... deprived the defendant of a fair trial ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotati

2016"A defendant in a criminal prosecution may waive one or more of his or her fundamental rights. ... [I]n the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal [that], while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial. ... [A] constitutional claim that has been waived does not satisfy the third prong of the Golding test because, in such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to either party ... or that the alleged constitutional violation ... exists and ... deprived the defendant of a fair trial ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotati

2021In Payne, we clarified that the standard governing a prose- cutorial impropriety claim depends on the nature of the constitutional right allegedly violated. ‘‘[W]hen a defendant raises on appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to show, not only that the remarks were improper, but also that, considered in light of the whole trial, the improprieties were so egregious that they amounted to a denial of due process.’’ Id., 562–63. ‘‘On the other hand . . . if the defendant raises a cla

2021In Payne, we clarified that the standard governing a prose- cutorial impropriety claim depends on the nature of the constitutional right allegedly violated. ‘‘[W]hen a defendant raises on appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to show, not only that the remarks were improper, but also that, considered in light of the whole trial, the improprieties were so egregious that they amounted to a denial of due process.’’ Id., 562–63. ‘‘On the other hand . . . if the defendant raises a cla

2011In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469, 478 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007).

2011In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469, 478 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007).

2006“The court in Arluk relied on State v. Cooper, [supra, 38 Conn. App. 661 ], and stated that [w]e are mindful that in the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial. . . . [In Cooper], we held that a defendant could not satisfy the third prong of Golding where he had implicitly waived at trial a challenge to the alleged constitutional deprivation that was the basis of his claim on appeal.

2005The court in Arluk relied on State v. Cooper, [supra, 38 Conn. App. 661 ], and stated that [w]e are mindful that in the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial. . . .

2016We note that, ‘‘[i]n the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal [that], while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial. . . . [A] constitutional claim that has been waived does not satisfy the third prong of the Golding test because, in such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to either party . . . or that the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defen- dant of a fair trial . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holness, 289 Conn. 535,

2016We note that, ‘‘[i]n the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal [that], while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial. . . . [A] constitutional claim that has been waived does not satisfy the third prong of the Golding test because, in such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to either party . . . or that the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defen- dant of a fair trial . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holness, 289 Conn. 535,

2004“In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2003We are mindful that in “the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2004“In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2003We are mindful that in “the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2004“In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2003We are mindful that in “the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2004“In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2003We are mindful that in “the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2004“In the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2003We are mindful that in “the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.” State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 667 , 664 A.2d 773 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 , 665 A.2d 903 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214 , 116 S. Ct. 1837 , 134 L.

2018To reach a contrary conclusion would result in an ambush of the trial court by permitting the defendant to raise a claim on appeal that his or her counsel expressly had abandoned in the trial court." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton , 293 Conn. 435 , 448-49, 988 A.2d 167 (2009). "[W]aiver is [t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment-express or implied-of a legal right or notice....

2018To reach a contrary conclusion would result in an ambush of the trial court by permitting the defendant to raise a claim on appeal that his or her counsel expressly had abandoned in the trial court." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton , 293 Conn. 435 , 448-49, 988 A.2d 167 (2009). "[W]aiver is [t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment-express or implied-of a legal right or notice....

1990B The defendant also argues that the reimposition of the New London sentence to run consecutive to the New Haven sentence violated the state and federal constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 6 As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether this claim is reviewable under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 526 (1973); see also State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 240 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989); because the defendant raises this claim on appeal for the first time.

1990Because the defendant raises this claim on appeal for the first time, we must decide, as a preliminary matter, whether this claim is reviewable under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

2018Inasmuch as the defendant raises a claim on appeal different from the one that he raised at trial, he is not entitled to review of his claim." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saunders , 114 Conn. App. 493 , 504, 969 A.2d 868 , cert. denied, 292 Conn. 917 , 973 A.2d 1277 (2009).

2018Inasmuch as the defendant raises a claim on appeal different from the one that he raised at trial, he is not entitled to review of his claim." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saunders , 114 Conn. App. 493 , 504, 969 A.2d 868 , cert. denied, 292 Conn. 917 , 973 A.2d 1277 (2009).

2018Inasmuch as the defendant raises a claim on appeal different from the one that he raised at trial, he is not entitled to review of his claim." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saunders , 114 Conn. App. 493 , 504, 969 A.2d 868 , cert. denied, 292 Conn. 917 , 973 A.2d 1277 (2009).

2018Inasmuch as the defendant raises a claim on appeal different from the one that he raised at trial, he is not entitled to review of his claim." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saunders , 114 Conn. App. 493 , 504, 969 A.2d 868 , cert. denied, 292 Conn. 917 , 973 A.2d 1277 (2009).

2021The standard governing our review of a prosecutorial impro- priety claim depends on the nature of the constitutional right allegedly violated. ‘‘[W]hen a defendant raises on appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to show, not only that the remarks were improper, but also that, considered in light of the whole trial, the improprieties were so egregious that they amounted to a denial of due process.’’ Id., 562–63. ‘‘On the other hand . . . if the defendant raises a claim that the pr

2020We reject each of these claims. ‘‘[W]hen a defendant raises a claim of prosecutorial impropriety, we first must determine whether any impropriety in fact occurred; second, we must examine whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weatherspoon, 332 Conn. 531 , 555–56, 212 A.3d 208 (2019).

2020We reject each of these claims. ‘‘[W]hen a defendant raises a claim of prosecutorial impropriety, we first must determine whether any impropriety in fact occurred; second, we must examine whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weatherspoon, 332 Conn. 531 , 555–56, 212 A.3d 208 (2019).

2019At the conclusion of the adjudicatory stage of the hearing, the court found that the fourteen year old female's testimony "was completely not credible" and that it contradicted the defendant's admission to the contrary. 4 On appeal, the defendant raises no claim with respect to the dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceeding. 5 In Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 , 489, 92 S. Ct. 2593 , 33 L.

2019At the conclusion of the adjudicatory stage of the hearing, the court found that the fourteen year old female's testimony "was completely not credible" and that it contradicted the defendant's admission to the contrary. 4 On appeal, the defendant raises no claim with respect to the dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceeding. 5 In Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 , 489, 92 S. Ct. 2593 , 33 L.

2017We note that the burden is different when the defendant invokes a specific constitutional right. "[C]onsistent with our [Supreme Court's] decisions in [ State v. Cassidy , 236 Conn. 112 , 672 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 , 117 S.Ct. 273 , 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996) ] and [ State v. Angel T. , 292 Conn. 262 , 973 A.2d 1207 (2009) ], if the defendant raises a claim that the prosecutorial improprieties infringed a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the defendant meets hi

2017We note that the burden is different when the defendant invokes a specific constitutional right. "[C]onsistent with our [Supreme Court's] decisions in [ State v. Cassidy , 236 Conn. 112 , 672 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 , 117 S.Ct. 273 , 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996) ] and [ State v. Angel T. , 292 Conn. 262 , 973 A.2d 1207 (2009) ], if the defendant raises a claim that the prosecutorial improprieties infringed a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the defendant meets hi

2017We note that the burden is different when the defendant invokes a specific constitutional right. "[C]onsistent with our [Supreme Court's] decisions in [ State v. Cassidy , 236 Conn. 112 , 672 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 , 117 S.Ct. 273 , 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996) ] and [ State v. Angel T. , 292 Conn. 262 , 973 A.2d 1207 (2009) ], if the defendant raises a claim that the prosecutorial improprieties infringed a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the defendant meets hi

2017We note that the burden is different when the defendant invokes a specific constitutional right. "[C]onsistent with our [Supreme Court's] decisions in [ State v. Cassidy , 236 Conn. 112 , 672 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 , 117 S.Ct. 273 , 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996) ] and [ State v. Angel T. , 292 Conn. 262 , 973 A.2d 1207 (2009) ], if the defendant raises a claim that the prosecutorial improprieties infringed a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the defendant meets hi

2017We note that the burden is different when the defendant invokes a specific constitutional right. "[C]onsistent with our [Supreme Court's] decisions in [ State v. Cassidy , 236 Conn. 112 , 672 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 , 117 S.Ct. 273 , 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996) ] and [ State v. Angel T. , 292 Conn. 262 , 973 A.2d 1207 (2009) ], if the defendant raises a claim that the prosecutorial improprieties infringed a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the defendant meets hi

2017We note that the burden is different when the defendant invokes a specific constitutional right. "[C]onsistent with our [Supreme Court's] decisions in [ State v. Cassidy , 236 Conn. 112 , 672 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 , 117 S.Ct. 273 , 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996) ] and [ State v. Angel T. , 292 Conn. 262 , 973 A.2d 1207 (2009) ], if the defendant raises a claim that the prosecutorial improprieties infringed a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the defendant meets hi

2017Under this standard, "[a defendant] can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation ... exists and ... deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original; i

2017Under this standard, "[a defendant] can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation ... exists and ... deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original; i

2016The defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal and requests review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).9 We conclude that the claim fails under the third prong of Golding; the defendant has not demon- strated a violation of a constitutional right and depriva- tion of a fair trial.10 ‘‘It is true that ‘[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses . . . is in plain terms the right to present a defense, [and] the right to present the defendant’s ver- sion of the facts . . . .’ Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L.

2016The defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal and requests review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).9 We conclude that the claim fails under the third prong of Golding; the defendant has not demon- strated a violation of a constitutional right and depriva- tion of a fair trial.10 ‘‘It is true that ‘[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses . . . is in plain terms the right to present a defense, [and] the right to present the defendant’s ver- sion of the facts . . . .’ Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L.

2015Specifically, the defendant contends that the court’s canvass was inadequate in that ‘‘it failed to (1) tell how many jurors [the defendant] would have had versus just one judge, (2) indicate that the jury would have to be unanimous, and (3) evaluate [the defendant’s] educational, work, and jury trial experience.’’ The defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal and requests review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).3 We review the defendant’s claim because the record is adequate for review and his claim is of constitutional magnitude.4 State