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12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Howard v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011The trial court credited Ms. Player’s testimony and found that Mr. Robertson “had ten seconds to get away,” but remained there with lye in his hands and “threw it on [Ms. Watson].” Case law in this jurisdiction holds that “[w]hen a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the trial court must decide, as a matter of law, whether there is record evidence sufficient to support the claim.” Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted). 2008The trial court credited Ms. Player’s testimony and found that Mr. Robertson “had ten seconds to get away,” but remained there with lye in his hands and “threw it on [Ms. Watson].” Case law in this jurisdiction holds that “[w]hen a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the trial court must decide, as a matter of law, whether there is record evidence sufficient to support the claim.” Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C.1995). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023When a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “there is a presumption that the trial court should conduct a hearing.” Steward v. United States, 927 A.2d 1081, 1087 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Jones v. United States, 918 A.2d 389, 402-03 (D.C. 2007)). | 1 | 1 |
KEVIN M. BELLINGER v. UNITED STATES.green1 sentence2023But we have explained that a hearing is not necessary where “the claims (1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief.” Bellinger v. United States, 127 A.3d 505, 515 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 261 (D.C. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Newman v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023But we have explained that a hearing is not necessary where “the claims (1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief.” Bellinger v. United States, 127 A.3d 505, 515 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 261 (D.C. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Steward v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023When a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “there is a presumption that the trial court should conduct a hearing.” Steward v. United States, 927 A.2d 1081, 1087 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Jones v. United States, 918 A.2d 389, 402-03 (D.C. 2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007In a parental discipline context, “[s]light evidence is not sufficient evidence; a mere modicum cannot rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” Powell v. United States, 916 A.2d 890, 894 (D.C.2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2005See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1065 (D.C.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 , 108 S.Ct. 1740 , 100 L.Ed.2d 203 (1988). 2005See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1065 (D.C.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 , 108 S.Ct. 1740 , 100 L.Ed.2d 203 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Watson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2005See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1065 (D.C.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 , 108 S.Ct. 1740 , 100 L.Ed.2d 203 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Monroe v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978); Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755 (D.C.1978). 2000See Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978); Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755 (D.C.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Monroe v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000See Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978); Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755 (D.C.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995See Brown v. United States, 619 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C.1992) (citing Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678 , 682 n. 8 (D.C. 1984)). 1995See Brown v. United States, 619 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C.1992) (citing Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678 , 682 n. 8 (D.C.1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Bowler v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995See Brown v. United States, 619 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C.1992) (citing Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678 , 682 n. 8 (D.C. 1984)). 1995See Brown v. United States, 619 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C.1992) (citing Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678 , 682 n. 8 (D.C.1984)). | 1 | 1 |
McBride v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., McBride, supra, 441 A.2d at 652 (“If a defendant raises a claim of self-defense ... both communicated and uncommunicated threats bear on the question whether the complaining witness or the defendant was the aggressor”). 1992See, e.g., McBride, supra, 441 A.2d at 652 (“If a defendant raises a claim of self-defense ... both communicated and uncommunicated threats bear on the question whether the complaining witness or the defendant was the aggressor”). | 1 | 1 |
Speed v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990The court then should instruct on the general right of self-defense, explicitly informing the jury that the government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not acting in self-defense. 562 A.2d at 129-30 (footnote omitted). 1990In Speed v. United States, 562 A.2d 124 (D.C.1989), we said: [T]he trial court should instruct the jury that in order to prove simple assault when the victim is a police officer and the defendant raises the defense of self-defense, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (a) That at the time of the alleged assault the complainant was a member of a police force operating in the District of Columbia, the defendant did know or had reason to know that the complainant was a member of such force, and the officer was engaged in official police duties; and (b) That the defendant assaulted | 1 | 1 |
Rink v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1983See, e.g., Rink v. United States, 388 A.2d 52, 56 (D.C.1978). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Akersgreen2 sentences1979Specifically, the court stated that the evidence would “go[ ] beyond those [prior violent] acts” which a jury should consider 26 and that, in effect, the testimony put the decedent on trial as “a batterer, [a]nd that is not being tried in this case.” We have stated, apropos of this first ground, that prior acts of violence are admissible in “homicide cases where the defendant raises the claim of self-defense against the decedent as the alleged first aggressor.” United States v. Akers, D.C.App., 374 A.2d 874, 877 (1977) (emphasis omitted). 1979App., 374 A.2d 874, 877 (1977) (emphasis omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. United States
green
2 sentences2013In finding no double jeopardy violation, Clark held that when a defendant raises such a claim involving prosecution for a CPO violation, “the Blockburger analysis is provision-specific, focusing on the particular CPO condition that is alleged to have been violated.” Clark, 28 A.3d at 518 . 2013We looked at the content of the CPO to determine which provision Clark had violated and then compared that provision with simple ássault, concluding that “the crime of simple assault required proof that the violated CPO provision — coming within one hundred feet of the petitioner — did not.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Newby v. United States
green
2 sentences2007Once the defendant raises this defense, the government bears the burden of refuting it “by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the parent’s purpose in resorting to force against her child was not disciplinary, or that the force she used was unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 380-81 (quoting Newby, 797 A.2d at 1237 ). 2007Once the defendant raises this defense, the government bears the burden of refuting it “by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the parent’s purpose in resorting to force against her child was not disciplinary, or that the force she used was unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 380-81 (quoting Newby, 797 A.2d at 1237 ). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Watson v. United States
green
2 sentences2005See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1065 (D.C.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 , 108 S.Ct. 1740 , 100 L.Ed.2d 203 (1988). 2005See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1065 (D.C.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 , 108 S.Ct. 1740 , 100 L.Ed.2d 203 (1988). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Farrell v. United States
green
1 sentence2000See Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978); Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755 (D.C.1978). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.