defendant raises claim in Georgia

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2016Determining whether the State has done so rests with the jury.” (punctuation omitted)). 16 See State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309, 313 (2) ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981) (holding that court did not err in failing to disclose identity of confidential informant when, aside from defendant’s failure to present evidence to sustain charge that defense of 8 Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

2016Determining whether the State has done so rests with the jury.” (punctuation omitted)). 16 See State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309, 313 (2) ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981) (holding that court did not err in failing to disclose identity of confidential informant when, aside from defendant’s failure to present evidence to sustain charge that defense of 8 Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

2016After a defendant presents a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden is on the [S]tate to disprove entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Graves v. State, 274 Ga. App. 855, 856 (2) ( 619 SE2d 356 ) (2005) (“When a defendant raises the defense of entrapment and testifies to it at trial, the State has the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2016After a defendant presents a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden is on the [S]tate to disprove entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Graves v. State, 274 Ga. App. 855, 856 (2) ( 619 SE2d 356 ) (2005) (“When a defendant raises the defense of entrapment and testifies to it at trial, the State has the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2014See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U.S. 902 ( 98 SCt 3119 , 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460, 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962).

2019See generally Collins, 306 Ga. at 468 (2); Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 302-303 (9) (c) ( 824 SE2d 346 ) (2019).3 2 OCGA § 16-3-21 provides in subsection (d): In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense a justification provided by subsection (a) of this Code section, the defendant, in order to establish the defendant's reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary, may be permitted to offer: (1) Relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts of family violence or child abuse committed by the deceased, as

2019See generally Collins, 306 Ga. at 468 (2); Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 302-303 (9) (c) ( 824 SE2d 346 ) (2019).3 2 OCGA § 16-3-21 provides in subsection (d): In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense a justification provided by subsection (a) of this Code section, the defendant, in order to establish the defendant's reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary, may be permitted to offer: (1) Relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts of family violence or child abuse committed by the deceased, as

2019Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 88 (4) ( 526 SE2d 347 ) (2000). (a) First, Goodson alleges trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present expert testimony regarding Goodson’s state of mind under OCGA § 16-3-21 (d) (2).2 However, trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial 2 OCGA § 16-3-21 (d) provides: In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense a justification provided by subsection (a) of this Code section, the defendant, in order to establish the defendant’s reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary,

2019Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 88 (4) ( 526 SE2d 347 ) (2000). (a) First, Goodson alleges trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present expert testimony regarding Goodson’s state of mind under OCGA § 16-3-21 (d) (2).2 However, trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial 2 OCGA § 16-3-21 (d) provides: In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense a justification provided by subsection (a) of this Code section, the defendant, in order to establish the defendant’s reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary,

2019See Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 584, 586 (2) (a) ( 723 SE2d 431 ) (2012).

2019See Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 584, 586 (2) (a) ( 723 SE2d 431 ) (2012).

2015See Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 (3) ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (failure to file motion for new trial raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review); see also Dawson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 842, 843-844 ( 691 SE2d 886 ) (2010) (failure to file motion to withdraw guilty plea raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review). *752 Decided February 20, 2015.

2015See Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 (3) ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (failure to file motion for new trial raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review); see also Dawson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 842, 843-844 ( 691 SE2d 886 ) (2010) (failure to file motion to withdraw guilty plea raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review). *752 Decided February 20, 2015.

2015See Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 (3) ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (failure to file motion for new trial raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review); see also Dawson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 842, 843-844 ( 691 SE2d 886 ) (2010) (failure to file motion to withdraw guilty plea raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review). *752 Decided February 20, 2015.

2015See Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 (3) ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (failure to file motion for new trial raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review); see also Dawson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 842, 843-844 ( 691 SE2d 886 ) (2010) (failure to file motion to withdraw guilty plea raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim in trial court bars review). *752 Decided February 20, 2015.

2011“Notably, where a defendant raises a claim under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 in his motion for new trial, the law imposes upon the trial court an affirmative duty to exercise its discretion and weigh the evidence to determine whether a new trial is warranted.” (Citations omitted.) Hartley v. State, 299 Ga. App. 534, 540 (3) ( 683 SE2d 109 ) (2009).

2011“Notably, where a defendant raises a claim under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 in his motion for new trial, the law imposes upon the trial court an affirmative duty to exercise its discretion and weigh the evidence to determine whether a new trial is warranted.” (Citations omitted.) Hartley v. State, 299 Ga. App. 534, 540 (3) ( 683 SE2d 109 ) (2009).

2009See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U. S. 902 (98 SC 3119, 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338 (1) ( 18 SE2d 546 ) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 622 ( 4 SE2d 453 ) (1939).

2009See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U. S. 902 (98 SC 3119, 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338 (1) ( 18 SE2d 546 ) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 622 ( 4 SE2d 453 ) (1939).

2009See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U. S. 902 (98 SC 3119, 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338 (1) ( 18 SE2d 546 ) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 622 ( 4 SE2d 453 ) (1939).

2009See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41 ) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U. S. 902 (98 SC 3119, 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496 ) (1962); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338 (1) ( 18 SE2d 546 ) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 622 ( 4 SE2d 453 ) (1939).

2009“When a defendant raises this defense and testifies to it at trial, it is the State’s burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation omitted.) Wilcox v. State, 229 Ga. App. 227, 229 (1) ( 493 SE2d 724 ) (1997).

2009“When a defendant raises this defense and testifies to it at trial, it is the State’s burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation omitted.) Wilcox v. State, 229 Ga. App. 227, 229 (1) ( 493 SE2d 724 ) (1997).

2005Generally, “similar transaction evidence may be admitted to rebut the defense of entrapment, insofar as the evidence proves the falsity of *261 specific testimony of the defendant regarding his lack of predisposition to commit the crime!’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Gober v. State, 249 Ga. App. 168, 175 (9) ( 547 SE2d 656 ) (2001); see White v. State, 244 Ga. App. 475, 476 (1) ( 536 SE2d 180 ) (2000) (when a defendant raises the defense of entrapment and testifies to it at trial, it is the State’s burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt).

2005Generally, “similar transaction evidence may be admitted to rebut the defense of entrapment, insofar as the evidence proves the falsity of *261 specific testimony of the defendant regarding his lack of predisposition to commit the crime!’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Gober v. State, 249 Ga. App. 168, 175 (9) ( 547 SE2d 656 ) (2001); see White v. State, 244 Ga. App. 475, 476 (1) ( 536 SE2d 180 ) (2000) (when a defendant raises the defense of entrapment and testifies to it at trial, it is the State’s burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt).

2005Even if we assume that school records are covered by this claim of privilege, which we need not decide here, in a criminal case where the defendant raises a claim of mental retardation, putting the defendant's mental capacity at issue, "such affirmative defense waives the privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21(5) through (8)." Trammel v. Bradberry, 256 Ga.App. 412, 424 (6), 568 S.E.2d 715 (2002).

2005Even if we assume that school records are covered by this claim of privilege, which we need not decide here, in a criminal case where the defendant raises a claim of mental retardation, putting the defendant's mental capacity at issue, "such affirmative defense waives the privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21(5) through (8)." Trammel v. Bradberry, 256 Ga.App. 412, 424 (6), 568 S.E.2d 715 (2002).

2005Generally, “similar transaction evidence may be admitted to rebut the defense of entrapment, insofar as the evidence proves the falsity of *261 specific testimony of the defendant regarding his lack of predisposition to commit the crime!’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Gober v. State, 249 Ga. App. 168, 175 (9) ( 547 SE2d 656 ) (2001); see White v. State, 244 Ga. App. 475, 476 (1) ( 536 SE2d 180 ) (2000) (when a defendant raises the defense of entrapment and testifies to it at trial, it is the State’s burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt).

2005Generally, “similar transaction evidence may be admitted to rebut the defense of entrapment, insofar as the evidence proves the falsity of *261 specific testimony of the defendant regarding his lack of predisposition to commit the crime!’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Gober v. State, 249 Ga. App. 168, 175 (9) ( 547 SE2d 656 ) (2001); see White v. State, 244 Ga. App. 475, 476 (1) ( 536 SE2d 180 ) (2000) (when a defendant raises the defense of entrapment and testifies to it at trial, it is the State’s burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt).

1976"In Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493 ( 214 SE2d 738 ), we held that where the evidence of the defendant raises the defense of entrapment and is uncontested or not rebutted by the state, a conviction cannot be upheld as the State has the duty to come forward with contrary proof.” Hall v. State, *676 136 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 222 SE2d 140 ).

1976"In Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493 ( 214 SE2d 738 ), we held that where the evidence of the defendant raises the defense of entrapment and is uncontested or not rebutted by the state, a conviction cannot be upheld as the State has the duty to come forward with contrary proof.” Hall v. State, *676 136 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 222 SE2d 140 ).

1976See Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305 (1) ( 223 SE2d 498 ).

1976See Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305 (1) ( 223 SE2d 498 ).