contingent claim in Nebraska

1940Plaintiff contends that a contingent claim, such as the claim involved in this case, does not become absolute, within the meaning of the decedent’s act, until it becomes a claim proper to be presented to the county court for final adjudication as a claim against the estate (see Hazlett v. Estate of Blakely, 70 Neb. 613 , 97 N. W. 808 ) ; therefore, it could not become a claim proper to be allowed by the court until it has passed to judgment in this action (a stockholder’s liability suit).

1940Plaintiff contends that a contingent claim, such as the claim involved in this case, does not become absolute, within the meaning of the decedent’s act, until it becomes a claim proper to be presented to the county court for final adjudication as a claim against the estate (see Hazlett v. Estate of Blakely, 70 Neb. 613 , 97 N. W. 808 ) ; therefore, it could not become a claim proper to be allowed by the court until it has passed to judgment in this action (a stockholder’s liability suit).

1932Stichter v. Cox, 52 Neb. 532 ; Hazlett v. Estate of Blakely, 70 Neb. 613 ; Davis v. Davis, 137 Wis. 640 ; 11 R.

1931Franklin v. Parks, 77 Okla. 280 ; Stichter v. Cox, 52 Neb. 532 . 2.

1932Stichter v. Cox, 52 Neb. 532 ; Hazlett v. Estate of Blakely, 70 Neb. 613 ; Davis v. Davis, 137 Wis. 640 ; 11 R.

1930Stichter v. Cox, 52 Neb. 532 ; Hazlett v. Estate of Blakely, 70 Neb. 613 ; Davis v. Davis, 137 Wis. 640 ; 11 R.

1953“A cause of action for personal injuries alleged to have-been proximately caused by negligence of a decedent during his lifetime survives, and when no action was-brought thereon during his lifetime, it must be prosecuted by a claim filed against the estate of decedent in-the county court which has exclusive original jurisdiction-thereof.” Such opinion cites numerous cases sustaining the-aforesaid conclusions, and was cited with approval as: late as Flessner v. Wenquist, ante p. 378, 56 N. W. 2d 294 . *887 Section 25-1267.41, R.

1949Until that event happens a right of action upon said claim does not arise.” We conclude, therefore, that although plaintiffs cause of action survived, the district court had no original jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, and in conformity with our holding in Schmidt v. Henderson, 148 Neb. 343 , 27 N. W. 2d 396 , and Lippincott v. Wolski, 147 Neb. 930 , 25 N. W. 2d 747 , 169 A. L.

1949Until that event happens a right of action upon said claim does not arise.” We conclude, therefore, that although plaintiffs cause of action survived, the district court had no original jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, and in conformity with our holding in Schmidt v. Henderson, 148 Neb. 343 , 27 N. W. 2d 396 , and Lippincott v. Wolski, 147 Neb. 930 , 25 N. W. 2d 747 , 169 A. L.

1949Until that event happens a right of action upon said claim does not arise.” We conclude, therefore, that although plaintiffs cause of action survived, the district court had no original jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, and in conformity with our holding in Schmidt v. Henderson, 148 Neb. 343 , 27 N. W. 2d 396 , and Lippincott v. Wolski, 147 Neb. 930 , 25 N. W. 2d 747 , 169 A. L.

1949Until that event happens a right of action upon said claim does not arise.” We conclude, therefore, that although plaintiffs cause of action survived, the district court had no original jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, and in conformity with our holding in Schmidt v. Henderson, 148 Neb. 343 , 27 N. W. 2d 396 , and Lippincott v. Wolski, 147 Neb. 930 , 25 N. W. 2d 747 , 169 A. L.

1941Brownell v. Anderson, 117 Neb. 652 , 222 N. W. 55 ; Parker v. Luehrmann, 126 Neb. 1 , 252 N. W. 402 .

1941Brownell v. Anderson, 117 Neb. 652 , 222 N. W. 55 ; Parker v. Luehrmann, 126 Neb. 1 , 252 N. W. 402 .

1940Plaintiff cites Parker v. Luehrmann, supra, and also relies on In re Kleinschmidt’s Estate, 167 Wis. 450 , 167 N. W. 827 , wherein the supreme court of Wisconsin construed a similar section of the statutes.

1940Plaintiff cites Parker v. Luehrmann, supra, and also relies on In re Kleinschmidt’s Estate, 167 Wis. 450 , 167 N. W. 827 , wherein the supreme court of Wisconsin construed a similar section of the statutes.

1937In Hantzch v. Massolt, 61 Minn. 361 , 63 N. W. 1069 , it was held: “That a claim against the estate of deceased sureties on the bond of a guardian whose account as such had not been allowed and settled by the probate court, when the time expired for presenting claims against their respective estates, is such a contingent claim.” “A contingent claim against a decedent’s estate is one upon which the liability depends upon some future event, which may or may not happen, and which makes it uncertain whether it will ever be a liability.” In re Estate of Golden, 120 Neb. 233 , 233 N. W. 893 .

1937In Hantzch v. Massolt, 61 Minn. 361 , 63 N. W. 1069 , it was held: “That a claim against the estate of deceased sureties on the bond of a guardian whose account as such had not been allowed and settled by the probate court, when the time expired for presenting claims against their respective estates, is such a contingent claim.” “A contingent claim against a decedent’s estate is one upon which the liability depends upon some future event, which may or may not happen, and which makes it uncertain whether it will ever be a liability.” In re Estate of Golden, 120 Neb. 233 , 233 N. W. 893 .

1932In the case of In re Estate of Golden, 120 Neb. 232 , there was presented for allowance, as a contingent claim, a claim “based on a plea for a deficiency judgment against the Golden estate in a pending action to foreclose a real estate mortgage executed by Golden in his lifetime to secure a note for $5,000.” In an opinion on rehearing, 120 Neb. 233 , the controlling question then before this court was: “Is such a claim, under the circumstances set forth, a ‘contingent claim?’ ” It was answered in the negative.

1931A similar holding is found in Rogers v. Selleck, 117 Neb. 569 . 4.

1931Franklin v. Parks, 77 Okla. 280 ; Stichter v. Cox, 52 Neb. 532 . 2.