contingent claim in Missouri

1966In the case of Howard’s Estate v. Howe, 344 Mo. 1245 , 131 S.W.2d 517 , l. c. 519, the Supreme Court said: “ * * * A contingent claim is one where the liability depends upon some future event, which may or may not happen, and therefore makes it now wholly uncertain whether there will ever be a liability.

1966In the case of Howard’s Estate v. Howe, 344 Mo. 1245 , 131 S.W.2d 517 , l. c. 519, the Supreme Court said: “ * * * A contingent claim is one where the liability depends upon some future event, which may or may not happen, and therefore makes it now wholly uncertain whether there will ever be a liability.

2022Contractors, 821 S.W.2d at 501 , and this Court has found no identity of the thing sued for, it is unnecessary to decide whether there is an identity of the cause of action. 7 Whether the probate division’s judgment is res judicata to bar the department’s contingent claim against the probate estate for the payment of Green Duck’s unpaid sales tax based on the assessments against Mr. Townsend, as a responsible party, is not an issue before the Court. 7 person within three years after the return was filed or required to be filed.” Section 144.220.3 (emphasis added).

1995The court recognized that if it “were to hold that the filing of a contingent claim was sufficient for purposes of being deemed a covered claim, the statutory filing deadline would have no meaning.” Id. 138 Ill.Dec. at 24 , 546 N.E.2d at 1079 .

1995The court recognized that if it “were to hold that the filing of a contingent claim was sufficient for purposes of being deemed a covered claim, the statutory filing deadline would have no meaning.” Id. 138 Ill.Dec. at 24 , 546 N.E.2d at 1079 .

1966The contingency does not relate to the amount which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount may ever be recovered. * * * ” For the same definition of a contingent claim see: In Re Franz’ Estate, Mo., 245 S.W.2d 1 , l. c. 7; Elms Realty Co. v. Wood, supra, l. c. 1005; Stevens v. Stevens, 172 Mo. 28 , 72 S.W. 542 ; Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams, Mo.App., 311 S.W.2d 70 ; and, Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 209 and cases therein cited.

1966The contingency does not relate to the amount which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount may ever be recovered. * * * ” For the same definition of a contingent claim see: In Re Franz’ Estate, Mo., 245 S.W.2d 1 , l. c. 7; Elms Realty Co. v. Wood, supra, l. c. 1005; Stevens v. Stevens, 172 Mo. 28 , 72 S.W. 542 ; Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams, Mo.App., 311 S.W.2d 70 ; and, Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 209 and cases therein cited.

1966The contingency does not relate to the amount which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount may ever be recovered. * * * ” For the same definition of a contingent claim see: In Re Franz’ Estate, Mo., 245 S.W.2d 1 , l. c. 7; Elms Realty Co. v. Wood, supra, l. c. 1005; Stevens v. Stevens, 172 Mo. 28 , 72 S.W. 542 ; Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams, Mo.App., 311 S.W.2d 70 ; and, Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 209 and cases therein cited.

1966The contingency does not relate to the amount which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount may ever be recovered. * * * ” For the same definition of a contingent claim see: In Re Franz’ Estate, Mo., 245 S.W.2d 1 , l. c. 7; Elms Realty Co. v. Wood, supra, l. c. 1005; Stevens v. Stevens, 172 Mo. 28 , 72 S.W. 542 ; Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams, Mo.App., 311 S.W.2d 70 ; and, Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 209 and cases therein cited.

1966In Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 210, it is said: “Prior to the 1955 Code the statutes of non-claim did not bar a contingent claim. * * * ” In the Committee Comment following Section 473.360, supra, is the following “ * * (2) it expressly bars contingent claims other than those based on warranties in conveyances, whereas such claims are not barred under the present law (Kimpton v. Spellman, 351 Mo. 674, 675 , 173 S.W.2d 886 ); * * *.” It is the purpose of the New Probate Code to provide a speedy method for administering a decedent’s estate, to establish a time after

1966In Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 210, it is said: “Prior to the 1955 Code the statutes of non-claim did not bar a contingent claim. * * * ” In the Committee Comment following Section 473.360, supra, is the following “ * * (2) it expressly bars contingent claims other than those based on warranties in conveyances, whereas such claims are not barred under the present law (Kimpton v. Spellman, 351 Mo. 674, 675 , 173 S.W.2d 886 ); * * *.” It is the purpose of the New Probate Code to provide a speedy method for administering a decedent’s estate, to establish a time after

1966North v. Hawkinson, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 733 , l. c. 736; Steele v. Cross, Mo., 366 S.W.2d 434 .

1966North v. Hawkinson, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 733 , l. c. 736; Steele v. Cross, Mo., 366 S.W.2d 434 .

1966The contingency does not relate to the amount which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount may ever be recovered. * * * ” For the same definition of a contingent claim see: In Re Franz’ Estate, Mo., 245 S.W.2d 1 , l. c. 7; Elms Realty Co. v. Wood, supra, l. c. 1005; Stevens v. Stevens, 172 Mo. 28 , 72 S.W. 542 ; Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams, Mo.App., 311 S.W.2d 70 ; and, Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 209 and cases therein cited.

1966The contingency does not relate to the amount which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount may ever be recovered. * * * ” For the same definition of a contingent claim see: In Re Franz’ Estate, Mo., 245 S.W.2d 1 , l. c. 7; Elms Realty Co. v. Wood, supra, l. c. 1005; Stevens v. Stevens, 172 Mo. 28 , 72 S.W. 542 ; Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams, Mo.App., 311 S.W.2d 70 ; and, Maus, Probate Law and Practice, Volume 4, Section 921, p. 209 and cases therein cited.

1955Pierce v. Johnson, 136 Ohio St. 95 , 23 N.E.2d 993 , 125 A.L.R. 867 ; Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196 , 36 N.W.2d 856 .

1955Pierce v. Johnson, 136 Ohio St. 95 , 23 N.E.2d 993 , 125 A.L.R. 867 ; Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196 , 36 N.W.2d 856 .

1955Pierce v. Johnson, 136 Ohio St. 95 , 23 N.E.2d 993 , 125 A.L.R. 867 ; Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196 , 36 N.W.2d 856 .

1955Pierce v. Johnson, 136 Ohio St. 95 , 23 N.E.2d 993 , 125 A.L.R. 867 ; Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196 , 36 N.W.2d 856 .

1903J., in Sargent v. Kimball, 37 Vt. 320 , as follows: “A contingent claim is where the liability depends upon some future event, which may or may not happen, and therefore makes it now wholly uncertain whether there will ever be a liability.” Thus the distinction fully appears between contingent demands and demands “running to certain ma turity.” Stock subscriptions were held to belong to tbe latter class in G-aresehe v. Lewis, and unpaid rents under a covenant in a lease were held to belong to tbe same class in Traylor v. Cabanne, but afterwards tbis ■decision was utterly discredited in Kavanau