contingent claim in Oklahoma

2016In Anderson v. Merriott, 1976 OK 74 , ¶ 8, 550 P.2d 1320 , this Court explained: [58 O.S. § 339] recognizes an unimatured debt is entitled to the same protection and remedies as one which is due before the death of the debtor.

2016In Anderson v. Merriott , 1976 OK 74, ¶8, 550 P.2d 1320, this Court explained: [58 O.S. § 339] recognizes an unmatured debt is entitled to the same protection and remedies as one which is due before the death of the debtor.

1998Qualified immunity sometimes is erroneously referred to as "good faith immunity." Before Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 815 (1982), the contingent immunity enjoyed by public employees could correctly be called good faith immunity; however, the Supreme Court abandoned the subjective good faith standard in that case.

1998Id. at 818-19 . ¶ 13 In its place, stands qualified immunity, which is a two-pronged, objective test: Does the plaintiff assert violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and was that right clearly established at the time of the alleged violation so that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known the objectionable conduct violated that right?

1976The Supreme Court of Kansas in Sharpe v. Sharpe, 120 Kan. 305 , 243 P. 274 (1926) allowed a claim by a former wife against the estate of her ex-husband for child support not yet due.

1976The Supreme Court of Kansas in Sharpe v. Sharpe, 120 Kan. 305 , 243 P. 274 (1926) allowed a claim by a former wife against the estate of her ex-husband for child support not yet due.

1976In Dabney v. Dabney, 9 Cal.App.2d 665 , 51 P.2d 108 (1935) a contingent claim rejected by an administrator was allowed to be established against an estate.

1976In Dabney v. Dabney, 9 Cal.App.2d 665 , 51 P.2d 108 (1935) a contingent claim rejected by an administrator was allowed to be established against an estate.

1972In Bowler v. Emery (1908), 29 R.I. 310 , 70 A. 7 , the court was confronted with a statute which provided for sequestration of estate assets for the benefit of “a person who has a contingent claim against a decedent which cannot be proved as a debt within the time allowed for filing claims etc.” The lease in the Rhode Island case was for a term of 99 years.

1972In Bowler v. Emery (1908), 29 R.I. 310 , 70 A. 7 , the court was confronted with a statute which provided for sequestration of estate assets for the benefit of “a person who has a contingent claim against a decedent which cannot be proved as a debt within the time allowed for filing claims etc.” The lease in the Rhode Island case was for a term of 99 years.

1935An examination of the cases of Wright v. Farmers’ National Bank, 110 Okla. 74 , 243 P. 512 , and O’Neill v. Lauderdale, 80 Okla. 170 , 195 P. 121 , discloses that in those cases the court misconstrued section 1233, supra, by holding that a contingent claim arising on a contract hereafter made, that is, made subsequent to the passage or adoption of the act, may be presented within one month after it becomes due and absolute.

1935An examination of the cases of Wright v. Farmers’ National Bank, 110 Okla. 74 , 243 P. 512 , and O’Neill v. Lauderdale, 80 Okla. 170 , 195 P. 121 , discloses that in those cases the court misconstrued section 1233, supra, by holding that a contingent claim arising on a contract hereafter made, that is, made subsequent to the passage or adoption of the act, may be presented within one month after it becomes due and absolute.

1935An examination of the cases of Wright v. Farmers’ National Bank, 110 Okla. 74 , 243 P. 512 , and O’Neill v. Lauderdale, 80 Okla. 170 , 195 P. 121 , discloses that in those cases the court misconstrued section 1233, supra, by holding that a contingent claim arising on a contract hereafter made, that is, made subsequent to the passage or adoption of the act, may be presented within one month after it becomes due and absolute.

1925Morse v. Steele (Cal.) 64 Pac. 690 .

1920Insurance Co., 64 Minn. 495 , 58 A. S. R. —, it is said: *282 “A condition precedent calls for the performance of some act or the happening of some event after the contract is entered into, and upon the performance or happening of which its obligation is made to depend.” In 6 R.

1920J. 114, a contingent liability is defined as: “Not existing or occurring through necessity ; dependent on a foreseen ' possibility; provisionally liable to exist, happen, or take effect in the future; possible, or liable, but not certain, to occur; dependent on that which is undetermined or unknown; dependent for effect on something that may or may not occur.” In Greene, Adm’r v. Dyer, 32 Me. 460 , it was said: “In the case of a contingent claim, the contingency does not relate to the amount which may be due or which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount will ever become

1920J. 114, a contingent liability is defined as: “Not existing or occurring through necessity ; dependent on a foreseen ' possibility; provisionally liable to exist, happen, or take effect in the future; possible, or liable, but not certain, to occur; dependent on that which is undetermined or unknown; dependent for effect on something that may or may not occur.” In Greene, Adm’r v. Dyer, 32 Me. 460 , it was said: “In the case of a contingent claim, the contingency does not relate to the amount which may be due or which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty whether any amount will ever become