Garcia standard in New Mexico

2019In Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 111-12 , we did not expressly compare the case with similar cases but rather observed that the comparison cases were sufficiently outlined in Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 78-83 . 5 These included two cases in which a death sentence was imposed and two cases resulting in a life sentence.

2019In Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 111-12 , we did not expressly compare the case with similar cases but rather observed that the comparison cases were sufficiently outlined in Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 78-83 . 5 These included two cases in which a death sentence was imposed and two cases resulting in a life sentence.

2019In Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 111-12 , we did not expressly compare the case with similar cases but rather observed that the comparison cases were sufficiently outlined in Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 78-83 . 5 These included two cases in which a death sentence was imposed and two cases resulting in a life sentence.

2019In Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 111-12 , we did not expressly compare the case with similar cases but rather observed that the comparison cases were sufficiently outlined in Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 78-83 . 5 These included two cases in which a death sentence was imposed and two cases resulting in a life sentence.

2022Stallings, 2020-NMSC-019, ¶ 49 ; see also id. ¶ 45 (“Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that can reasonably be understood to invoke the right to self-representation, the trial court has a duty to inquire further into the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” (emphasis added)).

2022The Court in Breit found that retrial is barred when improper official conduct is so unfairly prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial, and if the official knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial, and if the official either intends to provoke a mistrial or acts in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal. 1996-NMSC-067 , ¶ 32. {18} The nature of Defendant’s motion fits squarely within the Piñon-Garcia exception to proceeding with a trial de novo on appeal in the district court from an infer

2017But in 17 Tomlinson, we undid the analyses of those cases and crafted our own rule, concluding 18 “two years and eight months is a constitutionally reasonable period of time within 19 which to file” a claim. 2005-NMSC-020, ¶ 24 . 20 {51} Faithful application of the Terry–Garcia analysis would have required the 21 opposite result.

2005Cf. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶53 , 126 N.M. 438 , 971 P.2d 829 (“Where there is a doubtful or deficient record, every presumption must be indulged ... in favor of the correctness and regularity of the [trial] court’s judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original)); State v. Herrera, 2004-NMCA-015, ¶¶ 8-9 , 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 (observing that “a defendant can waive fundamental rights, including constitutional rights,” and holding that a defendant waives the right to confrontation by failing to enter an objection); Brown, 116 N.M. at 706 , 866 P.2d at 1173

2005Cf. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶53 , 126 N.M. 438 , 971 P.2d 829 (“Where there is a doubtful or deficient record, every presumption must be indulged ... in favor of the correctness and regularity of the [trial] court’s judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original)); State v. Herrera, 2004-NMCA-015, ¶¶ 8-9 , 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 (observing that “a defendant can waive fundamental rights, including constitutional rights,” and holding that a defendant waives the right to confrontation by failing to enter an objection); Brown, 116 N.M. at 706 , 866 P.2d at 1173

2005Cf. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶53 , 126 N.M. 438 , 971 P.2d 829 (“Where there is a doubtful or deficient record, every presumption must be indulged ... in favor of the correctness and regularity of the [trial] court’s judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original)); State v. Herrera, 2004-NMCA-015, ¶¶ 8-9 , 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 (observing that “a defendant can waive fundamental rights, including constitutional rights,” and holding that a defendant waives the right to confrontation by failing to enter an objection); Brown, 116 N.M. at 706 , 866 P.2d at 1173

2005Cf. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶53 , 126 N.M. 438 , 971 P.2d 829 (“Where there is a doubtful or deficient record, every presumption must be indulged ... in favor of the correctness and regularity of the [trial] court’s judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original)); State v. Herrera, 2004-NMCA-015, ¶¶ 8-9 , 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 (observing that “a defendant can waive fundamental rights, including constitutional rights,” and holding that a defendant waives the right to confrontation by failing to enter an objection); Brown, 116 N.M. at 706 , 866 P.2d at 1173

1996In the instant case, Garcia entered an Alford plea, which essentially allows a defendant “to plead guilty while simultaneously maintaining [his] innocence.” State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410 , 412 n. 1, 882 P.2d 1 , 3 n. 1 (1994).

1996In the instant case, Garcia entered an Alford plea, which essentially allows a defendant “to plead guilty while simultaneously maintaining [his] innocence.” State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410 , 412 n. 1, 882 P.2d 1 , 3 n. 1 (1994).

1980In order to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, there must be some evidence in the record which would support such an instruction, State v. Manus, supra, and which would support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232 , 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).

1980In order to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, there must be some evidence in the record which would support such an instruction, State v. Manus, supra, and which would support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232 , 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).