Garcia claim in Pennsylvania

2019See McCool, 984 A.2d at 571 (holding that prison inmate’s allegations were insufficient to state a claim in his action against prison medical facility doctor, brought under medical malpractice 9 exception to sovereign immunity, because his certificates of merit incorrectly stated that expert testimony was not necessary to aid the jury in reaching conclusions as to the cause of his pain or injury; the ailments in question were such that an ordinary layperson would be incapable of deciding).

2019Garcia’s claim challenges the policy of the prison medical provider, asserting that the entity providing medical treatment has shown “deliberate indifference”7 in its policy of failing to provide Hepatitis workups to those who test positive for Hepatitis C, violating his constitutional rights and causing his Hepatitis 7 “The phrase ‘deliberate indifference’ is the legal standard by which courts adjudicate cases concerning alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement brought under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Jochen v. Horn, 727 A.2d 645, 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)

2019DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2011).

2017See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010).

2017Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a prosecution for the other, in order to prove Garcia’s “common plan, scheme and design in sexually assaulting women.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 7- 8; id. at 8 (wherein the trial court concluded that Garcia’s claim that sexual acts committed with both victims was consensual was probative of his intent and motive); see also Commonwealth v. Newman, 598 A.2d 275, 278 (Pa. 1991) (concluding that consolidation of rape indictments was proper where both rapes occurred la

2017Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a prosecution for the other, in order to prove Garcia’s “common plan, scheme and design in sexually assaulting women.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 7- 8; id. at 8 (wherein the trial court concluded that Garcia’s claim that sexual acts committed with both victims was consensual was probative of his intent and motive); see also Commonwealth v. Newman, 598 A.2d 275, 278 (Pa. 1991) (concluding that consolidation of rape indictments was proper where both rapes occurred la

2017See Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Superior Court has jurisdiction to vacate common pleas court’s improper denial of Act 84 injunction petition).

2004Commonwealth v. Rivera, 565 Pa. 289 , 773 A.2d 131, 137 (2001) (citations omitted). ¶ 23 Appellant’s defense was in conflict with the Garcia’s defense because Garcia’s statement was that Appellant (“the other guy”) had shot the victim, while Appellant maintained his innocence.

2004Commonwealth v. Rivera, 565 Pa. 289 , 773 A.2d 131, 137 (2001) (citations omitted). ¶ 23 Appellant’s defense was in conflict with the Garcia’s defense because Garcia’s statement was that Appellant (“the other guy”) had shot the victim, while Appellant maintained his innocence.

2004We therefore determine that a retrial of appellant should be severed from any future retrial of Garcia, should such a trial be conducted. ¶25 We recognize that in Commonwealth v. Garcia, 2004 PA Super 61, ¶¶ 13, 14 , 847 A.2d 67 (2004), we affirmed co-defendant Garcia’s judgment of sentence and found that the lower court did not err in denying Garcia’s motion for severance.

2004We therefore determine that a retrial of appellant should be severed from any future retrial of Garcia, should such a trial be conducted. ¶25 We recognize that in Commonwealth v. Garcia, 2004 PA Super 61, ¶¶ 13, 14 , 847 A.2d 67 (2004), we affirmed co-defendant Garcia’s judgment of sentence and found that the lower court did not err in denying Garcia’s motion for severance.