Garcia defense in Utah

2017We conclude that trial counsel's mistake did not prejudice Garcia's defense. ¶ 35 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused the "Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The United States Supreme Court "has recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' " Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (citation omitted).

2017We conclude that trial counsel's mistake did not prejudice Garcia's defense. ¶ 35 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused the "Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The United States Supreme Court "has recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' " Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (citation omitted).

2022Instead, because his challenge “is directed to the sentence imposed,” see Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 17 , 184 P.3d 592 , we base our analysis on the first sentence of Article I, Section 9, which is very similar to the language of the Eighth Amendment. 20190832-CA 29 2022 UT App 77 State v. Garcia LWOP does not “shock[] the moral sense of all reasonable” persons, see Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 33 , and therefore does not violate Article I, Section 9.

2022Instead, because his challenge “is directed to the sentence imposed,” see Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 17 , 184 P.3d 592 , we base our analysis on the first sentence of Article I, Section 9, which is very similar to the language of the Eighth Amendment. 20190832-CA 29 2022 UT App 77 State v. Garcia LWOP does not “shock[] the moral sense of all reasonable” persons, see Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 33 , and therefore does not violate Article I, Section 9.

2022Instead, because his challenge “is directed to the sentence imposed,” see Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 17 , 184 P.3d 592 , we base our analysis on the first sentence of Article I, Section 9, which is very similar to the language of the Eighth Amendment. 20190832-CA 29 2022 UT App 77 State v. Garcia LWOP does not “shock[] the moral sense of all reasonable” persons, see Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 33 , and therefore does not violate Article I, Section 9.

2022Instead, because his challenge “is directed to the sentence imposed,” see Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 17 , 184 P.3d 592 , we base our analysis on the first sentence of Article I, Section 9, which is very similar to the language of the Eighth Amendment. 20190832-CA 29 2022 UT App 77 State v. Garcia LWOP does not “shock[] the moral sense of all reasonable” persons, see Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 33 , and therefore does not violate Article I, Section 9.

2022Because the Unnecessary Rigor Clause “is focused on the circumstances and nature of the process and conditions of confinement, not on the sentence imposed,” State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 50 , 353 P.3d 55 (quotation simplified), it does not apply to Garcia’s challenge.

2022Because the Unnecessary Rigor Clause “is focused on the circumstances and nature of the process and conditions of confinement, not on the sentence imposed,” State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 50 , 353 P.3d 55 (quotation simplified), it does not apply to Garcia’s challenge.

2016The instruction stated, "Before you can find the Defendant 'guilty of the lesser-included offense of ATTEMPTED MAN SLAUGHTER, ... you must find beyond a reasonable doubt [that the] affirmative defense of imperfect-self defense does not apply." The jury found Garcia guilty of one count of attempted murder, both counts of discharge of a firearm, and the count of possessing a firearm as a restricted person. 1 Garcia appealsf ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 18 Garcia contends that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction "that told the jury to convict [Garcia] of le

2016The instruction stated, "Before you can find the Defendant 'guilty of the lesser-included offense of ATTEMPTED MAN SLAUGHTER, ... you must find beyond a reasonable doubt [that the] affirmative defense of imperfect-self defense does not apply." The jury found Garcia guilty of one count of attempted murder, both counts of discharge of a firearm, and the count of possessing a firearm as a restricted person. 1 Garcia appealsf ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 18 Garcia contends that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction "that told the jury to convict [Garcia] of le

2016To prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" and, second, "that counsel's deficient performance was prejfudicial-Le., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 19 , 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

2016To prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" and, second, "that counsel's deficient performance was prejfudicial-Le., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 19 , 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

1993Applying the Garcia analysis, this court held in Walker that section 41-6-44(1) still describes two distinct offenses: (1) operating a vehicle, and (2) being in actual physical control of a vehicle. 790 P.2d at 89 n. 2. 4 .

1993Applying the Garcia analysis, this court held in Walker that section 41-6-44(1) still describes two distinct offenses: (1) operating a vehicle, and (2) being in actual physical control of a vehicle. 790 P.2d at 89 n. 2. 4 .