8 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Danial R.B. v. Ledyard M.green2 sentences2017Initially, we note that the Garcia defendants correctly contend that plaintiffs’ notice of appeal is premature because it was filed prior to the service of a copy of the order and judgment from which the appeal was taken with notice of entry (see Matter of Danial R.B. v Ledyard M., 35 AD3d 1232, 1232 [2006]; see generally CPLR 5513 [a]). 2017Initially, we note that the Garcia defendants correctly contend that plaintiffs’ notice of appeal is premature because it was filed prior to the service of a copy of the order and judgment from which the appeal was taken with notice of entry (see Matter of Danial R.B. v Ledyard M., 35 AD3d 1232, 1232 [2006]; see generally CPLR 5513 [a]). | 2 | 3 |
Chase's Cigar Store, Inc. v. Stam Agency, Inc.green2 sentences2017Second, plaintiffs failed to establish that there was any question concerning coverage of decedent’s property, and that decedent or plaintiffs relied on Garcia’s expertise in resolving that question; indeed, the record establishes that decedent and plaintiffs were not so much concerned with drawing on Garcia’s expertise as with providing some business to Garcia, whom they considered a good friend (see Sawyer, 92 AD3d at 1238 ; Chase’s Cigar Store v Stam, Agency, 281 AD2d 911, 912 [2001]). 2017Second, plaintiffs failed to establish that there was any question concerning coverage of decedent’s property, and that decedent or plaintiffs relied on Garcia’s expertise in resolving that question; indeed, the record establishes that decedent and plaintiffs were not so much concerned with drawing on Garcia’s expertise as with providing some business to Garcia, whom they considered a good friend (see Sawyer, 92 AD3d at 1238 ; Chase’s Cigar Store v Stam, Agency, 281 AD2d 911, 912 [2001]). | 2 | 3 |
Zuckerman v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2017We conclude that the Garcia defendants met their initial burden of establishing that they did not have a special relation ship with decedent or plaintiffs, and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). 2017We conclude that the Garcia defendants met their initial burden of establishing that they did not have a special relation ship with decedent or plaintiffs, and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). | 2 | 3 |
Baez-Pena v. MM Truck & Body Repair, Inc.green1 sentence2022Defendants Gables and Garcia failed to establish prima facie that Garcia's act of slowing or stopping the tractor-trailer to avoid a collision with an overpass was not a proximate cause of the ensuing accident in which plaintiff's car, which was following the tractor-trailer, was rear-ended by defendant Andrew Katcher's car ( see Tutrani v County of Suffolk , 10 NY3d 906 [2008]; Newell v Bronston , 183 AD3d 441, 441 [1st Dept 2020]; Baez-Pena v MM Truck & Body Repair, Inc. , 151 AD3d 473, 477 [1st Dept 2017]). | 1 | 1 |
Newell v. Bronstongreen1 sentence2022Defendants Gables and Garcia failed to establish prima facie that Garcia's act of slowing or stopping the tractor-trailer to avoid a collision with an overpass was not a proximate cause of the ensuing accident in which plaintiff's car, which was following the tractor-trailer, was rear-ended by defendant Andrew Katcher's car ( see Tutrani v County of Suffolk , 10 NY3d 906 [2008]; Newell v Bronston , 183 AD3d 441, 441 [1st Dept 2020]; Baez-Pena v MM Truck & Body Repair, Inc. , 151 AD3d 473, 477 [1st Dept 2017]). | 1 | 1 |
Germaine v. Yugreen1 sentence2009“On a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action, a defendant doctor has the burden of establishing the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice, or that the plaintiff was not injured thereby” (Germaine v Yu, 49 AD3d 685, 686 [2008], quoting Shahid v New York City Health & Hosps. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
SAWYER, ANN M. v. RUTECKI, VICTOR
green
2 sentences2017Second, plaintiffs failed to establish that there was any question concerning coverage of decedent’s property, and that decedent or plaintiffs relied on Garcia’s expertise in resolving that question; indeed, the record establishes that decedent and plaintiffs were not so much concerned with drawing on Garcia’s expertise as with providing some business to Garcia, whom they considered a good friend (see Sawyer, 92 AD3d at 1238 ; Chase’s Cigar Store v Stam, Agency, 281 AD2d 911, 912 [2001]). 2017Second, plaintiffs failed to establish that there was any question concerning coverage of decedent’s property, and that decedent or plaintiffs relied on Garcia’s expertise in resolving that question; indeed, the record establishes that decedent and plaintiffs were not so much concerned with drawing on Garcia’s expertise as with providing some business to Garcia, whom they considered a good friend (see Sawyer, 92 AD3d at 1238 ; Chase’s Cigar Store v Stam, Agency, 281 AD2d 911, 912 [2001]). | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Murphy v. Kuhn
green
2 sentences2017Lastly, the Garcia defendants established that the third and final special relationship category does not apply inasmuch as the parties clearly did not have “a course of dealing” that lasted "an extended period of time.” As the court pointed out, “[t]here is no question that the [decedent and plaintiffs] had no prior insurance client-broker/agent relationship with the Garcia [defendants before the subject transaction with respect to insuring the [subject property].” Moreover, the parties’ entire “course of dealing” at the time of the fire was less than three years (see generally Murphy, 90 NY2 2017Lastly, the Garcia defendants established that the third and final special relationship category does not apply inasmuch as the parties clearly did not have “a course of dealing” that lasted "an extended period of time.” As the court pointed out, “[t]here is no question that the [decedent and plaintiffs] had no prior insurance client-broker/agent relationship with the Garcia [defendants before the subject transaction with respect to insuring the [subject property].” Moreover, the parties’ entire “course of dealing” at the time of the fire was less than three years (see generally Murphy, 90 NY2 | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Tutrani v. County of Suffolk
green
1 sentence2022Defendants Gables and Garcia failed to establish prima facie that Garcia's act of slowing or stopping the tractor-trailer to avoid a collision with an overpass was not a proximate cause of the ensuing accident in which plaintiff's car, which was following the tractor-trailer, was rear-ended by defendant Andrew Katcher's car ( see Tutrani v County of Suffolk , 10 NY3d 906 [2008]; Newell v Bronston , 183 AD3d 441, 441 [1st Dept 2020]; Baez-Pena v MM Truck & Body Repair, Inc. , 151 AD3d 473, 477 [1st Dept 2017]). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Urbaez
green
1 sentence2022In the in-court colloquy, the People relied on People v Urbaez ( 10 NY3d 773 [2008]) to assert their right to reduce the charges to B misdemeanors to avoid giving Mr. Garcia a jury trial. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Pulka v. Edelman
green
1 sentence2010The plaintiff failed to establish in opposition to defendant Garcias’ motion that the Garcia defendants owed a duty to him and in the absence of any such duty, there is no liability (Pulka v Edelman, supra, citing Palsgraf v Long Is. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Elbert v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis (see, People v Dordal, 55 NY2d 954, 956 ). 1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis (see, People v Dordal, 55 NY2d 954, 956 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Warner-Lambert Co.
green
2 sentences1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis (see, People v Dordal, 55 NY2d 954, 956 ). 1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis (see, People v Dordal, 55 NY2d 954, 956 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Dordal
green
2 sentences1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis (see, People v Dordal, 55 NY2d 954, 956 ). 1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis (see, People v Dordal, 55 NY2d 954, 956 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Jennings
green
2 sentences1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People ( see , People v Warner-Lambert Co. , 51 N.Y.2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis ( see , People v Dordal , 55 N.Y.2d 954, 956 ). *38 The standard itself is defined in CPL 70.10 (1) as "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every 1995Additionally, at the pleading stage, a reviewing court must view the evidence supporting the indictment in the light most favorable to the People ( see , People v Warner-Lambert Co. , 51 N.Y.2d 295, 299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 ), and the court may not substitute itself for the Grand Jury in drawing or not drawing permissible inferences or drawing different inferences, as the Court seems to be doing in the Garcia analysis ( see , People v Dordal , 55 N.Y.2d 954, 956 ). *38 The standard itself is defined in CPL 70.10 (1) as "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.