four-pronged test (New York) · Go Syfert
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four-pronged test in New York

11 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1974–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Kangreen
ny · 1991 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 1993–1995
2 sentences

1995In determining whether closure of the courtroom is necessary, the Court of Appeals has set forth a four-pronged test: "(1) the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding; and (4) the trial court must make findings adequate to support the closure” (People v Kin Kan, 78 NY2d 54, 58 ; Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 ; People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 442 ).

1993Since Jones , also, the United States Supreme Court has further particularized the standard for closure, under the Sixth Amendment, which we recognized in People v Kin Kan ( 78 NY2d 54, 58 ) as a four-pronged test: "[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure” (Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 , supra).

12
Cuffy v. City of New Yorkgreen
ny · 1987 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024NO. 193 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2024 In Cuffy v. City ofNew York ( 69 NY2d 255,260 [1987]), the Court of Appeals established the four-pronged test for determining whether a special duty exists: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) the party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.

11
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen
ny · 1986 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Separately, summary judgment is appropriate under CPLR §3212 when the movant makes a prima facie showing that there are no material issues of fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

11
Weiss v. City of New Yorkgreen
nyappdiv · 1998 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008In Leonardelli v Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. ( 288 AD2d 105, 106 [1st Dept 2001]), the Court reiterated the four-pronged test for restoration and, quoting Weiss v City of New York ( 247 AD2d 239, 240 [1st Dept 1998]), noted that the purpose of the statute was to strike “actually dead” cases, and that the Court would look not to the technicalities, but rather to the totality of the circumstances.

11
Leonardelli v. Presbyterian Hospitalgreen
nyappdiv · 2001 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008In Leonardelli v Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. ( 288 AD2d 105, 106 [1st Dept 2001]), the Court reiterated the four-pronged test for restoration and, quoting Weiss v City of New York ( 247 AD2d 239, 240 [1st Dept 1998]), noted that the purpose of the statute was to strike “actually dead” cases, and that the Court would look not to the technicalities, but rather to the totality of the circumstances.

11
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Bradygreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005A state tax on interstate commerce violates the dormant Commerce Clause unless it “is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” (Complete Auto Tr., Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274, 279 [1977] [upholding under Commerce Clause “a state tax for the privilege of carrying on within a state, certain activities related to a corporation’s operation of an interstate business” (id. at 274 [internal quotation marks omitted])]).

2005A state tax on interstate commerce violates the dormant Commerce Clause unless it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State" ( Complete Auto Tr., Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274, 279 [1977] [upholding under Commerce Clause "a state tax for the privilege of carrying on within a state, certain activities related to a corporation's operation of an interstate business" ( id. at 274 [internal quotation marks omitted])]).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Waller v. Georgia green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1995In determining whether closure of the courtroom is necessary, the Court of Appeals has set forth a four-pronged test: "(1) the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding; and (4) the trial court must make findings adequate to support the closure” (People v Kin Kan, 78 NY2d 54, 58 ; Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 ; People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 442 ).

1993Since Jones , also, the United States Supreme Court has further particularized the standard for closure, under the Sixth Amendment, which we recognized in People v Kin Kan ( 78 NY2d 54, 58 ) as a four-pronged test: "[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure” (Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 , supra).

21993–1995
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. red
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

1995The Complete Auto articulation of the four-pronged standard for determining the validity of a State tax on interstate commercial activity under the dormant Commerce Clause remains the prevailing test, with refinements, to this day (see, Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines, 514 US, at —, 115 S Ct, at 1337 , supra).

1995The Complete Auto articulation of the four-pronged standard for determining the validity of a State tax on interstate commercial activity under the dormant Commerce Clause remains the prevailing test, with refinements, to this day (see , Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines , 514 US, at ___ , 115 S Ct, at 1337 , supra) .

11995–1995
National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1995One such refinement of Complete Auto was made at the same term in National Geographic v California Equalization Bd. ( 430 US 551 ).

1995One such refinement of Complete Auto was made at the *174 same term in National Geographic v California Equalization Bd. ( 430 US 551 ).

11995–1995
People v. Bess green
nyappdiv · 1995
1 sentence

1995Further, once the defendant seeks the inclusion of members of his family, the People must prove that the individuals’ exclusion is necessary to protect the witness (People v Kin Kan, supra, at 58-59; People v Bess, 220 AD2d 603, 604 ).

11995–1995
People v. Martinez green
ny · 1993
1 sentence

1995In determining whether closure of the courtroom is necessary, the Court of Appeals has set forth a four-pronged test: "(1) the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding; and (4) the trial court must make findings adequate to support the closure” (People v Kin Kan, 78 NY2d 54, 58 ; Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 ; People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 442 ).

11995–1995
People v. Raja green
nyappdiv · 1980
1 sentence

1992The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held in the case of People v Dillenbeck ( 115 AD2d 331, 331-332 ): "In order for a statement to be admitted as past recollection recorded, four requirements must be met: (1) the witness must be unable or unwilling to testify to the events contained in the memorandum; (2) the witness must have observed the events described therein; (3) the memorandum must have been pre pared when knowledge of the contents were fresh in the mind of the witness; (4) the witness must have intended the memorandum to be accurate at the time it was made (People v Raja, 77 AD

11992–1992
People v. Dillenbeck green
nyappdiv · 1985
1 sentence

1992The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held in the case of People v Dillenbeck ( 115 AD2d 331, 331-332 ): "In order for a statement to be admitted as past recollection recorded, four requirements must be met: (1) the witness must be unable or unwilling to testify to the events contained in the memorandum; (2) the witness must have observed the events described therein; (3) the memorandum must have been pre pared when knowledge of the contents were fresh in the mind of the witness; (4) the witness must have intended the memorandum to be accurate at the time it was made (People v Raja, 77 AD

11992–1992
Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin green
ny · 1974
1 sentence

1989Applying the four-pronged test set forth in Matter of Douglas-ton Civic Assn. v Galvin ( 36 NY2d 1, 7 ), we agree that there was insufficient information provided to determine whether the association was fairly representative of the Town of Woodstock community. * Turning to the merits, we reverse that part of Supreme Court’s judgment which remitted the matter to the Planning Board and otherwise affirm.

11989–1989
United States v. O'Brien green
scotus · 1968
1 sentence

1986Again my model is Chief Judge Wachtler in the Arcara case ( 65 NY2d 324 , 335-336, supra) who, in turn, adopted the four-pronged test in United States v O’Brien ( 391 US 367, 377 ).

11986–1986
Britton v. County of Erie green
nyappdiv · 1974
1 sentence

1979Co., 244 NY 331, 338 , supra.) This four-pronged test was reaffirmed in White v Guarente ( 43 NY2d 356 ) and the Fourth Department recently held that the failure to show a special relationship of trust is fatal to an action for negligent misrepresentation (Everson v First Trust & Deposit Co., 46 AD2d 722 ).

11979–1979
International Products Co. v. Erie R.R. Co. green
ny · 1927
1 sentence

1979Co., 244 NY 331, 338 , supra.) This four-pronged test was reaffirmed in White v Guarente ( 43 NY2d 356 ) and the Fourth Department recently held that the failure to show a special relationship of trust is fatal to an action for negligent misrepresentation (Everson v First Trust & Deposit Co., 46 AD2d 722 ).

11979–1979
White v. Guarente green
ny · 1977
1 sentence

1979Co., 244 NY 331, 338 , supra.) This four-pronged test was reaffirmed in White v Guarente ( 43 NY2d 356 ) and the Fourth Department recently held that the failure to show a special relationship of trust is fatal to an action for negligent misrepresentation (Everson v First Trust & Deposit Co., 46 AD2d 722 ).

11979–1979
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
1 sentence

1974Miranda v. Arizona (supra) defined custodial interrogation to mean (p. 444) “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or ¡otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”.

11974–1974

Where else courts name it

PA 72 (1974–2026) NJ 31 (1987–2026) CT 29 (1983–2026) MI 28 (1981–2021) TX 17 (1981–2025) GA 17 (1981–2026) WA 13 (2004–2026) IL 13 (1974–2006) NY 11 (1974–2024) FL 10 (1980–2024) OH 10 (1987–2026) AL 8 (1991–2015) ID 8 (1995–2022) RI 8 (1979–2016) VA 7 (1987–2012) NC 6 (1976–2018) CA 6 (1995–2014) MO 6 (1976–2001) WV 5 (1996–2023) UT 4 (1984–2001) TN 4 (1979–2010) LA 4 (2008–2023) MN 4 (1981–2015) DC 3 (1978–1996) KY 3 (2015–2024) WI 2 (1986–2003) VT 2 (1984–1989) MS 2 (2012–2014) IN 2 (1998–2006) ND 2 (2022–2022) KS 2 (1985–1990) MA 2 (2014–2022) WY 2 (1989–2003) NM 2 (2014–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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