6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Lynchred2 sentences2014“A punishment is cruel or unusual within the meaning of the California Constitution if ‘it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’ (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 .) In Lynch, the Supreme Court extracted from prior decisions a four- pronged analysis for claims of disproportionate sentencing. 1997Defendant maintains this sentence, as *1278 applied to him, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution because it is “grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) 7 A punishment is cruel or unusual within the meaning of the California Constitution if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 10 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Dillongreen2 sentences1997Defendant maintains this sentence, as *1278 applied to him, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution because it is “grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) 7 A punishment is cruel or unusual within the meaning of the California Constitution if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 10 1997Defendant maintains this sentence, as *1278 applied to him, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution because it is “grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) 7 A punishment is cruel or unusual within the meaning of the California Constitution if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 10 | 1 | 1 |
Hammarley v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1995Newsperson's Shield Law In ruling that defendant had failed to meet the second prong of the Hammarley test, the court was referring to Hammarley 's construction of the shield law under Evidence Code section 1070, and its development of a four-pronged test that assisted the court in determining whether the statute should protect a newsperson from having to reveal undisclosed corroborating sources pertaining to the newsperson's interviews with a named individual who was the prosecution's principal witness in a murder case. ( Hammarley *52 v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 392-394 [ 15 1995Newsperson's Shield Law In ruling that defendant had failed to meet the second prong of the Hammarley test, the court was referring to Hammarley 's construction of the shield law under Evidence Code section 1070, and its development of a four-pronged test that assisted the court in determining whether the statute should protect a newsperson from having to reveal undisclosed corroborating sources pertaining to the newsperson's interviews with a named individual who was the prosecution's principal witness in a murder case. ( Hammarley *52 v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 392-394 [ 15 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Griggs
green
2 sentences1999Moreover, it makes no senseand would frustrate the express intent of the three strikes law (see § 667, subd. (b))to allow the use of juvenile adjudications as `strikes' but to permit only adults to incur a `strike' as the result of an offense listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c), or section 1192.7, subdivision (c)." ( Griggs, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 557 at p. 561 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 .) If the single sentence comprising paragraph (D) ended with the phrase "or described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony," the symmetry between paragraphs (B) and (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) would 1999Moreover, it makes no senseand would frustrate the express intent of the three strikes law (see § 667, subd. (b))to allow the use of juvenile adjudications as `strikes' but to permit only adults to incur a `strike' as the result of an offense listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c), or section 1192.7, subdivision (c)." ( Griggs, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 557 at p. 561 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 .) If the single sentence comprising paragraph (D) ended with the phrase "or described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony," the symmetry between paragraphs (B) and (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) would | 1 | 1999–1999 |
In Re Robbins
green
2 sentences1999We recently explained this test in Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 770 , which incorporates policy 3 of the Supreme Court Policies: “Pursuant to policies adopted by this court in June 1989, a habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal. 1999We recently explained this test in Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 770 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 , which incorporates policy 3 of the Supreme Court Policies: "Pursuant to policies adopted by this court in June 1989, a habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant's reply brief on the direct appeal. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
green
2 sentences1999Comm’n (1980) 447 U.S. 557 [ 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L.Ed.2d 341 ] (Central Hudson), the Supreme Court articulated a four-pronged analysis for evaluating the validity of commercial speech restrictions. 1999Comm’n (1980) 447 U.S. 557 [ 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L.Ed.2d 341 ] (Central Hudson), the Supreme Court articulated a four-pronged analysis for evaluating the validity of commercial speech restrictions. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.