Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
17 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carsner v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d 1 , 2–3 (Tex. Crim. 2018In order for a defendant to be entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the defendant must meet a four-pronged test, which includes in part establishing that the evidence is admissible and not “merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching[.]” See Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. | 5 | 6 |
State v. Arizmendigreen2 sentences2025To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must satisfy each part of a four-pronged test: (1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant’s failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not due to the defendant’s lack of due diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different result in a new trial. 7 State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Cri 2018State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 148-49 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Erazo v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. 2009Erazo v. State , 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Wallace v. Stategreen1 sentence2018App. 2014) (citing Wallace v. State, 106 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Fantasy Ranch v. City of Arlington TX, et agreen1 sentence2013Id.; Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of Arlington, Texas, 459 F.3d 546, 554 (5th Cir.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Bradygreen2 sentences1994Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279, 287 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079, 1083 . 1994Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279, 287 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079, 1083 . | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Stategreen1 sentence1988Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 788 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
2 sentences1999This was usually done via the four-pronged test first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 1999This was usually done via the four-pronged test first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1997Relying on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in which the Supreme Court established a four-pronged test to determine if a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated, the State concedes that the length of trial delay in the instant case weighed in favor of dismissal, but maintains that the reasons for the delay — the plea negotiations and an overcrowded docket — excuse it. 1997Relying on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in which the Supreme Court established a four-pronged test to determine if a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated, the State concedes that the length of trial delay in the instant case weighed in favor of dismissal, but maintains that the reasons for the delay — the plea negotiations and an overcrowded docket — excuse it. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lee v. State
green
2 sentences1996Lee v. State, 893 S.W.2d 80 , 85 n. 2 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994, no pet.). . 1996Lee v. State, 893 S.W.2d 80 , 85 n. 2 (Tex.App.El Paso 1994, no pet.). [9] Being the focus of a criminal investigation does not equate to being in custody, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 , 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615 , 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), and the mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Beckwith v. United States
green
2 sentences1996Lee v. State, 893 S.W.2d 80 , 85 n. 2 (Tex.App.El Paso 1994, no pet.). [9] Being the focus of a criminal investigation does not equate to being in custody, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 , 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615 , 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), and the mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings. 1996Lee v. State, 893 S.W.2d 80 , 85 n. 2 (Tex.App.El Paso 1994, no pet.). [9] Being the focus of a criminal investigation does not equate to being in custody, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 , 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615 , 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), and the mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co.
green
1 sentence1981A finding of identity required an affirmative answer to each of the following questions: (1) Would a recovery under the original claim bar a recovery under the claim alleged in the amended petition? (2) Would the same evidence support both causes of action alleged? (3) Is the measure of damages the same under each claim? (4) Is each cause of action subject to the same defenses? 61 S.W. at 709 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.