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12 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1893–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haddock v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2022Nevertheless, “other recognized limitations still govern the tort liability of municipal officers” (Tango v -6- Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40 [1983]), and governmental defendants “unquestionably continue to enjoy . . . a significant measure of immunity” (Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]; see Connolly v Long Is. 2018It is well settled that, "[d]espite the sovereign's own statutory surrender of common-law tort immunity for the misfeasance ***727 of its employees, governmental entities somewhat incongruously claim-and unquestionably continue to enjoy-a significant measure of immunity fashioned for their protection by the courts" ( Haddock v. City of New York , 75 N.Y.2d 478 , 484, 554 N.Y.S.2d 439 , 553 N.E.2d 987 [1990] ). | 1 | 2 |
Tango v. Tulevechgreen2 sentences2022Nevertheless, “other recognized limitations still govern the tort liability of municipal officers” (Tango v -6- Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40 [1983]), and governmental defendants “unquestionably continue to enjoy . . . a significant measure of immunity” (Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]; see Connolly v Long Is. 1990Governmental immunity under the decisional law of this State does not attach to every act, but when official action involves the exercise of discretion or expert judgment in policy matters, and is not exclusively ministerial, a municipal defendant generally is not answerable in damages for the injurious consequences of that action (see, Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40 ; Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 216 ; Weiss v Fote, 7 NY2d 579 ). | 1 | 2 |
Jesus Ferreira v. City of Binghamtongreen2 sentences2025However, "other recognized limitations still govern the tort liability of municipal officers, and governmental defendants unquestionably continue to enjoy a significant measure of immunity" ( Ferreira v City of Binghamton , 38 NY3d 298, 308 [2022] [internal quotation marks, citation, and ellipsis omitted]). 2025However, "other recognized limitations still govern the tort liability of municipal officers, and governmental defendants unquestionably continue to enjoy a significant measure of immunity" ( Ferreira v City of Binghamton , 38 NY3d 298, 308 [2022] [internal quotation marks, citation, and ellipsis omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Connolly v. Long Island Power Auth.green1 sentence2022Power Auth., 30 NY3d 719, 726-727 [2018]). | 1 | 1 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodgreen2 sentences1998In CSX Transp. v Easterwood ( 507 US 658 ), the Supreme Court held that a preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act ( 45 USC §§ 421-444 ) invalidating any State “law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety” ( 45 USC § 434 [emphasis supplied]), once a Federal regulation was issued covering the same subject matter, preempted a common-law tort claim based upon excessive speed of a train at a grade crossing, in view of regulations fixing a maximum speed at such a crossing (CSX Transp. v Easterwood, supra, at 662, n 2). 1998In CSX Transp. v Easterwood ( 507 US 658 ), the Supreme Court held that a preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act ( 45 USC §§ 421-444 ) invalidating any State “law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety” ( 45 USC § 434 [emphasis supplied]), once a Federal regulation was issued covering the same subject matter, preempted a common-law tort claim based upon excessive speed of a train at a grade crossing, in view of regulations fixing a maximum speed at such a crossing (CSX Transp. v Easterwood, supra, at 662, n 2). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martingreen1 sentence1960(People v. Martin, 1 Misc 2d 76, 80 [top], affd. 7 A D 2d 970, supra.) Confronting defendant, too, is the presumption that no person acting in an official capacity, as for instance, a Judge or a Clerk of a court, or any other person acting under an oath of office, will do anything contrary to his official duty. | 1 | 1 |
Loughlin v. . State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1893See Anthony v. Leeret, 105 N. Y. at page 600 , 12 N. E. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Valdez v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2018The doctrine of governmental function immunity "reflects separation of powers principles and is intended to ensure that public servants are free to exercise their decision-making authority without interference from the courts" ( Valdez v. City of New York , 18 N.Y.3d 69 , 76, 936 N.Y.S.2d 587 , 960 N.E.2d 356 [2011] ). 2018The doctrine of governmental function immunity "reflects separation of powers principles and is intended to ensure that public servants are free to exercise their decision-making authority without interference from the courts" ( Valdez v. City of New York , 18 N.Y.3d 69 , 76, 936 N.Y.S.2d 587 , 960 N.E.2d 356 [2011] ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Iannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
green
1 sentence1990The legislative purpose of General Obligations Law § 9-103, to expand the availability of outdoor recreation by extending a measure of immunity to landowners, is disserved by an overly narrow construction or application (see, Iannotti v Consolidated Rail Corp., 74 NY2d 39, 44 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Weiss v. Fote
green
1 sentence1990Governmental immunity under the decisional law of this State does not attach to every act, but when official action involves the exercise of discretion or expert judgment in policy matters, and is not exclusively ministerial, a municipal defendant generally is not answerable in damages for the injurious consequences of that action (see, Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40 ; Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 216 ; Weiss v Fote, 7 NY2d 579 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Arteaga v. State of New York
green
1 sentence1990Governmental immunity under the decisional law of this State does not attach to every act, but when official action involves the exercise of discretion or expert judgment in policy matters, and is not exclusively ministerial, a municipal defendant generally is not answerable in damages for the injurious consequences of that action (see, Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40 ; Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 216 ; Weiss v Fote, 7 NY2d 579 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Reynolds v. Pegler
green
2 sentences1969The damages may be considered expressive of the community attitude towards one who wilfully and wantonly causes hurt or injury to another.” (Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp., at p. 38 ; emphasis supplied.) In Toomey v. Farley (2 N Y 2d 71, 83) our Court of Appeals citing the quoted language of Prince and Reynolds (supra) said “To those views we subscribe ” followed by this significant statement “ The question of the amount of compensatory and or punitive damage to be awarded was a matter for the jury.” (Emphasis supplied.) Since it is the mere performance of the libelous act and not its conseq 1969The damages may be considered expressive of the community attitude towards one who wilfully and wantonly causes hurt or injury to another.” (Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp., at p. 38 ; emphasis supplied.) In Toomey v. Farley (2 N Y 2d 71, 83) our Court of Appeals citing the quoted language of Prince and Reynolds (supra) said “To those views we subscribe ” followed by this significant statement “ The question of the amount of compensatory and or punitive damage to be awarded was a matter for the jury.” (Emphasis supplied.) Since it is the mere performance of the libelous act and not its conseq | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Matter of Seignious v. Rice
green
1 sentence1962This sort of delegation of legislative discretion was condemned in Seignious v. Rice ( 273 N. Y. 44, 50 ) in the following language: ‘ ‘ Authorization given to an administrative officer to choose without providing a measure or standard for such classification is beyond the power of the Legislature. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
People v. Yancovich
neutral
1 sentence1960S. 2d 205, affd. 283 App. Div. 842 .) Included within the measure of the presumption of regularity, is a judgment of conviction founded on a plea of guilty. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle
green
1 sentence1956As to (3): Many years ago it was aptly said that: “ A person may be of such high character that the grossest libel would damage him none; but that would be no reason for withdrawing his case from the wholesome, if not necessary, rule in respect of punitive damages.” (Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 Misc. 186, 190 .) And, more recently, it was written that to adopt the view that punitive damages are dependent upon, and must bear relationship to the allowance of actual damages, ‘ ‘ would mean that a defamer gains a measure of immunity no matter how venomous or malicious his attack simply beca | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Taylor v. Granite State Provident Ass'n
green
2 sentences1895It would be comparatively free from difficulty were it not that appellant insists that the court of appeals in Taylor v. Association, 136 N. Y. 343 , 32 N. E. 992 , asserted what constitutes a managing agent, and that an abatement of one jot from the full measure of that rule takes him without the Section. 1895It would be comparatively free from difficulty were it not that appellant insists that the court of appeals in Taylor v. Association, 136 N. Y. 343 , 32 N. E. 992 , asserted what constitutes a managing agent, and that an abatement of one jot from the full measure of that rule takes him without the Section. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.