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11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2024Cleveland v. Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, ¶ 9 , citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc.green1 sentence2016Rather, * * * courts consider the totality of the circumstances and in some cases, find that a temporal restriction is part of a series of factors considered rather than a threshold requirement."); United States v. Triumph Capital Group, 211 F.R.D. 31, 58 (D.C.Conn.2002) ("A temporal limitation in a warrant is not an absolute necessity, but is only one indicia of particularity," and therefore "the No. 14AP-812 15 absence of a temporal limitation does not render the warrant a prohibited general warrant."). {¶ 45} Cases in which federal courts have upheld search warrants in the absence of tempor | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cluttergreen1 sentence2015The factors include “whether the consenting third party in fact used the computer, whether it was located in a common area accessible to other occupants of the premises, and—often most importantly—whether the defendant’s files were password protected.” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting United States v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir.2012). {¶ 17} Alicia Buehrer and appellant had resided together. | 1 | 1 |
Addington v. Addington, Unpublished Decision (9-12-2006)green1 sentence2010See, also, Addington v. Addington, Scioto App. No. 05CA3034, 2006-Ohio-4871, at ¶8 . | 1 | 1 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001See Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. at 696 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661 -1662 ; see, also, State v. Deters, 128 Ohio App. at 333-334 , 714 N.E.2d at 974 -975 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Detersgreen1 sentence2001See Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. at 696 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661 -1662 ; see, also, State v. Deters, 128 Ohio App. at 333-334 , 714 N.E.2d at 974 -975 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cleveland v. Oles (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2024Cleveland v. Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, ¶ 9 , citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Bobo
green
1 sentence2016In Bobo, officers made a constitutional stop and search of the Defendant because the location of the stop was known for a high number of drug transactions, the stop was made late at night, the experience of the officer and his knowledge of drug transactions, the furtive movement of the defendant, and the necessity of safety of the officer upon leaving his vehicle. 37 Ohio St. 3d at 178-79 . {¶14} In Spradlin, officers were dispatched to a subdivision for a robbery in progress in Pataskala, Ohio. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Rice
neutral
1 sentence2015Summit No. 26116, 2012-Ohio-2174 , the Ninth District Court of Appeals identified a series of factors used by courts considering 7. warrantless searches of computers by consent of third parties. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kenyon v. Scott Fetzer Co.
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 266 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Cassidy v. Cassidy, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2005)
neutral
1 sentence2010This particular statutory section sets out a series of factors that a court must consider when determining whether to award spousal support. {¶9} “A trial court has broad discretion in establishing and modifying a spousal support award.” Cassidy v. Cassidy, Pike App. No. 03CA721, 2005-Ohio-3199, at ¶27 , citing Schultz v. Schultz (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 715, 724 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Schultz v. Schultz
green
1 sentence2010This particular statutory section sets out a series of factors that a court must consider when determining whether to award spousal support. {¶9} “A trial court has broad discretion in establishing and modifying a spousal support award.” Cassidy v. Cassidy, Pike App. No. 03CA721, 2005-Ohio-3199, at ¶27 , citing Schultz v. Schultz (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 715, 724 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
City of Lakewood v. Papadelis
green
2 sentences2008Id. {¶ 90} In Lakewood v. Papadelis (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 1 , 5 , 511 N.E.2d 1138 the Ohio Supreme Court prescribed a series of factors which the trial courts should apply when considering witness preclusion as a sanction for discovery violations under Crim R. 16. 2008Id. {¶ 90} In Lakewood v. Papadelis (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 1 , 5 , 511 N.E.2d 1138 the Ohio Supreme Court prescribed a series of factors which the trial courts should apply when considering witness preclusion as a sanction for discovery violations under Crim R. 16. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Parson
green
1 sentence2008Id. {¶ 90} In Lakewood v. Papadelis (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 1 , 5 , 511 N.E.2d 1138 the Ohio Supreme Court prescribed a series of factors which the trial courts should apply when considering witness preclusion as a sanction for discovery violations under Crim R. 16. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Unger
green
2 sentences2007They include: the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case. *Page 16 State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65 , 67-68 423 N.E.2d 1078 . {1131} Nayar made his motion for a continuance on the mo 2007They include: the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case. *Page 16 State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65 , 67-68 423 N.E.2d 1078 . {1131} Nayar made his motion for a continuance on the mo | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Bingham v. Bingham
green
2 sentences1996Appellant next cites Bingham v. Bingham (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 191 , 9 OBR 302, 459 N.E.2d 231 , which sets forth a series of factors for the court’s consideration when contemplating a modification in spousal support payments. 1996Appellant next cites Bingham v. Bingham (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 191 , 9 OBR 302, 459 N.E.2d 231 , which sets forth a series of factors for the court’s consideration when contemplating a modification in spousal support payments. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
1 sentence1983Id. at 740-741 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.