Ill defendant in Rhode Island

2012In our review of an adjudication of a probation violation, we accord “considerable deference to the reliability and credibility determinations made by the trial justice at a probation violation hearing.” State v. Jensen, 40 A.3d 771, 780 (R.I.2012); see also State v. Seamans, 935 A.2d 618, 624 (R.I.2007) (“It is not ordinarily the role of this Court to second-guess credibility assessments in a probation violation hearing.”).

2012In our review of an adjudication of a probation violation, we accord “considerable deference to the reliability and credibility determinations made by the trial justice at a probation violation hearing.” State v. Jensen, 40 A.3d 771, 780 (R.I.2012); see also State v. Seamans, 935 A.2d 618, 624 (R.I.2007) (“It is not ordinarily the role of this Court to second-guess credibility assessments in a probation violation hearing.”).

2010Ill Analysis The defendant challenges the hearing justice’s decision to grant summary judgment against him, alleging that he never agreed to pay Classic Entertainment any proceeds from his purse in the Jeff Lacy fight. 4 Unfortunately for defen *850 dant, however, he is checkmated by the basic rule that, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, defendant was required, “by competent evidence, [to] prove the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.” See Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 391 ; see also Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022, 1027 (R.I.2005); United Lending Corp., 827 A

1993This court has held that before a prior inconsistent statement may be used on cross-examination, a “witness’s attention first must be directed to the nature of the supposed statements and the circumstances under which they were made.” State v. Cianci, 430 A.2d 756, 762 (R.I.1981).

1990As this court established in State v. Andrade, 544 A.2d 1140, 1143 (R.I.1988), and followed in State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I.1989), it is not reversible error for a trial justice to refuse to give instructions requested by a defendant, as long as the charge given adequately covers the law relating to the request.

1990As this court established in State v. Andrade, 544 A.2d 1140, 1143 (R.I.1988), and followed in State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I.1989), it is not reversible error for a trial justice to refuse to give instructions requested by a defendant, as long as the charge given adequately covers the law relating to the request.

1985He argues that convictions on both murder and burglary were in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s double-jeopardy clause, which “prohibits both successive prosecution for the same offense as well as multiple punishment for the same offense.” State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 654 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1165 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263 , 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977)).

1985He argues that convictions on both murder and burglary were in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s double-jeopardy clause, which “prohibits both successive prosecution for the same offense as well as multiple punishment for the same offense.” State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 654 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1165 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263 , 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977)).

1985Generally, the “denial of a motion for a severance will not be reversed unless it is affirmatively shown that the defendant did, in fact, suffer prejudice sufficiently substantial to impinge upon his right to a fair trial.” State v. Skarbuno, 120 R.I. 714, 717 , 390 A.2d 915, 917 (1978); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 28 , 308 A.2d 300, 310 (1973).

1985Generally, the “denial of a motion for a severance will not be reversed unless it is affirmatively shown that the defendant did, in fact, suffer prejudice sufficiently substantial to impinge upon his right to a fair trial.” State v. Skarbuno, 120 R.I. 714, 717 , 390 A.2d 915, 917 (1978); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 28 , 308 A.2d 300, 310 (1973).

1985He argues that convictions on both murder and burglary were in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s double-jeopardy clause, which “prohibits both successive prosecution for the same offense as well as multiple punishment for the same offense.” State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 654 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1165 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263 , 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977)).

1985He argues that convictions on both murder and burglary were in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s double-jeopardy clause, which “prohibits both successive prosecution for the same offense as well as multiple punishment for the same offense.” State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 654 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1165 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263 , 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977)).

1985Generally, the “denial of a motion for a severance will not be reversed unless it is affirmatively shown that the defendant did, in fact, suffer prejudice sufficiently substantial to impinge upon his right to a fair trial.” State v. Skarbuno, 120 R.I. 714, 717 , 390 A.2d 915, 917 (1978); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 28 , 308 A.2d 300, 310 (1973).

1985Generally, the “denial of a motion for a severance will not be reversed unless it is affirmatively shown that the defendant did, in fact, suffer prejudice sufficiently substantial to impinge upon his right to a fair trial.” State v. Skarbuno, 120 R.I. 714, 717 , 390 A.2d 915, 917 (1978); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 28 , 308 A.2d 300, 310 (1973).

1982See Benevides v. Canario, 111 R.I. 204 , 301 A.2d 75 (1973).

1982See Benevides v. Canario, 111 R.I. 204 , 301 A.2d 75 (1973).

1980Although defendant had a right to show bias, State v. Arnold, 64 R.I. 355, 361 , 12 A.2d 401, 404 (1940), it is nevertheless the duty of the trial justice to determine what evidence is relevant to material issues in the trial.

1980Although defendant had a right to show bias, State v. Arnold, 64 R.I. 355, 361 , 12 A.2d 401, 404 (1940), it is nevertheless the duty of the trial justice to determine what evidence is relevant to material issues in the trial.

1977Ill The defendant contends that the trial justice improperly instructed the jury in answering the following questions which were submitted to him by the jury: (1) “ ‘Does there have to be a deliberate effort made by defendant to procure to alienate affections?’ ” and (2) “ ‘Does the defendant have to be the major cause of the breakup of the marriage?’ ” In answering these questions the trial justice quoted the following from Senn v. Kogut, 79 R.I. 429, 437 , 89 A.2d 842, 846 (1952), which is settled law in this jurisdiction. “[I]f the jury found from the evidence that defendant’s conduct was t

1977Ill The defendant contends that the trial justice improperly instructed the jury in answering the following questions which were submitted to him by the jury: (1) “ ‘Does there have to be a deliberate effort made by defendant to procure to alienate affections?’ ” and (2) “ ‘Does the defendant have to be the major cause of the breakup of the marriage?’ ” In answering these questions the trial justice quoted the following from Senn v. Kogut, 79 R.I. 429, 437 , 89 A.2d 842, 846 (1952), which is settled law in this jurisdiction. “[I]f the jury found from the evidence that defendant’s conduct was t