Ill standard in Delaware

1987Ill The defendant and amicus argue on several grounds that the State constitution requires automatic reversal where there has been, as in this case, a complete denial of otherwise proper cross-examination concerning potential bias. 5 First, relying on Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 674 (1983), and our earlier Van Arsdall opinion, they contend that this Court has already interpreted the Delaware constitution to require automatic reversal under these circumstances.

1984As the Delaware Supreme Court recently stated in Aronson v. Lewis, Del.Supr., 473 A.2d 805 (1984): “The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a).

1983Hochberg v. Keiser, Del.Supr., 447 A.2d 425, 426 (1982); Wilson v. Tweed, Del.Supr., 209 A.2d 899 (1965). 4 Ill The standard of review of the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is even more stringent since the granting of a new trial is in the discretion of the trial judge.

1979As a result, defendant’s stop was a lawful seizure pursuant to the principles announced in Prouse, supra, and Brown, supra. Ill The defendant argues that the search of defendant’s automobile violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section Six of the Delaware Constitution under the standards established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

1979As a result, defendant’s stop was a lawful seizure pursuant to the principles announced in Prouse, supra, and Brown, supra. Ill The defendant argues that the search of defendant’s automobile violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section Six of the Delaware Constitution under the standards established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

1979As a result, defendant’s stop was a lawful seizure pursuant to the principles announced in Prouse, supra, and Brown, supra. Ill The defendant argues that the search of defendant’s automobile violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section Six of the Delaware Constitution under the standards established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

1978Ill The standard for judging whether a state statute providing for substituted service of process on a nonresident is constitutionally applied under the rule of law set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner is the standard enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and restated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

1978Ill The standard for judging whether a state statute providing for substituted service of process on a nonresident is constitutionally applied under the rule of law set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner is the standard enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and restated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

1978Ill The standard for judging whether a state statute providing for substituted service of process on a nonresident is constitutionally applied under the rule of law set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner is the standard enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and restated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

1978Ill The standard for judging whether a state statute providing for substituted service of process on a nonresident is constitutionally applied under the rule of law set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner is the standard enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and restated in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

1978That standard is that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be supported by the presence of a connection between the forum, the litigation and the defendant. 6 As stated in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204 , 97 S.Ct. at 2580 : Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pen-noyer rest (after International Shoe) became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.

1978That standard is that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be supported by the presence of a connection between the forum, the litigation and the defendant. 6 As stated in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204 , 97 S.Ct. at 2580 : Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pen-noyer rest (after International Shoe) became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.

1975In Halko v. State, Del.Supr., 4 Storey 180 , 175 A.2d 42 (1961), this Court held that a charge which places the burden upon the accused to prove an alibi to the jury’s satisfaction improperly shifts the burden of proof that rests with the State.

1975In Halko v. State, Del.Supr., 4 Storey 180 , 175 A.2d 42 (1961), this Court held that a charge which places the burden upon the accused to prove an alibi to the jury’s satisfaction improperly shifts the burden of proof that rests with the State.