Ill defendant in Connecticut

2010Ill The defendant also contends that the court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of §§ 21a-277 (a) and 21a-278a (b), thereby diluting the standard of proof in violation of his right to due process under the federal and state constitutions. 3 The defendant did not preserve this claim at trial and now seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 4 We review the defendant’s claim because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude.

2010Ill The defendant also contends that the court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of §§ 21a-277 (a) and 21a-278a (b), thereby diluting the standard of proof in violation of his right to due process under the federal and state constitutions. 3 The defendant did not preserve this claim at trial and now seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 4 We review the defendant’s claim because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude.

2009Ill The defendant next claims that the denial of access to the victim’s Juvenile Court file violated his due process right to exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2009Ill The defendant next claims that the denial of access to the victim’s Juvenile Court file violated his due process right to exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2001Ill The defendant also claims that with respect to his conviction of the third count of sexual assault in the first degree, the court improperly admitted into evidence for substantive purposes the victim’s prior written statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2001Ill The defendant also claims that with respect to his conviction of the third count of sexual assault in the first degree, the court improperly admitted into evidence for substantive purposes the victim’s prior written statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

1989Ill The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in several respects in its instructions to the jury regarding entrapment. 12 He failed to except at trial to the portion of the charge he now challenges, but claims a right to appellate review under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69-70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1989Ill The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in several respects in its instructions to the jury regarding entrapment. 12 He failed to except at trial to the portion of the charge he now challenges, but claims a right to appellate review under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69-70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

2001Ill The defendant also claims that with respect to his conviction of the third count of sexual assault in the first degree, the court improperly admitted into evidence for substantive purposes the victim’s prior written statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

1989Ill The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury as to the limited purpose of oral prior inconsistent statements. 7 The defendant argues that in State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2001Ill The defendant also claims that with respect to his conviction of the third count of sexual assault in the first degree, the court improperly admitted into evidence for substantive purposes the victim’s prior written statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

1989Ill The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury as to the limited purpose of oral prior inconsistent statements. 7 The defendant argues that in State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2001Ill The defendant also claims that with respect to his conviction of the third count of sexual assault in the first degree, the court improperly admitted into evidence for substantive purposes the victim’s prior written statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

1989Ill The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury as to the limited purpose of oral prior inconsistent statements. 7 The defendant argues that in State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2010See State v. Samuels, *80 273 Conn. 541 , 871 A.2d 1005 (2005); State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284 , 677 A.2d 917 (1996). 3 Ill The defendant next claims that the court improperly denied his motion for acquittal because his conviction was based on insufficient evidence.

2010See State v. Samuels, *80 273 Conn. 541 , 871 A.2d 1005 (2005); State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284 , 677 A.2d 917 (1996). 3 Ill The defendant next claims that the court improperly denied his motion for acquittal because his conviction was based on insufficient evidence.

2006Ill The defendant next claims that the state violated his rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by exercising a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.

2006Ill The defendant next claims that the state violated his rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by exercising a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.

2009Ill The defendant’s third claim is that the court improperly admitted into evidence a redacted version of the victim’s statement to the police pursuant to Whelan, as the statement was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances, and the court failed to conduct a hearing to determine the reliability of the statement pursuant to State v. Mukhtaar, 253 Conn. 280 , 307 n.27, 750 A.2d 1059 (2000).

2009Ill The defendant’s third claim is that the court improperly admitted into evidence a redacted version of the victim’s statement to the police pursuant to Whelan, as the statement was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances, and the court failed to conduct a hearing to determine the reliability of the statement pursuant to State v. Mukhtaar, 253 Conn. 280 , 307 n.27, 750 A.2d 1059 (2000).

1996Ill The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly excluded certain polygraph evidence, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

1996Ill The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly excluded certain polygraph evidence, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

2000Ill The defendant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial in light of the trial court’s jury instruction that “[t]he law is made to protect society and innocent persons and not to protect guilty ones.” Specifically, the defendant contends that this instruction undermined the presumption of innocence, thereby diluting the state’s burden of proof in violation of his fifth amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 33 The defendant concedes that this claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 168-73 , 728 A.2d 466 , ce

2000Ill The defendant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial in light of the trial court’s jury instruction that “[t]he law is made to protect society and innocent persons and not to protect guilty ones.” Specifically, the defendant contends that this instruction undermined the presumption of innocence, thereby diluting the state’s burden of proof in violation of his fifth amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 33 The defendant concedes that this claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 168-73 , 728 A.2d 466 , ce

1999State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1999State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1999State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1989Generally, “ ‘a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly pursued on a petition for new trial or on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than on direct appeal.’ ” State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1999State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1989Generally, “ ‘a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly pursued on a petition for new trial or on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than on direct appeal.’ ” State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1999State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1989Generally, “ ‘a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly pursued on a petition for new trial or on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than on direct appeal.’ ” State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 541 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1994Ill The defendant’s last claim is that the trial court had a duty to protect the defendant under the rationale of Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983), which states that “[t]he court has a duty to shape its orders so that the family, especially those who are economically at risk, are given protection.” The facts of Sweet v. Sweet, supra, 657 , are very different from the present facts.

1994Ill The defendant’s last claim is that the trial court had a duty to protect the defendant under the rationale of Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983), which states that “[t]he court has a duty to shape its orders so that the family, especially those who are economically at risk, are given protection.” The facts of Sweet v. Sweet, supra, 657 , are very different from the present facts.

1995He argues that certain parts of the trial court’s jury instructions regarding the nature of circumstantial evidence and the process of drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence violated the constitutional prohibition against mandatory presumptions as set forth in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S. Ct. 2450 , 61 L.

1995He argues that certain parts of the trial court’s jury instructions regarding the nature of circumstantial evidence and the process of drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence violated the constitutional prohibition against mandatory presumptions as set forth in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S. Ct. 2450 , 61 L.

1992Ill The defendant claims, finally, that his convictions of both conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree violate the prohibition against double jeopardy contained in the fifth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution. 11 The state agrees, as do we, that the defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy was violated by the existence of the two conspiracy convictions. 12 The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution, which w

1992Ill The defendant claims, finally, that his convictions of both conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree violate the prohibition against double jeopardy contained in the fifth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution. 11 The state agrees, as do we, that the defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy was violated by the existence of the two conspiracy convictions. 12 The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution, which w

1989Ill The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on eyewitness identification by refusing to include in its charge an instruction on identification based on United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.

1986Ill The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested “model” Telf aire instruction on identification. 12 United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.

1987“The weaknesses of identifications can be explored on cross-examination and during counsel’s final arguments to the jury.” State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 478 , 507 A.2d 1387 (1986). 14 Ill The defendant next claims that the state and the New Haven police improperly failed to preserve: (1) a record of the array from which the defendant’s photographs were selected; and (2) the notes of two police officers who spoke with the victim immediately following the robbery.

1987“The weaknesses of identifications can be explored on cross-examination and during counsel’s final arguments to the jury.” State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 478 , 507 A.2d 1387 (1986). 14 Ill The defendant next claims that the state and the New Haven police improperly failed to preserve: (1) a record of the array from which the defendant’s photographs were selected; and (2) the notes of two police officers who spoke with the victim immediately following the robbery.

2013Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See St

2013Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See St

2013Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See St

2013Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See St

2013Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See St

2013Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See St

2013Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See St

2011The Appellate Court discussed the legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 52-571b in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn. App. 646 , 911 A.2d 319 (2006), [cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911 , 916 A.2d 51 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886 , 128 S. Ct. 206 , 169 L.

2011The Appellate Court discussed the legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 52-571b in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn. App. 646 , 911 A.2d 319 (2006), [cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911 , 916 A.2d 51 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886 , 128 S. Ct. 206 , 169 L.

2011The Appellate Court discussed the legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 52-571b in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn. App. 646 , 911 A.2d 319 (2006), [cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911 , 916 A.2d 51 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886 , 128 S. Ct. 206 , 169 L.