theory underlying instruction in Washington

2009This would require the judge presiding at a jury trial to weigh and evaluate evidence, and would run afoul of the well-supported principle that “[a]n essential function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 460 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999)).

2009This would require the judge presiding at a jury trial to weigh and evaluate evidence, and would run afoul of the well-supported principle that "[a]n essential function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses." Id. at 460, 6 P.3d 1150 (quoting State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wash.2d 703, 709 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999)).

2009This would require the judge presiding at a jury trial to weigh and evaluate evidence, and would run afoul of the well-supported principle that “[a]n essential function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 460 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999)).

2009This would require the judge presiding at a jury trial to weigh and evaluate evidence, and would run afoul of the well-supported principle that "[a]n essential function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses." Id. at 460, 6 P.3d 1150 (quoting State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wash.2d 703, 709 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999)).

2000This would require the judge presiding at a jury trial to weigh and evaluate evidence, and would run afoul of the well-supported principle that “[a]n essential function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999) (citing State v. Snider, 70 Wn.2d 326, 327 , 422 P.2d 816 (1967)).

2000This would require the judge presiding at a jury trial to weigh and evaluate evidence, and would run afoul of the well-supported principle that “[a]n essential function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999) (citing State v. Snider, 70 Wn.2d 326, 327 , 422 P.2d 816 (1967)).

1999Kitsap County, 136 Wn.2d at 579-80 .

1999Kitsap County, 136 Wash.2d at 579-80 , 964 P.2d 1173 .

2026App. 867, 872 , 684 P.2d 725 (1984).

2026While Lee is correct that the excited utterance exception does not list “reliability” as a formal element under ER 803(a)(2), Washington law acknowledges the theory underlying the exception—that statements made under the stress of a startling event are inherently trustworthy and reliable because such “stressful circumstances are believed to operate to temporarily overcome the ability to reflect and consciously fabricate.” State v. Dixon, 37 Wn.

2017This evidence supports the theory underlying instruction 13 and justifies the trial court's decision to give it. 28 Dennis. 109 Wn.2d at 479 (holding that a worker does not need to "demonstrate a 'logical relationship between the disease-based disability and the work'") (quoting Dennis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 44 Wn.

2017App. 423, 436 , 722 P.2d 1317 (1986)). 29 See Dennis. 109 Wn.2d at 471 . -12- No. 76026-2-1/13 Liberty Mutual further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to give two of Liberty Mutual's proposed instructions.

2009Id. ¶ 35 Rejecting the State's argument, our Supreme Court stated that such a proposition would empower trial courts to deny a request for an instruction on the basis that the theory underlying the instruction is "inconsistent" with another theory that finds support in the evidence.

2009This would require the judge presiding at a jury trial to weigh and evaluate evidence, and would run afoul of the well-supported principle that "[a]n essential function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses." Id. at 460, 6 P.3d 1150 (quoting State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wash.2d 703, 709 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999)).

1999Kitsap County, 136 Wash.2d at 579-80 , 964 P.2d 1173 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1935The presumption that the support given and the services rendered are gratuitous may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing an intention that they were to be paid for in pecuniary recompense. 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th ed.), §806; Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52 , 68 Pac. 352 ; Thompson v. Jackson, 85 Wash. 330 , 148 Pac. 5 ; Lyons v. McElroy, 104 Wash. 481 , 177 Pac. 312 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260 , 233 Pac. 632 .

1925The owner of the property is therefore under this theory no poorer by reason of the entire transaction, as the assessment only takes from him the equivalent of part or all of the special benefit which the public improvement has conferred upon him; or to state it in another way, the special benefits conferred on him by the public improvement compensate him or more than compensate him for the amount of the assessment which he is obliged to pay.” In City of Butte v. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336 , 74 Pac. 869 , it is remarked: “The only basis on which special taxation or special assessments

1925The owner of the property is therefore under this theory no poorer by reason of the entire transaction, as the assessment only takes from him the equivalent of part or all of the special benefit which the public improvement has conferred upon him; or to state it in another way, the special benefits conferred on him by the public improvement compensate him or more than compensate him for the amount of the assessment which he is obliged to pay.” In City of Butte v. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336 , 74 Pac. 869 , it is remarked: “The only basis on which special taxation or special assessments

1925The owner of the property is therefore under this theory no poorer by reason of the entire transaction, as the assessment only takes from him the equivalent of part or all of the special benefit which the public improvement has conferred upon him; or to state it in another way, the special benefits conferred on him by the public improvement compensate him or more than compensate him for the amount of the assessment which he is obliged to pay.” In City of Butte v. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336 , 74 Pac. 869 , it is remarked: “The only basis on which special taxation or special assessments

1925The owner of the property is therefore under this theory no poorer by reason of the entire transaction, as the assessment only takes from him the equivalent of part or all of the special benefit which the public improvement has conferred upon him; or to state it in another way, the special benefits conferred on him by the public improvement compensate him or more than compensate him for the amount of the assessment which he is obliged to pay.” In City of Butte v. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336 , 74 Pac. 869 , it is remarked: “The only basis on which special taxation or special assessments

1925The owner of the property is therefore under this theory no poorer by reason of the entire transaction, as the assessment only takes from him the equivalent of part or all of the special benefit which the public improvement has conferred upon him; or to state it in another way, the special benefits conferred on him by the public improvement compensate him or more than compensate him for the amount of the assessment which he is obliged to pay.” In City of Butte v. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336 , 74 Pac. 869 , it is remarked: “The only basis on which special taxation or special assessments

1925The owner of the property is therefore under this theory no poorer by reason of the entire transaction, as the assessment only takes from him the equivalent of part or all of the special benefit which the public improvement has conferred upon him; or to state it in another way, the special benefits conferred on him by the public improvement compensate him or more than compensate him for the amount of the assessment which he is obliged to pay.” In City of Butte v. School District No. 1, 29 Mont. 336 , 74 Pac. 869 , it is remarked: “The only basis on which special taxation or special assessments