theory underlying rule (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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theory underlying rule in Georgia

7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1940–1999 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Green v. Stategreen
gactapp · 1983 · cited in 6 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1999
2 sentences

1999Citing Green, supra, the Supreme Court also discussed the theory underlying the rule that a court commits reversible error in failing to charge on circumstantial evidence, upon request, when the only direct evidence comes from a witness who has been impeached: [W]here both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt is admitted, and the jury is authorized to find that all the direct evidence, in the form of witness testimony, has been impeached, the jury is left to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant based solely on the circumstantial evidence, and therefore must

1993See Green v. State, 167 Ga. App. 548 ( 306 SE2d 354 ) (1983).

56
Robinson v. Stategreen
ga · 1991 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993See Green v. State, 167 Ga. App. 548 ( 306 SE2d 354 ) (1983). *903 The Supreme Court noted in Robinson v. State, 261 Ga. 698 ( 410 SE2d 116 ) (1991), that it was impossible to determine whether the jury found the state's witnesses had not been impeached and thus based its verdict on the direct evidence, or whether the jury found that the state's witnesses had been impeached and thus based its verdict on circumstantial evidence (giving rise to a need for a jury charge on circumstantial evidence).

1993See Green v. State, 167 Ga. App. 548 ( 306 SE2d 354 ) (1983). *903 The Supreme Court noted in Robinson v. State, 261 Ga. 698 ( 410 SE2d 116 ) (1991), that it was impossible to determine whether the jury found the state's witnesses had not been impeached and thus based its verdict on the direct evidence, or whether the jury found that the state's witnesses had been impeached and thus based its verdict on circumstantial evidence (giving rise to a need for a jury charge on circumstantial evidence).

11
Stanley v. Stategreen
ga · 1977 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991See also, Stanley v. State, 239 Ga. 260, 261 , 236 S.E.2d 611 (1977), which adopted the rule in Horne, supra. The theory underlying this rule is that where both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt is admitted, and the jury is authorized to find that all the direct evidence, in the form of witness testimony, has been impeached, the jury is left to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant based solely on the circumstantial evidence, and therefore must have some guidance on the quantum of circumstantial evidence which will authorize a conviction.

1991See also, Stanley v. State, 239 Ga. 260, 261 , 236 S.E.2d 611 (1977), which adopted the rule in Horne, supra. The theory underlying this rule is that where both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt is admitted, and the jury is authorized to find that all the direct evidence, in the form of witness testimony, has been impeached, the jury is left to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant based solely on the circumstantial evidence, and therefore must have some guidance on the quantum of circumstantial evidence which will authorize a conviction.

11
Horne v. Stategreen
gactapp · 1956 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991See also Stanley v. State, 239 Ga. 260, 261 ( 236 SE2d 611 ) (1977), which adopted the rule in Horne, supra. The theory underlying this rule is that where both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt is admitted, and the jury is authorized to find that all the direct evidence, in the form of witness testimony, has been impeached, the jury is left to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant based solely on the circumstantial evidence, and therefore must have some guidance on the quantum of circumstantial evidence which will authorize a conviction.

11
Harrell v. Parkergreen
ga · 1938 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1940–1940
2 sentences

1940Harrell v. Parker, 186 Ga. 760, 769 ( 198 S. E. 776 ).

1940Harrell v. Parker, 186 Ga. 760, 769 ( 198 S. E. 776 ).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Where else courts name it

CA 70 (1941–2026) IN 19 (1999–2024) NJ 12 (1955–2025) WA 11 (1925–2026) NY 10 (1937–2002) TX 9 (1966–2017) MT 8 (1925–1998) GA 7 (1940–1999) WI 5 (1989–2013) RI 5 (1971–2005) MD 5 (1984–2012) IL 4 (1980–2026) OH 4 (1975–2016) DC 3 (1978–1994) LA 3 (1934–1962) MA 3 (1975–2001) MI 3 (1986–2019) IA 3 (1930–2017) NH 2 (1988–2002) HI 2 (1952–1996) MO 2 (1999–2005) OK 2 (1938–1954) ME 2 (1978–1979) CT 2 (1942–1993) NC 2 (1974–2005) CO 2 (2020–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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