theory underlying rule in Texas

2017Mere relevance or a contradiction in position, without more, is insufficient for *90 offensive-use waiver; instead, the privileged information “must go to the very heart of the affirmative relief sought.” Davis, 856 S.W.2d at 163 .

2017Airlines, 155 S.W.3d at 624 ; In re United Supermarkets, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 619, 621 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, orig. proceeding) (“The theory underlying the waiver of a privilege by its offensive use is that a party who is seeking affirmative relief should not be permitted to maintain an action, and at the •' same time, maintain evidentiary privileges that protect from discovery outcome determinative information not otherwise available to the other party.”).

2000Denton, 897 S.W.2d at 761 .

1999Rule ... 702.” Id. at 768 .

1995Id. 14 .

1981The theory underlying this rule is explained in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155-56 , 96 S.Ct. 1989, 1993-1994 , 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976), which involved a question similar to that now before us.

1981The theory underlying this rule is explained in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155-56 , 96 S.Ct. 1989, 1993-1994 , 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976), which involved a question similar to that now before us.

1968Cf. Riha v. Osterritter, 61 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1933, writ ref’d).

1966City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Construction Co., 136 Tex. 315 , 150 S.W.2d 989 .” See also the opinion in Hines v. Parks, 128 Tex. 289 , 96 S.W.2d 970 (1936), which discusses the history and purpose of Article 2211, V.A.C.S., enacted in 1931, and since 1941 carried forward unchanged as Rule 301, T.R.C.P.

1966City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Construction Co., 136 Tex. 315 , 150 S.W.2d 989 .” See also the opinion in Hines v. Parks, 128 Tex. 289 , 96 S.W.2d 970 (1936), which discusses the history and purpose of Article 2211, V.A.C.S., enacted in 1931, and since 1941 carried forward unchanged as Rule 301, T.R.C.P.

1966Consistent with the theory underlying rule 301, that the error of an improper decision should be corrected in the trial court, that court may, by the better view, set aside such judgment before it becomes final and grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.” In Hann v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn., 312 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1958, n. w. h.), the court held as follows: “The rules do not provide for a time limit on the filing and passing upon of a motion non obstante veredicto, therefore, such motion may be filed even after the court has rendered judgment

1966Consistent with the theory underlying rule 301, that the error of an improper decision should be corrected in the trial court, that court may, by the better view, set aside such judgment before it becomes final and grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.” In Hann v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn., 312 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1958, n. w. h.), the court held as follows: “The rules do not provide for a time limit on the filing and passing upon of a motion non obstante veredicto, therefore, such motion may be filed even after the court has rendered judgment

1966City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Construction Co., 136 Tex. 315 , 150 S.W.2d 989 .” See also the opinion in Hines v. Parks, 128 Tex. 289 , 96 S.W.2d 970 (1936), which discusses the history and purpose of Article 2211, V.A.C.S., enacted in 1931, and since 1941 carried forward unchanged as Rule 301, T.R.C.P.

1966City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Construction Co., 136 Tex. 315 , 150 S.W.2d 989 .” See also the opinion in Hines v. Parks, 128 Tex. 289 , 96 S.W.2d 970 (1936), which discusses the history and purpose of Article 2211, V.A.C.S., enacted in 1931, and since 1941 carried forward unchanged as Rule 301, T.R.C.P.